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NEW SECURITY NOTIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES THROUGH GENERIC
TRANSFORMATIONS AMONG DIFFERENT PRIMITIVES
YUSUKE SAKAI
ABSTRACT
Recent years have witnessed an active research on cryptographic primitives with complex
functionality beyond simple encryption or authentication. A cryptographic primitive is re-
quired to be proposed together with a formal model of its usage and a rigorous proof of
security under that model.
This approach has suered from the two drawbacks: (1) security models are defined in
a very specific manner for each primitive, which situation causes the relationship between
these security models not to be very clear, and (2) no comprehensive ways to confirm that a
formal model of security really captures every possible scenarios in practice.
This research relaxes these two drawbacks by the following approach: (1) By observing
the fact that a cryptographic primitive A should be crucial for constructing another primitive
B, we identify an easy-to-understand approach for constructing various cryptographic prim-
itives. (2) Consider a situation in which there are closely related cryptographic primitives A
and B, and the primitive A has no known security requirement that corresponds to some well-
known security requirement (b) for the latter primitive B. We argue that this situation suggests
that this unknown security requirement for A can capture some practical attack. This enables
us to detect unknown threats for various cryptographic primitives that have been missed by
the current security models.
Following this approach, we identify an overlooked security threat for a cryptographic
primitive called group signature. Furthermore, we apply the methodology (2) to the “revo-
cable” group signature and obtain a new extension of public-key encryption which allows to
restrict a plaintext that can be securely encrypted.
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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In the recent highly-computerized society, information security is increasingly important.
Among various information security technologies, the public-key encryption for secret mes-
sage transmission and the digital signature for message integrity are the central tools for
secure communications.
In addition to these fundamental primitives, more sophisticated cryptography than the sim-
ple encryption or authentication, is also the target of active research (These cryptographic
schemes are often called cryptographic primitives or simply primitives). Group signature,
which is a “anonymous” authentication, is a typical example of such cryptographic primi-
tives. For public-key encryption, various extensions, that are suitable for various types of
multiparty computation, are also the target of actively research. Although most of these so-
phisticated cryptographic primitives are far from a practical use, some of them are almost
ready to use in practice, as their standardization processes are almost complete.
1.1.1 The “Provable Security” Framework
The “provable security” framework is a nowadays standard approach for analyzing cryp-
tographic schemes. In this framework, we first describe a mathematical “model” for the
practical use of the cryptographic primitive to be analyzed, and after that we provide a math-
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ematical prove that any attempt to attack which can be mounted under the model will fail.
This approach provides a useful tool to specify “what level of security is achieved” by the
cryptographic scheme and to validate the security claim of the scheme in a rigorous way.
1.1.2 The Problem and Our Approach
However, even the provable security framework has suered from several weakness. The
most important drawback is that the security model for various cryptographic primitives
(sometimes they are called as “security notion”) have been defined in an ad hoc and primitive-
specific manner. This situation is not very satisfiable, as it tends to cause a bunch of extension
of primitives, their security notions, and ad hoc constructions of these primitives. The worse
thing is, it often occurs that once researcher defines a security notions for some primitive, they
tend to stick to constructing a scheme that satisfying this security notion and not to explore
further practical threats that are not included in the current security notion.
To relax the above drawbacks, this research takes the following approach.
 By clarifying the relationship among security notions of dierent cryptographic prim-
itives, we try to identify techniques in common among various primitives and tech-
niques specific to some primitives, even for quite complex primitives.
 we try to clarify the relative strength of various security notions (in particular, in the
form of any scheme that satisfies some security notion can be generically transformed
to another scheme that satisfies a dierent security notion).
This approach is not only interesting in a theoretical point of view, but we below argue that it
is also helpful for the above-mentioned problems.
1.1.3 The Benefit of Our Approach
In the following we describe the merit of our approach.
(I) Guidelines for Designing Cryptographic Schemes. Firstly, our approach can provide a
useful guideline for designing a concrete cryptographic scheme. In particular, following our
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approach of clarifying the relationship of security notions, when we need to design a new
cryptographic scheme satisfying new security notion (possibly stronger than known notions),
we can easily choose appropriate building blocks, can easily provide precise security proof.
In particular, let us assume that by following our approach, we observe that a scheme with
the new security notion can be generically transformed to another well-known primitive with
a well-known security notion. This can be interpreted as a strong evidence that the latter well-
known primitive is crucial to construct the former, less-understood primitive. Thus it further
suggests that to use the former primitive is a promising approach to construct the latter new
primitive.
In contrast to this, let us assume that any scheme(s) with well-known security notion(s) can
be generically transformed to a scheme with the new security notion. In this case, the obvi-
ous merit is of course that by following this generic transformation we can obtain a scheme
that satisfies the new security notion. However, often such a generic construction will not
necessarily achieve practical performance, and for these cases we will deviate (or optimize)
the generic construction to construct a more practical scheme. A demerit of this optimized
scheme is that we need to provide a security proof for the optimized scheme separately, since
the security proof for the generic construction no longer ensures the security of the optimized
scheme. Fortunately, for most cases, the security proofs for both the generic construction
and the optimized scheme share the basic principle. Then the security proof for the generic
construction can serve as a guideline for the security proof for the optimized scheme.
This approach is potentially useful when we need to move from current (number-theoretic)
cryptography from cryptography based on completely dierent hardness assumption due to,
for example, practical quantum computers. Even for such a case, since our approach identifies
the core technique for various cryptographic primitives, at first we will realize these core
techniques from the new hardness assumptions, and thus over these core techniques we can
re-construct various cryptographic primitives.
(II) More Comprehensive Detection of Overlooked Threat. The other merit of our ap-
proach is that it potentially enable us to identify overlooked practical threat more easily.
This is because investigating the relationship between among various primitives we may find
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closely related two primitives A and B in which the former primitive A has no well-known
security notion which corresponds to a well-known security notion for the latter primitive B.
In this case, we can define a new security notion for A to complement the correspondence
between two primitives. This new security notion might be artificial and of only theoretical
interest. However, if their counterparts well capture some practical threats, it is natural to
expect such new security notions to have practical importance. Moreover, it is plausible for
recent sophisticated cryptographic primitives with quite complex usage to having overlooked
practical threats.
1.2 Contributions
This section describes the contribution of this thesis.
1.2.1 On Public-key Encryption with Non-interactive Opening
The first part of the contribution is on the relationship among the primitive called public-
key encryption with non-interactive opening (PEKNO) [DHKT08] and other cryptographic
primitives.
1.2.1.1 Application to Group Signature
Group signature is a cryptographic primitive for anonymous authentication. It is well-known
that a group signature scheme can be constructed from a combination of a public-key
encryption scheme (satisfying a certain security notion) and other cryptographic primi-
tives [BMW03, BSZ05, AW04, OFHO09].
We will investigate this relationship between group signature and public-key encryption,
from the viewpoint (II) of the above. In particular, we observed that the security levels
achieved by PKENO (PKENO can be seen as an extension of public-key encryption with
a stronger security notion) will not correspond to any known security notions for group sig-
nature, and thus from the viewpoint (II) we will obtain a new security notion for group sig-
nature (We name this opening soundness). We stress that this security notion is not included
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in the Bellare-Shi-Zhang model, which it a currently standard security definition for group
signature.
Furthermore, we also argue that opening soundness captures several threat of practical
importance. For example, the lack of opening soundness will be crucial in an anonymous
auctions using group signature (it is a typical and well-known application of group signa-
ture [ACJT00]). We will discuss that if the group signature scheme does not have opening
soundness, it is possible for a malicious bidder who did not bid the highest price to claim
falsely in a publicly verifiable way that he bid the highest price.
In addition to this, from the viewpoint (I), we will investigate what is a crucial building
block for achieving opening soundness. Firstly, we will construct group signature schemes
with opening soundness, using techniques of PKENO. In contrast, we also shows that any
group signature scheme that satisfies opening soundness can be transformed to a PKENO
scheme. Following the viewpoint (I), these two result shows that PKENO is a crucial tool for
achieving opening soundness.
1.2.1.2 Applications to Threshold Encryption
Threshold (public-key) encryption is an extension of public-key encryption which divides a
secret keys of public-key encryption into several decryption servers to avoid a single point of
failure. As the name suggest, a ciphertext can be decrypted if decryption servers more than
some threshold cooperate. Robustness is a security notion for threshold encryption, which
intuitively requires that any deviation from the protocol of decryption server can be detected.
We will investigate the robustness notion from the viewpoint (I) of the above.
Galindo et al. showed that a robust threshold encryption scheme can be constructed from
any secure PKENO scheme [GLF+10]. Following the viewpoint (I), their result suggests
that using PKENO is crucial to for constructing TPKE. The other direction, however, is not
clearly and exhaustively stated in the literature.
We will investigate the latter direction, and will show that from any PKENO scheme we
can construct a robust threshold encryption scheme. From the viewpoint (I) this result can be
interpreted as the evidence for the equivalence between the existence of PKENO and that of
robust threshold encryption, and will provide a useful suggestion for constructing both robust
– 7 –
threshold encryption and PKENO.
1.2.2 On Revocable Group Signature
Revocable group signature is an extension of group signatures with an additional functionality
for securely expires some secret keys for authentication. As mentioned above, a group sig-
nature scheme can be constructed using public-key encryption as a building block [BMW03,
BSZ05, AW04, OFHO09]. The viewpoint (II) suggests that this relationship between group
signature and public-key encryption can be extended to revocable group signature, and when
doing so we have some extended functionality for public-key encryption.
By promoting this idea, we will present a new extension of public-key encryption called
restrictive public-key encryption (restrictive PKE), which enable us to restrict plaintext that
is securely encrypted. Furthermore, an ecient construction of restrictive PKE from using
techniques of revocable group signature schemes.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary
In this chapter we introduce notations and definitions used throughout this thesis.
2.1 Public-key Encryption and Its Extensions
2.1.1 Chosen-ciphertext Secure Public-key Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme (PKg;PEnc;PDec) consists of the following three proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
PKg. The key-generation algorithm PKg takes as input the security parameter 1 and out-
puts a pair (ek; dk) of the encryption key and the decryption key. The encryption key
ek implicitly specifies the message spaceMek, which determines the set of plaintexts
that can be encrypted under that encryption key.
PEnc. The encryption algorithm PEnc takes as input an encryption key ek and a plaintext
m 2 Mek and outputs a ciphertext c.
PDec. The decryption algorithm PDec takes as input a decryption key dk and a ciphertext
c and outputs a plaintext m 2 Mek or a special symbol ? indicating the decryption
failure.
A public-key encryption scheme is required to satisfy the following correctness condition:
for all  2 N, all (ek; dk)  PKg(1), all m 2 Mek, it holds that PDec(dk;PEnc(ek;m)) = m
– 9 –
with probability one.
Chosen-ciphertext security [NY90, RS92] is a nowadays standard security notion for
public-key encryption schemes. This security notion intuitively requires that even when an
adversary knows the decryption result of some ciphertexts of her choice, it does not help her
for recovering the plaintext of any other ciphertext. The formal definition of this notion is
defined by the following experiment.
ExpCCA(A1;A2)():
b f0; 1g
(ek; dk) PKg(1)
(m0;m1; state) A1PDec(dk;)(ek)
c  PEnc(ek;mb)
b0  A2PDec(dk;)(state; c)
return b = b0
In the experiment, the adversary (A1;A2) is required to output m0 and m1 which satisfy
jm0j = jm1j, andA2 is required not to submit c to its oracle.
Definition 2.1. A public-key encryption scheme (PKg;PEnc;PDec) is chosen-ciphertext
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (A1;A2) the advantage
AdvCCA(A1;A2)() = j2  Pr[ExpCCA(A1;A2)() = 1]   1j is negligible in .
2.1.2 Tag-based Encryption
Tag-based encryption [MRY04] is an extension of public-key encryption. It allows a sender to
associate the ciphertext with an arbitrary string called the tag, and the decryption is performed
under some specific tag. The formal syntax is as follows.
TKg. The key-generation algorithm PKg takes as input the security parameter 1 and out-
puts a pair (ek; dk) of the encryption key and the decryption key. The encryption key
ek implicitly specifies the message spaceMek, which determines the set of plaintexts
that can be encrypted under that encryption key.
TEnc. The encryption algorithm PEnc takes as input an encryption key ek, a tag t, a plain-
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text m 2 Mek and outputs a ciphertext c associated with the tag t.
TDec. The decryption algorithm PDec takes as input a decryption key dk, a tag t, and a
ciphertext c and outputs a plaintext m 2 Mek or a special symbol ? indicating the
decryption failure.
We require a tag-based encryption scheme to satisfy the following correctness condi-
tion: for all  2 N, all (ek; dk)  TKg(1), all m 2 Mek, and any tag t it holds that
TDec(dk; t;TEnc(ek; t;m)) = m with probability one.
In this thesis we will utilize the security notion for tag-based encryption schemes called
selective-tag weak chosen-ciphertext security [Kil06]. This notion is formally defined by the
following experiment.
ExpsTag-wCCA(A1;A2;A3)():
b f0; 1g
(t; state1) A1(1)
(ek; dk) TKg(1)
(m0;m1; state2) A2TDec(dk;;)(state1; ek)
c  TEnc(ek; t;mb)
b0  A3TDec(dk;;)(state2; c)
return b = b0
In the experiment, the adversary (A1;A2;A3) is required to output m0 and m1 which satisfy
jm0j = jm0j, and not to submit any decryption query of the form (t; c) with any c throughout
the experiment*1.
Definition 2.2. A tag-based encryption scheme (TKg;TEnc;TDec) is selective-tag weak
chosen-ciphertext secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (A1;A2;A3) the
advantage AdvsTag-wCCA(A1;A2;A3)() = j2  Pr[Exp
sTag-wCCA
(A1;A2;A3)(k) = 1]   1j is negligible in .
*1 The name “weak” comes from this restriction. In contrast to this, the (ordinary, non-weak) chosen-ciphertext
security for tag-based encryption only forbidsA3 to submit the query (t; c).
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2.1.3 Public-key Encryption with Non-interactive Opening
Public-key encryption with non-interactive opening is another extension of public-key en-
cryption [DHKT08]. This allows the receiver to demonstrate the decryption result of any
given ciphertext to any third-party, without making the decryption key itself public. Formally
this primitive is constituted by the following five algorithms.
NOKg. The key-generation algorithm NOKg takes as input the security parameter 1 and
outputs a pair (ek; dk) of the encryption key and the decryption key. The encryption key
ek implicitly specifies the message spaceMek, which determines the set of plaintexts
that can be encrypted under that encryption key.
NOEnc. The encryption algorithm NOEnc takes as input an encryption key ek and a plain-
text m 2 Mek and outputs a ciphertext c.
NODec. The decryption algorithm NODec takes as input a decryption key dk and a cipher-
text c and outputs a plaintext m 2 Mek or a special symbol ? indicating the decryption
failure.
NOProve. The proof algorithmNOProve takes as input a decryption key dk and a ciphertext
c and outputs a proof .
NOVerify. The verification NOVerify takes as input an encryption key ek, a ciphertext c, a
decryption resultm 2 Mek[f?g, and a proof , and outputs a symbol> or? indicating
the validity or invalidity of the proof, respectively.
As correctness requirements, a PKENO scheme is required to satisfy the following condi-
tions:
1. for all  2 N, any (ek; dk)  NOKg(1), and any plaintext m 2 Mek, it holds that
NODec(dk;NOEnc(ek;m)) = m with probability one, and
2. for all  2 N, any (ek; dk) NOKg(1), and any ciphertext c not necessarily generated
honestly byNOEnc, it holds thatNOVerify(ek; c;NODec(dk; c);NOProve(dk; c)) = >.
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Basically there are two dierent kinds of security requirements for PKENO schemes, the
first of which is usual plaintext secrecy, and the other is soundness of the proof. The former
is defined as an extension of chosen-ciphertext security of public-key encryption. The latter
has, actually, two variations of definitions, which is relatively weaker and stronger.
The secrecy requirement is defined as a natural extension of chosen-ciphertext security
(of public-key encryption), and is also called the chosen-ciphertext security. The formal
definition of the chosen-ciphertext security for PKENO schemes are defined by the following
experiment.
ExpPKENO-CCA(A1;A2) ():
b f0; 1g
(ek; dk) NOKg(1)
(m0;m1; state) A1NODec(dk;);NOProve(dk;)(ek)
c  NOEnc(ek;mb)
b0  A2PDec(dk;);NOProve(dk;)(state; c)
return b = b0
In the experiment, the adversary (A1;A2) is required to output m0 and m1 with jm0j = jm1j,
andA2 is required not to submit c to its both oracles NODec(dk; ) and NOProve(dk; ).
Definition 2.3. A PKENO scheme (NOKg;NOEnc;NODec;NOProve;NOVerify) is chosen-
ciphertext secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (A1;A2) the advantage
AdvPKENO-CCA(A1;A2) () = j2  Pr[ExpPKENO-CCA(A1;A2) () = 1]   1j is negligible in .
The first variant of the soundness notions is proof soundness. This security notion requires
even an malicious receiver, who possesses the decryption key, to be unable to produce a false
proof that claims that a ciphertext would decrypted to a dierent result than that is actually
is. The exact definition of the experiment is as follows.
ExpPKENO-Sound(A1;A2) ():
(ek; dk) NOKg(1)
(m; state) A1(ek; dk)
c NOEnc(ek;m)
(m0; 0) A2(state; c)
return (NOVerify(ek; c;m0; 0) = >) ^ (m , m0)
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In the experiment, m0 is allowed to be ?. This is interpreted as it excludes the possibility
of producing two dierent proofs for single ciphertext in which one proof claims that the
ciphertext is decrypted successfully, and the other claims that it will be rejected as an invalid
ciphertext.
Definition 2.4. A PKENO scheme (NOKg;NOEnc;NODec;NOProve;NOVerify) satisfies
proof soundness if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (A1;A2) the advantage
AdvPKENO-Sound(A1;A2) () = Pr[Exp
PKENO-Sound
(A1;A2) = 1] is negligible in .
The last security notion is called the committing property, which is firstly defined by
Galindo et al. [GLF+10]. This security notion, intuitively, requires soundness of the proof
to hold even for maliciously generated ciphertexts. As opposed to this, the proof soundness
notion, only requires soundness to hold for honestly generated ciphertext. It comes from the
description of the experiment of proof soundness, in which the ciphertext c is generated by
the encryption algorithm NOEnc but not generated by the adversary. The experiment for the
committing property is as follows.
ExpPKENO-CommitA ():
(ek; dk) NOKg(1)
(c;m; ;m0; 0) A(ek; dk)
return (NOVerify(ek; c;m; ) = >) ^ (NOVerify(ek; c;m0; 0) = >) ^ (m , m0)
In the experiment, the plaintexts m and m0 is required to be in Mek [ f?g. As in the proof
soundness, m and m0 are allowed to be ?.
Definition 2.5. A PKENO scheme (NOKg;NOEnc;NODec;NOProve;NOVerify)
is committing if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the advantage
AdvPKENO-CommitA () = Pr[Adv
PKENO-Commit
A () = 1] is negligible in .
2.2 Digital Signatures
A signature scheme consists of the following three algorithms:
SgKg. The key-generation algorithm SgKg takes as input the security parameter 1 and
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outputs a pair (vk; sk) of the verification key and the signing key.
SgSign. The signing algorithm SgSign takes as input a signing key sk and a message m and
outputs a signature .
SgVerify. The verification algorithm SgVerify takes as input a verification key vk, a message
m, and a signature  and outputs a symbol > or ? indicating validity or invalidity,
respectively, of the signature for the message.
As a correctness requirement, it is required that for all  2 N, any message m it holds that
SgVerify(vk;m;SgSign(sk;m)) = > with probability one.
The standard security notion for signature scheme is existential unforgeability under
chosen-message attacks [GMR88]. This notion is defined via the following experiment.
ExpEUF-CMAA ():
(vk; sk) SgKg(1)
(m; ) ASgSign(sk;)(vk)
return SgVerify(vk;m; ) = > and m is not queried byA
Definition 2.6. A signature scheme (SgKg;SgSign;SgVerify) is existentially unforgeable
under chosen-message attacks if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A the ad-
vantage AdvEUF-CMAA () = Pr[Exp
EUF-CMA
A () = 1] is negligible in .
Another useful notion of security of signature scheme is the strong unforgeability. Th
strong unforgeability further requires that no adversary, given a correct signature–message
pair (m; ), is able to alter the signature  to 0 which is verified as a valid signature for the
same message m. In this thesis we will utilize a strongly unforgeable signature scheme that
resists one-time chosen-message attacks. This requirement is formalized by the following
experiment.
ExpsEUF-OT-CMA(A1;A2) ():
(vk; sk) SgKg(1)
(m; state) A1(vk)
  SgSign(sk;m)
(m; ) A2(; state)
return (SgVerify(vk;m; ) = >) ^ ((m; ) , (m; ))
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Definition 2.7. A signature scheme (SgKg;SgSign;SgVerify) is strongly unforgeable under
one-time chosen-message attack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (A1;A2)
the advantage AdvsEUF-OT-CMA(A1;A2) () = Pr[Exp
sEUF-OT-CMA
(A1;A2) () = 1] is negligible in .
For simplicity, we sometimes call a signature scheme that is strongly unforgeable under one-
time chosen-message attack as a strongly-unforgeable one-time signature.
2.3 Group Signatures
2.3.1 Brief History of Models for GS Schemes
Since its introduction, GS has enjoyed a fair amount of interest, leading to a number of con-
crete schemes being proposed, but also resulting in many kinds of security requirements of
GS schemes being considered, e.g. unforgeability, exculpability, traceability, coalition re-
sistance, framing resistance, anonymity, and unlinkability [CvH91, ACJT00, AT99, CP95].
Therefore, there was a need to consolidate the security requirements of GS schemes, and
in 2003, Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi [BMW03] (BMW) showed that their formula-
tions of full-anonymity and full-traceability are strong enough to capture all the above se-
curity requirements. In addition, they gave a concrete GS scheme in their model based on
a simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system and an enhanced trapdoor
permutation. Although the BMWmodel has made a great contribution towards the modeling
of GS, it has the shortcoming of only considering the static group setting, i.e., the number
of members is decided in the initial setup phase, and new members cannot be added later.
In addition, since the group manager (GM) in the BMW model generates all secret signing
keys, the GM can construct a signature such that the opening procedure identifies an honest
user as the signer, even though this user never signed the given message, and there is further-
more no way for a user to verify whether the claimed result of an opening performed by the
GM is true or not. To address this, Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [BSZ05] proposed a more general
functionality of GS schemes which allows users to join dynamically and the correctness of an
opening result to be publicly verifiable, and defined a corresponding set of security require-
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ments (anonymity, traceability, and non-frameability) which are strong enough to capture all
existing security requirements.
2.3.2 Definitions of the BSZ Model
In the BSZ model, the GM is split into two separated entities: the issuing manager (IM) and
the opening manager (OM). The IM is provided with an issuer key ik, and is responsible
for running the interactive joining algorithm with a user who, at the end of the interaction,
will obtain a group signing key which can be used to sign messages on behalf of the group.
The OM is provided with an opening key ok, and is responsible for running the opening
algorithm which reveals which group member constructed a given signature. The opening
algorithm furthermore provides a proof which shows that the given group member was indeed
the signer, and which is verifiable through a new algorithm called Judge. This functionality
is important to handle a situation in which the OM might be corrupted or malicious. In the
following, we introduce the formal definition of a GS scheme in the BSZ model.
In this section, we briefly review the model and the security notions of group signatures,
presented by Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [BSZ05]. A group signature scheme consists of the
following seven algorithms:
GKg: This is the group key generation algorithm which, on input 1k, returns the keys
(gpk; ik; ok), where gpk is a group public key, ik is an issuing key, and ok is an opening
key.
UKg: This is the user key generation algorithm which, on input gpk, returns a personal
public and private key pair (upk; usk). Each user i will generate a personal key pair
(upki; uski) before engaging in the joining protocol which is described below. It is
assumed that anyone can obtain an authentic copy of the public key of any user. (This
might be implemented via a standard public key infrastructure.)
Join/Issue: This is the pair of interactive algorithms which implement the joining protocol
run by a user i and the issuer. The algorithm Join, which is run by the user, takes
(gpk; upk; usk) as input, whereas Issue, which is run by the issuer, takes (gpk; upk; ik)
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as input. Upon successful completion of the protocol, Join outputs a private signing
key gski for user i, and Issue outputs the registration information of user i which is
stored in reg[i], where reg is a registration table maintained by the issuer.
GSig: This is the group signing algorithm run by a user i, which, on input gpk, a signing
key gski, and a message m, returns a group signature .
GVf: This is the group signature verification algorithm which, on input (gpk;m;), returns
1 to indicate that  is a valid signature on m, or 0 otherwise.
Open: This is the opening algorithm run by the opener, which, on input (gpk; ok; reg;m;),
returns (i; ), where i specifies that the originator of the signature  is the user i, and 
is a non-interactive proof of this. In case the algorithm fails to identify the originator
of the signature, it outputs i = 0. Note that Open requires access to the registration
table reg.
Judge: This is the judge algorithm which, on input (gpk; i; upki;m;; ), outputs either 1 or
0 indicating that the proof  is accepted as valid or invalid, respectively.
The model in [BSZ05] introduces four requirements for a group signature scheme, namely,
correctness, anonymity, non-frameability, and traceability. The correctness notion requires
that honestly generated signatures will be accepted as valid by the verification algorithm, can
be opened by the opening algorithm, and that the judging algorithm will accept the resulting
proof as valid. The anonymity notion requires that no information about the identity of a
signer is leaked from a group signature, even if the signing keys of all group members and
the issuer are exposed. The non-frameability notion requires that no adversary corrupting
both the opener and the issuer, can produce a signature and an opening proof that identify
an uncorrupted group member as the signer, when the uncorrupted group member did not
produce the signature in question. The traceability notion requires that an adversary corrupt-
ing the opener and controlling a group of malicious group members, cannot produce a valid
signature that cannot be opened correctly.
The formal definitions of the four notions are given as follows. We first define several
oracles needed for security notions:
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AddU(i): The add-user oracle runsUKg(gpk) and Join=Issue protocol to add an honest user.
It returns the user public key upk of the user. The oracle add i to the set HU.
RReg(i): The read-registration-table oracle reveals the content of the registration table
reg[i].
SndToU(i;M): The send-to-user oracle at first sets up a user public/secret key pair by
(upki; uski) UKg(gpk) and add i to the set HU. The oracle then allows the adversary
to engage a group-joining protocol of the user i on the behalf of the corrupted issuer.
The message M is sent to the user iwho follows the protocol Join(gpk; upki; uski). The
response of the user is returned to the adversary.
WReg(i;M): The write-registration-table oracle updates reg[i] to M.
USK(i): The user-secret-keys oracle reveals the secret keys (uski; gski) of the user i to the
adversary.
CrptU(i;M): The corrupt-user oracle sets the user public key of the user i to M and add i to
the set CU.
Open(m;): The open oracle returns the opening (i; ) Open(gpk; ok;m;) of the signa-
ture  under the message m.
Chb(m; i0; i1): The challenge oracle returns a challenge   GSig(gpk; gskib ;m). The
users i0 and i1 needs to be in the set HU.
GSig(i;m): The signing oracle returns a signature   GSig(gpk; gski;m) on the message
m of the user i, who needs to be in the set HU.
SndToI(i;M): The send-to-issuer oracle allows the adversary to engage a group-joining pro-
tocol on behalf of the corrupted user i. The messageM is sent to the issuer who follows
the protocol Issue(gpk; upki; ik). The response of the issuer is returned to the adver-
sary. If the protocol is successfully completed, the output of Issue will be recorded at
reg[i]. The user i needs to be in the set CU.
The correctness and security requirements for a group signature scheme are as follows:
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Definition 2.8. A group signature scheme is said to have correctness if
Pr[(gpk; ik; ok) GKg(1k); (i;m) AAddU;RReg(gpk);
 GSig(gpk; gski;m); ( j; ) Open(gpk; ok; reg;m;)
: GVf(gpk;m;) = 0 _ i , j _ Judge(gpk; i; upki;m;; ) = 0]
is negligible in k for any adversaryA.
Definition 2.9. A group signature scheme is said to have anonymity if
Pr[b f0; 1g; (gpk; ik; ok) GKg(1k);
b0  ASndToU;WReg;USK;CrptU;Open;Chb (gpk; ik) : b = b0]   1
2
is negligible in k for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA.
Definition 2.10. A group signature scheme is said to have non-frameability if
Pr[(gpk; ik; ok) GKg(1k); (m;; i; ) ASndToU;WReg;USK;CrptU;GSig(gpk; ok; ik)
: GVf(gpk;m;) = 1 ^ i 2 HU ^ Judge(gpk; i; upki;m;; ) = 1
^ A queried neither USK(i) nor GSig(i;m)]
is negligible in k for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA.
Definition 2.11. A group signature scheme is said to have traceability if
Pr[(gpk; ik; ok) GKg(1k); (m;) ACrptU;SndToI;AddU;USK;RReg(gpk; ok);
(i; ) Open(gpk; ok; reg;m;) : GVf(gpk;m;) = 1
^ (i = 0 _ Judge(gpk; i; upki;m;; ) = 0)]
is negligible in k for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA.
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2.4 Threshold Encryption
Threshold encryption is an extension of public-key encryption [DF90]. This primitive enables
to store the decryption key in a distributed form among several decryption servers, in order for
protection against (possibly accidental) key exposure. The following syntax and definitions
are adopted from Shoup and Gennaro [SG02], Boneh, Boyen, and Halevi [BBH06], and
Galindo et al. [GLF+10]. The primitive consists of the following five algorithms.
ThKg. The key-generation algorithm ThKg takes as input the security parameter 1, the
number n of decryption servers, and the threshold k where 1  k  n and outputs a
triple (pk; vk; (ski)i2[n]) where pk is the public key, vk is the verification key, and ski is
the decryption key for the i-th decryption server. The public key ek implicitly specifies
the message space Mpk, which determines the set of plaintexts that can be encrypted
under that public key.
ThEnc. The encryption algorithm ThEnc takes as input a public key pk and a plaintext
m 2 Mpk and outputs a ciphertext C.
ThDec. The partial decryption algorithm ThDec takes as input the public key pk, the index
i of a server, the decryption key ski for the i-th server, and a ciphertext C and outputs
a decryption share  = (i; ˆ).
ThVerify. The share verification algorithm ThVerify takes as input the public key pk, the
verification key vk, a ciphertext C, and a decryption share  and outputs > or ?.
ThCombine. The combining algorithm ThCombine takes as input the public key pk, the
verification key vk, a ciphertext C, and k decryption shares 1, : : :, k and outputs a
plaintext m or ?.
A threshold encryption scheme is required to satisfy the following correctness conditions.
For all  2 N, any integers n and k (1  k  n), any (pk; vk; (ski)i2[n])  ThKg(1; n; k), it
holds that
1. for any plaintext m 2 Mpk and any k-subset f1; : : : ; kg  [n], if we let
– 21 –
C  ThEnc(pk;m) and i  ThDec(pk; i; ski ;C) for all i 2 [k], it holds that
ThCombine(pk; vk;C; 1; : : : ; k) = m, and
2. for any C and any  2 [n], ThVerify(pk; vk;C;ThDec(pk; ; sk;C)) outputs >.
There are two basic security requirements for threshold encryption schemes: chosen-
ciphertext security and decryption consistency. Chosen-ciphertext security is a natural thresh-
old variant of the chosen-ciphertext security of public-key encryption. Decryption consist-
ency requires even malicious server cannot control the result of entire decryption by submit-
ting a maliciously generated decryption share. Formal definitions are as follows.
Chosen-ciphertext security of a threshold encryption scheme is defined by the following
experiment.
Exp(k; n)-CCA(A1;A2;A3)():
b f0; 1g
(S ; state1) A1(1; n; k)
(pk; vk; (ski)i2[n]) ThKg(1; n; k)
(m0;m1; state2) A2ThDec(pk;sk();)(pk; vk; (ski)i2S ; state1)
C  ThEnc(pk;mb)
b0  A3ThDec(pk;sk();)(C; state2)
return b = b0
In the experiment, the adversary (A1;A2;A3) is required to output m0 and m1 with jm0j =
jm1j. Furthermore, S output byA1 is required to be cardinality k   1, andA3 is required not
to submit any query of the form (i;C), regardless of i.
Definition 2.12. A threshold encryption scheme (ThKg;ThEnc;ThDec;ThVerify;
ThCombine) is chosen-ciphertext secure if for any integer k and n (0  k  n) and
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (A1;A2;A3) the advantage Adv(k; n)(A1;A2;A3)() =
Pr[Exp(k; n)-CCA(A1;A2;A3)() = 1] is negligible in .
The formal definition of decryption consistency is as follows. This definition is actually
the “known secret key” variant, which is originally defined by Galindo et al. [GLF+10]. The
experiment for the formal definition is as follows.
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Exp(k; n)-ConsistentA ():
(pk; vk; (ski)[n]) ThKg(1; n; k)
(C; ((i; ˆi))i2[k]; ((0i ; ˆ
0
i))i2[k]) A(pk; vk; (ski)[n])
return 1 if the following conditions are satisfied:
1, : : :, k are mutually distinct
ThVerify(pk; vk;C; (i; ˆi)) = >valid for all i 2 [k]
01, : : :, 
0
k are mutually distinct
ThVerify(pk; vk;C; (0i ; ˆ
0
i)) = >valid for all i 2 [k]
ThCombine(pk; vk;C; ((1; ˆ1))i2[k]) , ThCombine(pk; vk;C; ((01; ˆ
0
1))i2[k])
return 0 otherwise
Definition 2.13. A threshold encryption scheme (ThKg;ThEnc;ThDec;ThVerify;
ThCombine) has decryption consistency with known secret keys if for any integer k
and n (1  k  n) and any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A the advantage
Adv(k; n)-ConsistentA () = Pr[Exp
(k; n)-Consistent() = 1] is negligible in .
2.5 Target Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
A family of functions is called target collision-resistant if no algorithms, which firstly chooses
an input and then is given a description of a function in the family, can find another input that
produces the same output to the first input. The formal definition we need is as follows: A
function generator HashGen(1`) takes as input a security parameter and outputs a function
H . The family of functions is said to be target collision-resistant when Pr[(x; s)  A;H  
HashGen(1`); x0  A(H ; s) : H(x) = H(x0) ^ x , x0] is negligible for any polynomial-time
algorithmA.
2.6 Commitment
A commitment scheme consists of the three algorithms ComKg, Commit, and ComVerify.
The algorithm ComKg takes the security parameter 1 and outputs a parameter ck. The
commitment algorithm takes as input the parameter ck and a string m, and outputs a pair
(c; r), where c is the commitment string for m and r is the corresponding decommitment
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string. The decommitment algorithm ComVerify takes as input the security parameter 1, a
commitment string c, a string m, and a decommitment string r and outputs 0 or 1, indicating
the decommitment is valid or invalid. It is required that for any ck output by ComKg(1), any
m 2 f0; 1g, and any (c; r) output by Commit(ck;m), it holds that ComVerify(ck; c;m; r) = 1.
As the hiding property it is required that for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
the probability jPr[b  f0; 1g; ck  ComKg(1); b0  AOb(ck) : b = b0]   1=2j is negligible
in , where the oracle Ob, when receives a pair (m0;m1) as input, runs Commit(ck;mb) to
obtain (c; r) and returns c. As the binding property it is required that for any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaryA the probability Pr[ck  ComKg(1); (c;m; r;m0; r0) A(ck) :
m , m0 ^ ComVerify(ck; c;m; r) = 1 ^ ComVerify(ck; c;m0; r0) = 1] is negligible in .
2.7 Non-interactive Proofs
A non-interactive proof system for an NP-relation R 2 f0; 1g  f0; 1g defining
L = fxj(x; w) 2 R for some wg consists of three algorithms (K; P;V), which satisfy the
following correctness and soundness conditions: For correctness, it is required that for
any security parameter ` 2 N, any common reference string crs  K(1`), and any pair
(x; w) 2 R, it holds that V(1`; crs; x; P(1`; crs; x; w)) = >; for soundness, it is required
that for any ` 2 N and any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the probability
Pr[crs  K(1`); (x; )  A(1`; crs) : V(1`; crs; x; ) = > ^ x < L] is negligible. We
will later use three types of proof systems, one which is witness indistinguishable [FS90],
one which is zero-knowledge [MDSMP91, FLS90] and one which is simulation-sound
zero-knowledge [Sah99].
2.8 Number-theoretic Assumptions
Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input 1 generates gk =
(p;G1;G2;GT ; g1; g2; e) where p is a prime, G1, G2, and GT are groups of order p,
e : G1  G2 ! GT is a non-degenerate bilinear map, and g1 and g2 are generators of G1 and
G2, respectively. We call such an algorithm by an asymmetric bilinear group generator. In
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the case that G1 = G2 and g1 = g2 we abuse the notation as gk = (p;G;GT ; g; e) and call this
bilinear group generator as a symmetric bilinear group generator.
Occasionally we will employ groups without eciently computable bilinear maps. For
such groups we further assumes that we can generate such a group with specified order.
Formally, we assume that we have a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Gddh which on
input a prime p outputs a pair (G; gˆ) of (a description of) a group with order p and a generator
of the group. We call such an algorithm by a group generator.
On these group generators, we state the following complexity-theoretic assumptions.
Definition 2.14. We say that the decision linear assumption on a symmetric bilinear group
generator G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, we have that jPr[gk =
(p;G;GT ; g; e)  G(1); u; v  G;;   Zp : A(gk; u; v; g; u; v; g+) = 1]   Pr[gk =
(p;G;GT ; g; e)  G(1); u; v  G;; ;   Zp : A(gk; u; v; g; u; v; g) = 1]j is negligible
in .
Definition 2.15. We say that the decision bilinear Die-Hellman assumption on a symmetric
bilinear group generatorG if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA, we have that
jPr[gk = (p;G;GT ; g; e)  G(1);; ;   Zp : A(gk; g; g; g; e(g; g)) = 1]   Pr[gk =
(p;G;GT ; g; e) G(1);; ; ;   Zp : A(gk; g; g; g; e(g; g)) = 1]j is negligible in .
2.9 Useful Constructions of Cryptographic Primitives
2.9.1 Kiltz’s Tag-based Encryption Scheme
In this paper we use Kiltz’s construction of tag-based encryption [Kil06], which is explained
below. The scheme can be built on bilinear groups. Let gk = (p;G;GT ; e; g) be a group
description. The key generation algorithm chooses random integers ;   Zp and random
elements K; L  G, and sets pk = (F;H;K; L) where F = g and H = g and dk = (; ).
A ciphertext of a plaintext m under a tag t is computed as y = (y1; y2; y3; y4; y5) = (Fr;
Hs;mgr+s; (gtK)r; (gtL)s). The decryption algorithm decrypts a ciphertext (y1; y2; y3; y4; y5)
under a tag t by checking e(F; y4) = e(y1; gtK) and e(H; y5) = e(y2; gtL) and outputs y3=y

1y

2
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if the two equations hold, otherwise outputs ?. This encryption scheme is secure against
selective-tag weak chosen-ciphertext attacks if the decisional linear assumption holds [Kil06].
Another interesting property is that the scheme has public verifiability in the sense that it can
be eciently checked whether a given five-tuple (y1; y2; y3; y4; y5) lies in the range of the
encryption algorithm under a given public key pk and a given tag t by checking the two
equations e(F; y4) = e(y1; gtK) and e(H; y5) = e(y2; gtL).
2.9.2 BB and BBS+ signatures
Here we describe the BB signature, the BBS+ signature, and their related definitions, which
are used as important components in the proposed constructions presented in the following
section.
Definition 2.16. Bilinear groups are a tuple (p;G;GT ; e; g) such that G and GT are cyclic
groups of prime order p, g 2 G is a generator of G, and e is an eciently computable
bilinear map e : G  G ! GT with the following properties: for all g, g0, h, h0 2 G,
e(gg0; h) = e(g; h)e(g0; h) and e(g; hh0) = e(g; h)e(g; h0), and e(g; g) is not the unit of GT .
The description of the BB signature [BB08] is as follows:
SgKgBB(1
): Choose X 2R Zp and g˜ 2 G, computes Y = g˜X , and outputs a verification key
vk = (g˜;Y) 2 G2 and a private signing key sigk = X.
SgSignBB(pk; sk;M): Output a signature F = g˜
1
X+M .
SgVerifyBB(pk; F): Check whether e(F; Y g˜M)
?
= e(g; g).
In our RPKE scheme, to prove M 2 [1;N] we apply the BB signature whose signatures are
represented as SgSignBB(1), SgSignBB(2), : : :, SgSignBB(N). To prove the knowledge of a
BB signature Fk = SgSignBB(k) is as follows: Let g5 2 G (we use g5 for the same purpose in
our RPKE, and therefore for the sake of clarity we use it here). Choose  2 Zp and compute
C = Fkg

5. Then, C satisfies the relation: e(C;Y)=e(g˜; g) = e(g5;Y)
e(g5; g)=e(C; g)k where
 = k. Therefore, we prove the knowledge of DLs  and  to prove the knowledge of
SgSignBB(k). This relation is appeared in the REnc algorithm of our RPKE scheme for the
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relations of C2, C3, C4, and C5. Note that, for C3 and C5, we use the notation g˙ instead of g˜
in our RPKE scheme.
The BBS+ Signature [ASM06, BBS04, FI06] can be described as follows:
SgKgBBS+(1
; L) Choose X 2R Zp and g; g1; : : : ; gL+1 2 G, where L is the length of mes-
sages. Computes Y = gX , and outputs a verification key vk = (g; g1; : : : ; gL+1;Y) 2
GL+3 and a private signing key sigk = X.
SgSignBBS+(pk; sk; (m1; : : : ;mL)) Choose y; z 2R Zp, compute B = (gm11    gmLL gyL+1g)
1
X+z ,
and output a signature (B; y; z).
SgVerifyBBS+(pk; (B; y; z)) Check whether e(B;Yg
z) ?= e(gm11    gmLL gyL+1; g).
In our RPKE scheme, to restrictive message space, we apply BBS+ signature with L = 3
whose signatures are represented as SgSignBBS+(t;m0;m1), SgSignBBS+(t;m1;m2), : : :,
SgSignBBS+(t;mr;mr+1), where (m1;m2; : : : ;mr) are prohibited messages, (m0;mr+1) =
(0;N + 1), and t is the serial number. To prove the knowledge of a BBS+ signature
SgSignBBS+(t;m j;m j+1) := (B j; y j; z j) is as follows: Let g5 2 G. Choose  2 Zp and compute
C = B jg5 . Then, C satisfies the relation:
e(g5;Y)e(g5; g)e(g1; g)te(g2; g)m je(g3; g)m j+1e(g4; g)y j
e(C; g)z j
=
e(C; Y)
e(g; g)
where  = z j. Therefore, we prove the knowledge of DLs , , m j, m j+1, y j, and z j to
prove the knowledge of SgSignBBS+(t;m j;m j+1). Note that proving of the knowledge of t is
not necessary, since t is just used as a serial number in our RPKE scheme. This relation is
appeared in the REnc algorithm of our RPKE scheme for the relation of C1.
2.9.3 Groth-Sahai Proofs
Groth and Sahai [GS08] introduced a framework for very ecient non-interactive proof for
the satisfiability of relations in bilinear groups, including pairing product equations. The
proof system consists of algorithms (KNI; P;V; X). The algorithm KNI(gk) takes a group pa-
rameter gk as input and outputs (crs; xk), where crs is a common reference string and xk is
a trapdoor extraction key for extracting a witness from a proof. The algorithm P(crs; x; w)
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outputs a proof  for an equation described by x whose witness is w. A proof  is verified by
running V(crs; x; ). The algorithm Xxk(x; ) extracts a witness from the proof  which passes
the verification algorithm.
There are two types of Groth-Sahai proof systems, (KNI; PNIWI;VNIWI; X) and
(KNI; PNIZK;VNIZK; X), which respectively provide witness-indistinguishability and zero-
knowledge. The two types of proof systems have identical common reference string
generation algorithms, and can share a single common reference string. Furthermore, there
are two types of reference strings: one yields perfect soundness, and the other yields perfect
witness indistinguishability or perfect zero-knowledge, depending on the type of proof
system. For further details see [GS08].
The proof system has two types of the common reference string, the soundness string and
the witness-indistinguishability string. For both types the string consists of three vectors ~f1,
~f2, and ~f3 of G3, in which ~f1 = ( f1; 1; g), ~f2 = (1; f2; g) with random f1, f2 2 G n f 1 g for
both types. For the soundness string, the last vector ~f3 is set to ~f3 = ~f11 ~f22 , whereas for the
witness-indistinguishability string, it is set to ~f3 = ~f11 ~f22(1; 1; g) 1. On the soundness string,
the Groth-Sahai proof system provides perfect soundness of the proof system, while on the
witness-indistinguishability string the proof system can provide a zero-knowledge simulation
for certain types of a statement (that include the statement that we used in this paper).
Instead, the common reference string can be seen as eight group elements crs = (F;H;U;
V;W;U0;V 0;W 0). It should be noted that F and H essentially serve as a public key of a linear
encryption scheme [BBS04]. This property is exploited in the Groth group signature scheme
(and therefore also in our modification of that scheme). For further details see [GS08].
2.9.4 -protocol [Dam, Cra96]
Let R  f0; 1g  f0; 1g be a binary relation. For (x; !) 2 R, we call ! is a witness of x.
We assume that the following 3-round form, where x is common input of a prover P and a
verifier V , and ! (such that (x; !) 2 R)) is private input to P. First, P sends a message a to V .
V sends a random bit string e0. Finally, P sends a reply z, and V decides whether the proof
is accepted or not. We say that a 3-round protocol hP;Vi is a -protocol for relation R if the
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following hold:
Completeness: If P and V follow the protocol, then V always accepts.
Special soundness: From any common input x and any pair of accepting conversations on
input x, (a; e0; z) and (a; e00; z00) where e0 , e00, one can eciently compute ! such that
(x; !) 2 R.
Special honest verifier zero-knowledge: There exists a polynomial-time simulator, which
on input x and a random challenge string e0, outputs an accepting conversation of
the form (a; e0; z), with the same probability distribution as conversations between the
honest P, V on input x.
In our RPKE construction, we convert the underlying -protocol into NIZK proof of knowl-
edge by applying Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87]. Therefore, we require random oracles in our
construction. We denote such a converted proof as NIZKf! : (x; !) 2 Rg where x is an
instance of the language and ! is its witness.
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Part II
Applying Public-key Encryption
with Non-interactive Opening to
Secure Group Signature and
Threshold Encryption

Chapter 3
Opening Soundness of Dynamic
Group Signature Schemes
In this chapter, we propose a new security notion for the group signature primitive, which we
call opening soundness. As discussed below, this security notion captures practical threats
that will occur in typical use cases of group signature.
The contribution of this chapter falls into the category (II) of our contribution discussed in
Sect. 1.1.3. Namely, the opening soundness notion is obtained by translating the committing
notion for PKENO to a notion for group signature, through a generic construction of group
signature using public-key encryption (together with other primitives).
3.1 Introduction
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [CvH91], allow a group member
to anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group. More specifically, anyone will be
able to verify that a signature originates from a group member, but the signature does not
reveal the identity of the signer, not even to other members of the group. Group membership
is controlled by an authority called the issuer, who handles enrollment of users through an
interactive join protocol. To prevent misuse of the signing capabilities obtained by group
members, another authority called the opener can revoke the anonymity of a signature and
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identify the signer of the message.
Following the introduction of group signatures, a series of dierent security requirements
were proposed for this primitive, each of which aims at addressing a specific security con-
cern by augmenting or refining previous notions, e.g. unforgeability, exculpability, trace-
ability, coalition resistance, framing resistance, anonymity and unlinkability. These security
notions were later consolidated in the security model proposed by Bellare, Micciancio, and
Warinschi [BMW03] who introduce two strong security requirements, full-anonymity and
full-traceability, which imply all of the previously proposed notions of security.
However, a drawback of the model by Bellare, Micciancio, andWarinschi [BMW03] is that
only static group signature schemes are considered i.e. the set of group members is fixed, and
the private key material of each group member is generated in the setup phase of the scheme.
Furthermore, the authority controlling the group (which acts as both the issuer and opener) is
considered to be fully trusted. To address this, Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [BSZ05] extended the
model of [BMW03] to capture dynamic group signature schemes in which a user can dynam-
ically join the group by engaging in a join protocol with the issuer. Furthermore, to reduce
trust in the opener, the model adopts the approach by Camenisch and Michels [CM98], and
requires that the opener produces a non-interactive and publicly verifiable proof that a given
signature was produced by a given signer. The model introduces three formal security no-
tions: anonymity, traceability, and non-frameability. The former two notions are adaptations
of the full-anonymity and full-traceability notions to the dynamic group signature setting.
The latter notion, non-frameability, requires that even if a malicious opener and issuer col-
lude, they cannot frame an honest user by producing a signature and corresponding opening
which identify the honest user as the signer, when the honest user did not produce the signa-
ture in question.
Limitations of Non-Frameability. While non-frameability is a strong security notion, it
only partly covers the security properties one would intuitively expect to gain when the
opener is required to produce a non-interactive and publicly verifiable proof of an opening.
More specifically, the non-frameability notion only ensures that the opener cannot frame an
uncorrupted user by constructing a proof that the user is the signer of a signature he did not
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produce. However, no guarantee is given regarding an opening involving a corrupted user.
This leaves open the possibility that an opening showing that a malicious or corrupted user is
the signer of a signature produced by an honest user, can be constructed. Furthermore, this
might not require the opener to be corrupted or malicious, in which case a malicious user
might be able to independently forge a proof showing that he is the signer of any signature of
his choice.
Depending on the concrete scenario in which a dynamic group signature scheme is used,
the ability to forge an opening proof might become a real security concern. We highlight
several potential threats that this ability gives rise to:
 Signer impersonation. The most obvious threat is signer impersonation. This is a
problem if a group signature scheme is used for an anonymous auction as suggested
in [ACJT00]. In this scenario, the bidders correspond to group members, and when
submitting a bid, a group member will attach a group signature on his bid. The opener
serves as the auctioneer, and will make the opening of the signature on the highest bid
public. This will enable anyone to verify who the winner of the auction is. However,
a malicious bidder may forge a proof of ownership of the signature on the highest bid
and may insist that he/she is the winner.
A similar situation occurs if a dynamic group signature scheme is used to implement
an authentication scheme with identity escrow [KP98]. In this case, a malicious group
member can claim to be the user who authenticated himself to a server (and provide a
proof thereof) when this is not the case.
 Proxy confession. The ability to open a group signature is introduced to keep the
group members accountable of the messages signed on behalf of the group. However,
assume that a signature on some message causes a dispute, but the real signer wants to
avoid being blamed for this. Then the real signer asks (or intimidates) another group
member to forge a proof of ownership of the signature and take the blame.
 Key exposure. Consider the case in which a group member’s private key is exposed
and falls into the hands of a malicious user. This will not only allow the malicious
user to construct future signatures on any message of this choice, but will furthermore
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allow him to claim (and prove) that the original user is the signer of any previously
generated signature.
Our Contribution. We highlight the above described potential weakness of the security
guarantee provided by the formal model of Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [BSZ05]. Furthermore,
we show that this is not only a property of the security model, but that the most ecient
dynamic group signature schemes enable a malicious group member to forge a proof of own-
ership of a signature.
To address this, we propose a new security notion for dynamic group signatures which we
denote opening soundness. We consider two variants of this notion, weak opening soundness
and (ordinary) opening soundness. The former is intended to address the above highlighted
security threats in an intuitive and straightforward manner, and will rule out the possibility
that a malicious group member can produce a proof of ownership of a signature generated by
an honest user. The latter considers a stronger adversary who has access to the private key
of the opener, and who is only required to produce two dierent openings of a maliciously
constructed signature. The notion of opening soundness implies the notion of weak opening
soundness.
As a positive result, we prove that the generic construction of a dynamic group signature
scheme by Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [BSZ05] achieves opening soundness. We furthermore
propose a modification of the scheme by Groth [Gro10] which allows us to prove opening
soundness of the modified scheme. In contrast, we show that the original scheme does not
provide weak opening soundness. In addition, we briefly discuss opening soundness of the
random oracle scheme [FI05, BCN+10]. A summary of our results regarding opening sound-
ness of the above mentioned schemes can be seen in Table 3.1.
Related Work. Since the first proposal of group signature by Chaum and van Heyst, many
ecient constructions have been proposed, most of which are relying on the random ora-
cle model [ACJT00, BBS04, CL04, KY05, FI05, DP06, BCN+10]. Many initial schemes
were based on the strong-RSA assumption. The first group signature schemes based on as-
sumptions of the discrete-logarithm type were achieved independently by Camenisch and
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Table. 3.1 Summary of the results. The mark “?” means it is an open question whether
the scheme has the given property or not. The rightmost column denotes the section in
which the security of the corresponding scheme is discussed.
Opening Soundness
(Ordinary) Weak
Our Variant of [Gro10] Yes Yes (x3.4.1)
Bellare-Shi-Zhang [BSZ05] Yes Yes (x3.3)
Furukawa-Imai [FI05] No ? (x3.3)
Bichsel et al. [BCN+10] No ? (x3.3)
Groth (full version) [Gro10] No No (x3.3)
Lysyanskaya [CL04], and Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [BBS04]. The former scheme is
based on the LRSW assumption, while the latter is based on the q-strong Die-Hellman as-
sumption. Kiayias, Tsiounis, and Yung proposed the notion of traceable signature [KTY04],
which can be seen as an extension of group signature with additional anonymity-revocation
functionalities. One of these functionalities is that of allowing a group member to claim the
authorship of a signature, however, its security requirement does not care about the possi-
bility in which a malicious member falsely claims the authorship of an honestly generated
signature by another.
Constructions which are provably secure without random oracles were only recently
achieved. Besides the generic construction relying on non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proofs for general NP languages, Groth constructed the first concrete group
signature scheme with constant signature size by exploiting the properties of bilinear
groups [Gro06], though signatures are extremely large. Boyen and Waters proposed group
signature schemes [BW06, BW07] whose signature sizes are quite compact. In particular
the latter scheme has signatures consisting only of six group elements of a composite
order group. The drawback of these schemes is that they only achieve weaker security
guarantees, that is, they only provide so called CPA-anonymity in the security model of
Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi [BMW03]. Groth proposed another group signature
scheme [Gro07, Gro10] which has constant signature size (roughly one or two kilobytes)
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and which is provably secure in the dynamic group signature model of Bellare, Shi, and
Zhang [BSZ05] without relying on random oracles.
3.2 Opening Soundness
In this section we give a formal definition of opening soundness. Specifically, we introduce
two variants of opening soundness, weaker and stronger definitions.
The weaker definition, named weak opening soundness, is intended to address the security
concerns discussed in the introduction in a straightforward manner, and will rule out the
possibility that a malicious user can claim ownership of a signature produced by an honest
user by forging an opening proof. The definition is as follows:
Definition 3.1. A group signature scheme is said to have weak opening soundness if
Pr[(gpk; ik; ok) GKg(1k); (m; i; i; s) AAddU()(gpk);
 GSig(gpk; gski;m);   AAddU()(s;; gski)
: i , i ^ i; i 2 HU ^ Judge(gpk; i; upki ;m;; ) = 1]
is negligible for all polynomial time adversaries A, where the oracle AddU is defined as
follows:
AddU: On a query i 2 N, the oracle runs (upki; uski) UKg(gpk), then executes the proto-
col (gski; regi) hJoin(gpk; upki; uski); Issue(gpk; ik)i, adds i to a setHU, and lastly
returns upki.
Note that the adversary is only allowed to receive the secret signing key of a single user
i. Hence, this definition will not rule out attacks involving a corrupted opener, and therefore
cannot contribute towards reducing trust in this entity.
In contrast, the stronger definition, named opening soundness, is intended to rule out the
possibility that an adversary can produce two dierent openings of a signature, even if he is
allowed to corrupt the opener and all the users in the system, and furthermore generate the
signature in question maliciously. The definition is as follows:
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Definition 3.2. A group signature scheme is said to have opening soundness if
Pr[(gpk; ik; ok) GKg(1k); (m;; i1; 1; i2; 2) ACrptU;WReg(gpk; ok; ik)
: GVf(gpk;m;) = 1 ^ i1 , i2 ^ Judge(gpk; i1; upki1 ;m;; 1) = 1
^ Judge(gpk; i2; upki2 ;m;; 2) = 1]
is negligible for all polynomial time adversariesA, where the oracle CrptU(i;M) sets the user
public key of the user i to be M, and the oracleWReg(i;M) sets reg[i] to M.
While the weaker definition provides a minimum level of protection against the type of at-
tacks described in the introduction, we believe that, when applied to the scenarios mentioned
in the introduction, any dynamic group signature scheme should provide (ordinary) opening
soundness to prevent any type of attack which exploits ambiguity of openings, or involves
a corrupted opener. Furthermore, we will show that this level of security can be achieved
eciently by showing that our modified version of the scheme by Groth provides opening
soundness (See Sect. 3.4 for details).
3.3 Opening Soundness of Existing Schemes
We will now take a closer look at some of the existing dynamic group signature schemes,
and highlight the level of opening soundness (ordinary, weak or none) achieved by these.
Note that since the Bellare-Shi-Zhang security model for dynamic group signatures does not
considers opening soundness, a security proof in this model will not allow us to make any
conclusions regarding the opening soundness of existing schemes.
In this section, we will focus on the standard model scheme by Groth described in [Gro10]
(note that the updated scheme in [Gro10] is slightly dierent from the scheme described in
[Gro07]) and the generic construction of a dynamic group signature scheme by Bellare, Shi,
and Zhang [BSZ05]. More specifically, we will show that the scheme by Groth does not have
weak opening soundness whereas the generic construction by Bellare, Shi and Zhang has
opening soundness. We further show that the random oracle model schemes by Furukawa
and Imai [FI05] and Bichsel et al. [BCN+10] do not have opening soundness. Interestingly,
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while these schemes do not provide opening soundness, there seems to be no obvious attack
against the weak opening soundness of these.
The Groth Scheme. Figure 3.1 shows a description of the Groth scheme. Below, we will
expand on the description given in the figure. However, before discussing the implementation
GKg(1k):
gk  G(1k);H  HashGen(1k)
( f ; h; z) G; T = e( f ; z)
(crs; xk) KNI(gk)
(F;H;U;V;W;U0;V0;W0) crs
K; L  G; pk  (F;H;K; L)
(gpk; ik; ok)
 ((gk;H ; f ; h;T; crs; pk); z; xk)
Join=Issue(User i: gpk; Issuer: gpk; ik):
Run the coin-flipping protocol in [Gro10]
The user obtains vi = gxi and xi
and the issuer obtains vi
Issuer: r  Zp
(ai; bi) ( f  r ; (vih)rz)
set reg[i] vi
send (ai; bi) to the user
User: If e(ai; hvi)e( f ; bi) = T ,
set gski  (xi; ai; bi)
Open(gpk; ok; reg;m;):
(b; v; )
 Xxk(crs; (gpk; a;H(vksots)); )
Return (i; ) if there is i so v = reg[i],
else return (0; )
GSig(gpk; gski;m):
(vksots; sksots) KeyGensots(1k)
(Repeat untilH(vksots) ,  xi)
  Zp; a ai f  ; b bi(hvi)
  g1=(xi+H(vksots))
  PNIWI(crs; (gpk; a;H(vksots)); (b; vi; ))
y  Epk(H(vksots); )
  PNIZK(crs; (gpk; y; ); (r; s; t))
sots  Signsksots (vksots;m; a; ; y;  )
Return  = (vksots; a; ; y;  ; sots)
GVf(gpk;m;):
Return 1 if the following holds:
1 = Vervksots ((vksots;m; a; ; y;  ); sots),
1 = VNIWI(crs; (gpk; a;H(vksots)); ),
1 = VNIZK(crs; (gpk; ; y);  ), and
1 = ValidCiphertext(pk;H(vksots); y),
else return 0
Judge(gpk; i; reg[i];m;; ):
Return 1 if
i , 0 ^ e(; vigH(vksots)) = e(g; g),
else return 0
Figure. 3.1 The Groth group signature scheme [Gro10].
details of the Groth scheme, we note that the scheme diverge slightly from the description of
a dynamic group signature scheme given in the Bellare-Shi-Zhang model [BSZ05]. Specif-
ically, in [BSZ05], a user is assumed to independently generate a public/private key pair
(upki; uski), and then afterwards obtain a group signing key gski by interacting with the is-
suer in the Join protocol. In the Groth scheme [Gro10], on the other hand, a user generates
a public/private key pair jointly with the issuer in the Join protocol. The public key for user
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i will be stored in reg[i] by the issuer, and the corresponding private key will be the group
signing key gski of user i. This intuitively corresponds to a scheme in which the user key gen-
eration algorithm UKg is merged with the Join protocol. Note that in this setup it is assumed
that user i and the issuer agree upon the content of reg[i]. To ensure this, it is suggested in
[Gro10] that the user signs the content of reg[i], using a separate signing key, and that an
entry in reg is only considered to be valid if the content is signed by the corresponding user.
To model the security of this type of scheme, a few minor changes are required to the
security model presented in Sect. 2.3. Specifically, the public key upki of user i is simply
defined as the content of reg[i], and we no longer consider the write-registration-table oracle
WReg in the security definitions, but only the corrupt oracle CrptU which allows the adver-
sary to set the public key upki (i.e., the content of reg[i]) to a given value, i.e., the WReg
oracle is simply removed from the security definitions. Furthermore, since the issuer is the
only party which can insert the public key of a user in reg, and the issuer will only do so
upon successful completion of the Join protocol, we no longer consider the corrupt oracle
CrptU in the traceability security definition, but only SndToI which allows the adversary to
interact with the (honest) issuer in the Join protocol, i.e., the CrptU oracle is removed from
the definition. Lastly, the oracles AddU and SendToU will no longer run the algorithm UKg
since this algorithm is not defined for the scheme. With these changes, we obtain a security
model equivalent to the model presented by Groth [Gro10].
We will now return to the implementation details of the Groth scheme. In the group key
generation algorithm GKg, the elements f ; h;T correspond to a verification key of the Zhou-
Lin signature scheme [ZL06], whereas z corresponds to the signing key. Furthermore, pk is a
public key of Kiltz’s tag-based encryption scheme. Note that the first two elements of pk and
the common reference string crs for the non-interactive Groth-Sahai proofs are identical.
In the group signing algorithm GSig, a group member constructs two non-interactive
Groth-Sahai proofs. The first proof , constructed via PNIWI, shows knowledge of a
signature , a verification key v and a part b of a (re-randomized) certificate (a; b)
which satisfy e(a; hv)e( f ; b) = T ^ e(; vgH(vksots)) = e(g; g). The first part a of the
certificate can be safely revealed as part of the group signature since it does not leak
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any information about the identity of the member due to the re-randomization. The
second proof  , constructed via PNIZK, demonstrates that the plaintext of y is same as
the witness  used in . More specifically, the tag-based encryption y has the form
(y1; y2; y3; y4; y5) = (Fry ;Hsy ; gry+sy; (gH(vksots)K)ry ; (gH(vksots)L)sy), while the Groth-Sahai
proof  contains a commitment c = (c1; c2; c3) = (FrcU t;HscV t; grc+scW t). The proof
demonstrates that there exists (r; s; t) such that (c1y 11 ; c2y
 1
2 ; c3y
 1
3 ) = (F
rU t;HsV t; gr+sW t).
When y and c encrypt the same message, there exists (r; s; t) that satisfies above equation,
but if y and c encrypt dierent messages, no such tuple (r; s; t) exists.
The verification algorithm GVf will, in addition to the verification of the two non-
interactive proofs and the one-time signature, verify that the ciphertext y is a valid ciphertext,
using the algorithm ValidCiphertext. This algorithm is easily implemented for the tag-based
encryption scheme by Kiltz (see Sect. 2.9.1 for details).
We will now show how a malicious group member can forge a opening proof which shows
that he is the signer of any signature  produced by user i. As described above, an opening
proof consists of a certified signature  on vksots which is part of . To verify the opening
proof, it is only verified that  is a valid signature on vksots under the verification key vi of the
user in question.
Hence, a malicious user i0 who wants to impersonate the signer of the group signature 
on m, simply uses his own private signing key xi0 to construct a new signature 0 on vksots,
and publicizes this as an opening proof together with his own identity i0. This proof will be
accepted by the Judge algorithm since 0 is a valid signature in vksots.
We formally state this as a theorem:
Theorem 3.3. The Groth group signature scheme does not provide weak opening soundness.
Proof. We describe an algorithm for producing a forged proof: When the adversary receives
the security parameter 1` and a group public key gpk, it firstly issues two queries AddU(1)
and AddU(2) in order to add two members 1 and 2 the group. The adversary then requests
the challenge by outputting (i; i;m) = (1; 2; 0`), and receives a tuple (; gsk2), where  =
(vksots; a; ; y;  ; sots) and gsk2 = (x2; a2; b2). The adversary forges a proof of ownership
by computing  = g1=(x2+H(vksots)) and outputs  (Notice that vksots is taken from the group
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signature ).
One can easily verify that Judge(gpk; reg; 2;m;; ) actually outputs 1, which means that
the algorithm successfully breaks the opening soundness. 
The Bellare-Shi-Zhang Scheme. Below, we will give an intuitive description of the generic
construction of a dynamic group signature scheme by Bellare, Shi, and Zhang [BSZ05].
In the Bellare-Shi-Zhang construction, each group member i has a key pair (vki; ski) of an
EUF-CMA secure signature scheme. The issuer also possesses his own key pair (ak; ck) of
the signature scheme. The issuer signs the message hi; vkii to obtain the signature certi, and
sends certi to the user i. A group signature on a message m by the user i is a pair (C; ): here
C is an encryption of hi; vki; certi; si, s is a signature on m under the key pair (vki; ski), and
the NIZK proof  proves that the plaintext encrypted in C is of the form hi; vk; cert; si and
that cert and s are a valid certificate on vki and a valid signature on the message in question,
respectively. The opener attributes a group signature  = (C; ) to the user i by providing an
NIZK proof  for another statement (i.e., dierent from that of ), which shows the existence
of a decryption key that corresponds to the opener’s public key and that under that key C is
decrypted to hi; vki; certi; si.
This simple scheme provides opening soundness. Intuitively, this is due to the correct-
ness of the public key encryption used to encrypt the signature and the certificate, and the
soundness of the NIZK proof system for . The correctness condition of public key encryp-
tion ensures that given a public key pk and a ciphertext C, the decryption of C is determined
uniquely. Now, let us assume that an adversary of the opening soundness game outputs a
tuple (m;; i1; 1; i2; 2) where  = (C; ) and wins the game. The proof 1 proves that C
decrypts to hi1; vk; cert; si for some vk, cert, and s, whereas 2 proves that C decrypts to a
dierent plaintext hi2; vk0; cert0; s0i for some vk0, cert0, and s0. However, this should not be
possible since the decryption of C under a fixed public key is unique. Hence, the adversary
breaks the soundness of the NIZK proof system.
We show the detailed description of the BSZ scheme in Fig. 3.2. The construction is a ge-
neric construction from a EUF-CMA secure signature scheme (SKg;Sign;Ver), a IND-CCA
secure public-key encryption scheme (EKg;Enc;Dec), a simulation-sound zero-knowledge
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non-interactive proof system (K1; P1;V1), and a zero-knowledge non-interactive proof system
(K2; P2;V2). The proof system (K1; P1;V1) is for the relation
((pk; ak;m;C); (i; vk0; cert; ; r)) 2 R1
() Verak(hi; vk0i; cert) = 1 ^ Vervk0(m; s) = 1 ^ Encpk(hi; vk0; cert; si; r) = C;
while the proof system (K2; P2;V2) is for the relation
((pk;C; i; vk; cert; ); (dk;R)) 2 R2
() EKg(1k;R) = (pk; dk) ^ Dec(dk;C) = hi; vk; cert; i:
The theorem on the opening soundness is stated bellow.
Theorem 3.4. The Bellare-Shi-Zhang construction (Fig. 3.2) provides opening soundness,
assuming that the non-interactive proof systems (P1;V1) and (P2;V2) provide soundness with
negligible soundness error.
Proof. Let (GKg;UKg; Join; Issue;GSig;GVf;Open; Judge) be the Bellare-Shi-Zhang con-
struction. Let us consider an adversary A that is run in the environment of the opening
soundness experiment, and let succ be the event thatA breaks the opening soundness of the
scheme.
We will show that the probability Pr[succ] is negligible. Toward this end we define
three events invalid, non-trace1, and non-trace2. The event invalid is that A outputs
(M;; i; ; i0; 0) such that the group signature  = (c; ) contains a ciphertext c that has
no corresponding plaintext m and randomness r which satisfy c = Epk(m; r). The event
non-trace1 denotes that, for the ciphertext c output by A, there exists no decryption key dk
that satisfies pk = G(1k; dk) and Ddk(c) = hi1; vk; cert; si for some vk, cert, and s, and finally
non-trace2 denotes the same event for i2.
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GKg(1k):
crs1  K1(1`); crs2  K2(1`)
R f0; 1gk; (pk; dk) EKg(1k;R)
(ak; ck) SKg(1k)
gpk := (1k; crs1; crs2; pk; ak)
ok := (dk;R); ik := ck
Return (gpk; ok; ik)
UKg(1k):
(upk; usk) SKg(1k)
Return (upk; usk)
Join=Issue :
Join(gpk; upki; uski):
(vki; ski) SKg(1k); si  Signuski (vki)
Send (vki; si) to the issuer
Issue(gpk; upki; ik):
If Verupki (vki; si) = 1 then
certi  Signck(hi; vkii)
reg[i] := (vki; si),
Else certi := "
Send certi to the user
User:
gski := (i; vki; ski; certi)
GSig(gpk; gski;m):
Parse gpk as (1k; crs1; crs2; pk; ak)
Parse gski as (i; vki; ski; certi)
  Signski (m)
r  f0; 1gk; C  Encpk(hi; vki; certi; i; r)
1  P1(1k ; (pk; ak;m;C),
(i; vki; certi; ; r); crs1)
Return  := (C; );
GVf(gpk; reg;m;):
Parse gpk as (1k; crs1; crs2; pk; ak)
Parse  as (C; 1)
Return V1(1k; (pk; ak;m;C); 1; crs1)
Open(gpk; ok; reg;m;):
Parse gpk as (1k; crs1; crs2; pk; ak)
Parse ok as (dk;R)
Parse  as (C; 1)
M  Decdk(C)
Parse M as hi; vk; cert; i
If reg[i] , " then
Parse reg[i] as (vki; si)
Else vki := "; si := "
2  P2(1k; (pk;C; i; vk; cert; ); (dk;R); crs2)
If V1(1k ; (pk; ak;m;C); 1; crs1) = 0 then
Return (0; ")
If vk , vki or reg[i] = " then
Return (0; ")
 := (vki; si; i; vk; cert; ; 2)
Return (i; )
Judge(gpk; reg; i; upki;m;; ):
Parse gpk as (1k; crs1; crs2; pk; ak)
Parse  as (C; 1)
If (i; ) = " then
Return V1(1k; (pk; ak;m;C); 1; crs1) = 0
Parse  as (v¯k; s¯; i0; vk0; cert0; 0; 2)
If V2(1k ; (C; i0; vk0; cert0; 0); 2; crs2) = 0 then
Return 0
If i = i0 and Verupki(v¯k; s¯) = 1
and p¯k = pk0 then
Return 1
Else Return 0
Figure. 3.2 The Bellare-Shi-Zhang group signature scheme [BSZ05].
By the union bound, we obtain an upper bound for Pr[succ] as
Pr[succ]  Pr[succ ^ :invalid ^ :non-trace1 ^ :non-trace2]
+ Pr[succ ^ invalid] + Pr[succ ^ non-trace1] + Pr[succ ^ non-trace2]:
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The last three terms Pr[succ^invalid], Pr[succ^non-trace1], and Pr[succ^non-trace2] are
all negligible due to the soundness of the underlying zero-knowledge proof systems which are
assumed to have negligible soundness error i.e. if the event invalid occurs, it is straightforward
to construct an algorithm which breaks the soundness of (K1; P1;V1), and likewise, if either
of the events non-trace1, or non-trace2 occur, it is straightforward to construct algorithms
which break the soundness of (K2; P2;V2).
The remaining part is to show that Pr[succ ^ :invalid ^ :non-trace1 ^ :non-trace2] is
negligible. This term is in fact exactly equal to zero, due to the correctness of the public key
encryption scheme used. The condition :invalid ^ :non-trace1 ^ :non-trace2 means that
there are two dierent decryption keys dk1 and dk2 that correspond to the same public key
pk (i.e., there are random tapes 1 and 2 such that (pk; dk1) = EKg(1k; 1) and (pk; dk2) =
EKg(1k; 2)) but which produce dierent decryption results for a single valid ciphertext c.
The correctness condition requires that if a ciphertext c is honestly generated under a public
key pk, two decryption keys which are dierent but correspond to the same public key pk,
produce the same decryption results. Since the above situation contradicts this requirement,
the probability Pr[succ ^ :invalid ^ :non-trace1 ^ :non-trace2] is equal to zero. 
The Furukawa-Imai Scheme. The Furukawa-Imai group signature scheme [FI05] does not
have opening soundness, which we will show in the following.
The scheme makes use of a group G (with generator g) in which the decisional Die-
Hellman assumption holds, in addition to bilinear groups (G1;G2;GT ) with an asymmetric
bilinear map e : G1  G2 ! GT . In the scheme, each group member i has a public key
Qi = gxi and the corresponding secret key xi. The public key Qi is encrypted in a group
signature with (a kind of) ElGamal encryption. Let (R;V) = (Qigr; S r) be the ciphertext that
appears in a group signature, where S = gs is the public key of the ElGamal encryption. The
opener possesses the decryption key s, and identifies the signer by decrypting the ciphertext.
An opening contains a proof of knowledge of w such that Qi = R=V1=w, where Qi is the public
key of the specified member (The opener uses s as the witness for the above equation).
If the adversary corrupts the opener and two dierent members i and j, the adversary can
construct two dierent openings of a single signature, each of which attributes the signature
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to user i and user j, respectively. The adversary proceeds as follows: At first the signature
is honestly generated by the user i. Let (R;V) = (gxi+r; S r) be the ciphertext contained in
this signature. The first opening is also honestly generated by the opener to attribute the
signature to i. The second proof is generated by computing a proof of knowledge w that
satisfies Q j = R=V1=w with the witness w = sr=(xi+ r  x j). This proof attributes the signature
to the user j. Note that the randomness r for the encryption is reused to forge the second
proof. This is the reason why the adversary needs to corrupt the user i, not only the user j
and the opener.
The Bichsel et al. Scheme. In the Bichsel et al. scheme [BCN+10], a group member re-
ceives a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature on a random message  from the issuer. To gen-
erate a group signature, the member rerandomizes this certificate and computes a “signature
of knowledge” of  on the message m in question. This rerandomized certificate on  and the
signature of knowledge of  on m constitute the group signature.
The issuer should not know the random message , because otherwise non-frameability is
compromised. For this reason, in the group-joining protocol,  is jointly generated by the
user and the issuer as follows: The user i chooses a random exponent i and sends r˜ = x˜i
to the issuer, while the issuer also chooses a random i and computes w˜ = r˜  x˜i = x˜i+i .
This i + i will be used as the random message  mentioned above. To establish a publicly
verifiable connection between this  and the user i, the user i generates an (ordinary) signature
on ki = e(g; r˜) with a key pair which is previously registered in a public key infrastructure.
To open a signature, the opener uses w˜ to identify the user which corresponds to the reran-
domized certificate in the group signature, which is a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature on
the user’s . However, since w˜ makes the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature publicly verifi-
able, it cannot be used as an opening. Instead, the opener produces a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof of w˜ and i such that ki = e(g; w˜)=e(g; x˜)i and provides the signature on ki.
To verify this opening, a third party simply verifies the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
and the signature.
Unfortunately this scheme does not satisfy opening soundness. Assume a malicious signer
obtains a group signature by an honest user, and further obtains an honestly generated opening
– 47 –
of the signature. The proof of ownership contains ki and a signature on this by the honest user.
The malicious signer replaces the signature on ki with his own signature on ki. This forged
opening passes the verification.
3.4 Achieving Opening Soundness
In this section we present a variant of the Groth scheme, which provides opening soundness
(besides anonymity, non-frameability, and traceability).
3.4.1 The Modified Groth Scheme
The High-Level Idea. Let us first consider a general approach for achieving opening sound-
ness.
The opener, who has the secret opening key, will always be able to determine the correct
opening of a group signature. To provide opening soundness, the opener needs to convince
others that a given opening is correct. The easiest way to do that is to make the opening
key public, but this will compromise the anonymity of the scheme. Instead, the opener can
provide an NIZK proof of the correctness of an opening, to convince any third party. This is,
in fact, the approach used in the Bellare-Shi-Zhang construction.
If the opening algorithm essentially corresponds to a “decryption” of a ciphertext contained
in the group signature (this is the case for many existing schemes), we might be able to take
a dierent and more ecient approach. In particular, if the encryption scheme provides
randomness recovering, the opener can simply release the randomness used for the ciphertext
in question instead of an expensive zero-knowledge proof. Any third party will then be able
to verify the correctness of an opening by re-encrypting the relevant information with the
randomness provided by the opener, and then confirm that the resulting ciphertext is the same
as the one contained in the signature.
In the Groth scheme, an opening essentially corresponds to the decryption of a linear en-
cryption scheme. While linear encryption is not randomness-recovering, the opener is able to
release related values which, together with the use of a bilinear map, will allow a third party
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to confirm that the decryption was done correctly. This property will allow us to add opening
soundness to the original scheme. More specifically, in our variant of the Groth scheme, the
opener, given a ciphertext (c1; c2; c3) = (Fr;Hs; vgr+s), reveals gr and gs as a part of an open-
ing. Using the properties of the bilinear map, these values can replace the exact randomness
r and s when checking the correspondence between a ciphertext and a decryption: If a third
party, given gr and gs, wants to check the correspondence between a ciphertext (c1; c2; c3) and
a decryption v, he simply checks whether the equations e(F; gr) = e(c1; g), (H; gs) = e(c2; g),
and v = c3=(grgs) hold. If this is the case, he accepts the decryption as valid.
The above described modification to the Groth scheme will ensure that a verifier running
the Judge algorithm is able to verify that the public user key vi, given as part of an opening, is
the same as the public user key used in the proof  which is contained in the group signature.
This will ensure that two dierent openings containing dierent public user keys cannot both
be accepted as valid for a single group signature. While this property is very close to opening
soundness, it will not address the possibility that two dierent user have the same public
key. To rule this out, we make the following additional change to the Groth scheme: we
let both the verification algorithm GVf and the judge algorithm Judge take the registration
table reg as input i.e. we assume that reg is made public (note that this is allowed in the
original scheme [Gro10]). With this change, the Judge algorithm can simply check whether
the public key, given as part of an opening, corresponds to the public key of more than one
user, and reject the opening if this is the case. However, to ensure that the scheme remains
traceable, the verification algorithm will have to implement a similar check. Hence, we will
simply reject any signature or opening in the case the registration table reg contains repeated
public keys. Note that to preserve correctness, this change also requires us to ensure that no
honest execution of the Join protocol generates repeated public keys.
We note that the used approach to the verification of a decryption result is essentially the
same as that used by Galindo et al. [GLF+10] in the context of public key encryption with
non-interactive opening (PKENO). Furthermore, we note that in [GLF+10], the application
of PKENO schemes to group signature is briefly discussed as a mechanism for simplifying
the construction of an opening. Here, we will show that this approach is able to ensure the
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opening soundness of group signature schemes.
Description of our variant. The Groth scheme can achieve opening soundness with the
small modification shown in Fig. 3.3.
Join=Issue(User i: gpk; Issuer: gpk; ik):
Run the coin-flipping protocol in [Gro10]
The user obtains vi = gxi and xi
and the issuer obtains vi
(Repeat until vi , reg[ j] for all j)
Issuer: r  Zp
(ai; bi) ( f  r ; (vih)rz)
set reg[i] vi
send (ai; bi) to the user
User: If e(ai; hvi)e( f ; bi) = T
set gski  (xi; ai; bi)
GVf(gpk; reg;m;):
Return 1 if the following holds:
1 = Vervksots ((vksots;m; a; ; y;  ); sots),
1 = VNIWI(crs; (gpk; a;H(vksots)); ),
1 = VNIZK(crs; (gpk; ; y);  ),
1 = ValidCiphertext(pk;H(vksots); y),
and reg[i] , reg[ j] for all i , j
else return 0
Open(gpk; ok; reg;m;):
If GVf(gpk; reg;m;) = 0, return (0;?)
(b; v; ) Xxk(crs; (gpk; a;H(vksots)); )
(dF ; dH) xk; (y1; : : : ; y5) y
F := y
1=dF
1 ; H := y
1=dH
2
Return (i; (; F ; H))
if there is i so v = reg[i],
else (0;?)
Judge(gpk; i; reg;m;; (; F ; H)):
vi  reg[i]
Return 1 if the following holds:
GVf(gpk; reg;m;) = 1,
i , 0, e(; vigH(vksots)) = e(g; g),
e(F; F ) = e(y1; g), e(H; H) = e(y2; g),
and FH = y3,
else return 0
Figure. 3.3 The proposed modification of the Groth group signature scheme. The algo-
rithms that do not appear in the figure are exactly the same as in Fig. 3.1.
Theorem 3.5. The modified Groth scheme shown in Fig. 3.3 provides opening soundness.
Proof. Let us consider the game in Definition 3.2, and let gpk be the group public key in
the game, where the key is parsed as (F;H;    ), and let (m;; i; ; i0; 0) be the output of the
adversary. Furthermore, let , , and 0 be parsed as follows:  = (vksots; a; ; y;  ; sots) in
which y = (y1; y2; y3; y4; y5),  = (; F ; H) and 0 = (0; 0F ; 
0
H).
We hereafter show that given a fixed , it must hold that i = i0: Given a fixed  (in particular
y1, y2, and y3), the verification equations
e(F; F)
?
= e(y1; g) ^ e(H; H) ?= e(y2; g) ^ FH ?= y3
– 50 –
uniquely determine F , H , and . Since both  = (; F ; H) and 0 = (0; 0F ; 
0
H) are
accepted by Judge and hence must satisfy the verification equations, we must have that
(; F ; H) = (0; 0F ; 
0
H). Now, since  = 
0 and the equation e(; vgH(vksots)) = e(g; g)
uniquely determines v given fixed  and H(vksots), that vi and vi0 satisfy e(; vigH(vksots)) =
e(g; g) and e(; vi0gH(vksots)) = e(g; g) respectively, must imply that vi = vi0 . Hence, since
vi = reg[i] , reg[ j] = v j for all i , j, we conclude that i = i0. 
The changes shown in Fig. 3.3 yields a scheme which is secure in the Bellare-Shi-Zhang
model i.e. the anonymity, the non-frameability, and the traceability of the original Groth
scheme are maintained. This will be shown in the following.
Theorem 3.6. The modified Groth scheme provides anonymity if the decisional linear as-
sumption holds in G, the one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable, and the hash
function is target collision-resistant.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that have the advantage " in the anonymity game. To bound
the probability " we gradually modify the game played byA. In the following S i denotes the
event that the adversary A successfully guesses the bit b = b0 interacting with the environ-
ment of Game i.
Game 0. Game 0 is identical to the game in the definition of anonymity. In this game we
have that Pr[S 0] = 1=2 + ".
Game 1. Wemodify the behavior of theOpen oracle as follows: If theOpen oracle receives
a valid signature which reuses the verification key vksots from the challenge , then
the game aborts. Due to the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme
(KeyGensots;Signsots;Versots), this modification does not change the success probabil-
ity ofA with more than a negligible amount, that is, we have that jPr[S 0]   Pr[S 1]j is
negligible.
Game 2. We further modify the Open oracle to abort when a queried signature contains a
one-time signature verification key vksots that, when applying the hash functionH , col-
lides with the challenge verification key vksots i.e. H(vksots) = H(vksots). This causes
at most a negligible change in the probability in whichA successfully guess the chal-
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lenge bit due to the collision resistant property ofH .
Game 3. We then modify how the Open oracle obtains a signer identity i: When the Open
oracle is required to open a group signature, it first extracts a witness (b; v; ) from the
proof  using the extraction key xk. However, in Game 3, instead of then searching
for i such that reg[i] = v (which is done until Game 2), the Open oracle searches for i
such that
e(; vigH(vksots)) = e(g; g)
that is,  is a valid signature on vksots under vi. Note that the above verification equa-
tion uniquely defines vi given a signature  and a message H(vksots). Furthermore,
since the perfect soundness of  guarantees that  is a valid signature on H(vksots)
under the extracted v, the vi identified in the above procedure must be identical to v,
and hence, the user identity i returned by the oracle does not vary between Game 2
and Game 3.
Game 4. We now modify how the Open oracle obtains the signature : Specifically, in
Game 4, the Open oracle obtains  by decrypting y with xk, instead of extracting 
from the proof of knowledge . Due to the perfect soundness of  , this modification
produces the same  as in Game 3.
Game 5. Now we change how (; F ; H) is computed. Instead of decrypting y with xk
(recall that xk consists of logg F and logg H), we proceed as follows: In the generation
of the public key of the tag-based encryption, K and L are constructed as K := F
and L := H. The Open oracle then uses  and  to compute (; F ; H) as F :=
(y4=y1)
1=H(vksots), H := (y5=y2)
1=H(vksots), and  := y3=FH . As shown in Lemma 3.7,
this will not change the behavior of the oracle.
Game 6. In this game we switch the common reference string from a string providing per-
fect soundness to a string providing perfect witness-indistinguishability and perfect
zero-knowledge, respectively, for the two types of proof systems used in the scheme.
Since to two types of reference strings are computationally indistinguishable under the
decisional linear assumption, the success probability of the adversary will not change
by more than a negligible amount. Note that this change is possible because the Open
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oracle no longer needs the extraction key xk. Furthermore, in this game, all proofs  
are simulated with the zero-knowledge trapdoor.
Game 7. Finally we change the component y3 in the challenge to a random element in G.
As shown in Lemma 3.8, this will not introduce more than a negligible change in the
success probability of the adversary assuming the decisional linear assumption holds.
In Game 7 we can conclude that Pr[S 7] = 1=2, because the view of the adversary is inde-
pendent from the challenge bit b. Specifically, the challenge (vksots; a; ; y;  ; sots) contains
no information on b. Indeed, vksots is independently generated in the setup, a is distributed
uniformly due to rerandomization, the perfectly witness-indistinguishable proof  distributes
independently from the witness and hence the bit b, y is merely a random encryption,  does
not contain the information on b since it is computed from y and the zero-knowledge trapdoor,
and finally sots is a signature on hvksots;m; a; ; y;  i, which are all independent of b as seen
above. The oracles (Open, SndToU, WReg, USK and CrptU) also behave independently of
b.
Finally we prove that the changes in Game 5 and Game 7 will only introduce a negligibly
change in the success probability of the adversary.
Lemma 3.7. Pr[S 4] = Pr[S 5].
Proof (of Lemma 3.7). We will show that the response of the Open oracle does not change
between Game 4 and Game 5.
Consider a group signature  = (vksots; a; ; y;  ; sots) submitted to the Open oracle. If
the ciphertext y, which is a part of , does not pass the validity check ValidCiphertext, the
oracles in both games simply outputs ?.
Hence, we consider the case in which the ciphertext y passes the validity check. In this case
we can assume that there exist r and s in Zp such that y1 = Fr, y2 = Hs, y4 = (gH(vksots)K)r, and
y5 = (gH(vksots)L)s. We now show that the three equations F = gr, H = gr and  = y3=gr+s
hold in both games, and hence, the openings (F ; H ; ) returned by Open in Game 4 and
Game 5 are identical.
Consider the first two equations. In Game 4, F and H are computed as F := y
1=dF
1 and
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H := y
1=dH
2 . Since F = g
dF and H = gdH , F = y
1=dF
1 = (F
r)1=dF = gr and H = y
1=dH
2 =
(Hs)1=dH = gs hold. In Game 5, F and H are computed as F := (y4=y1)
1=H(vksots) and
H := (y5=y2)
1=H(vksots), where K = F and L = H. Thus
F =
 
y4
y1
!1=H(vksots)
=
 
(gH(vksots)K)r
(Fr)
!1=H(vksots)
= gr
and
H =
 
y5
y2
!1=H(vksots)
=
 
(gH(vksots)L)s
(Hs)
!1=H(vksots)
= gs:
Lastly, consider the third equation  = y3=gr+s. Note that  is computed as  :=
y3=y
1=dF
1 y
dH
3 in Game 4, whereas it is computed as  := y3=(y4=y

1)
1=H(vksots)(y5=y2)
1=H(vksots)
in Game 5. Since we have already established that y1=dF1 = (y4=y

1)
1=H(vksots) = gr and
y1=dH2 = (y5=y

2)
1=H(vksots) = gs, we can conclude that the two computations yield the same
value y3=gr+s. 
Lemma 3.8. jPr[S 6]   Pr[S 7]j is negligible if the decisional linear assumption holds.
Proof (of Lemma 3.8). To see this we construct a simulator that distinguishes a linear tuple
from a random tuple, given that jPr[S 6] Pr[S 7]j is non-negligible for someA. The simulator
receives the description of bilinear groups gk and a tuple (F;H; g; Fr;Hs;R) where R is gr+s
or a random group element, and simulates either Game 6 or Game 7, respectively.
Given gk and (F;H; g; Fr;Hs;R), the simulator constructs a witness-indistinguishable com-
mon reference string on the top of g, F, H together with a zero-knowledge trapdoor, which
can be done because the trapdoor consists of only the discrete logarithms of U0, V 0, W0
with respect to F, H, and g. Then the simulator sets up K, L as K := Fc1g H(vk

sots), L :=
Hc2g H(vk

sots) where c1, c2 are randomly chosen from Zp. The rest of the public verification
key gpk is honestly generated, and the adversaryA is run with input gpk and ik.
When the adversaryA issues an oracle query, the simulator responds as follows: User join-
ing queries, both corrupted and uncorrupted, is dealt with by simply following the real proto-
col. The challenge request (i0; i1;m) is handled by picking a random bit b, computing a and 
correctly from the signing key xib of user ib, computing a ciphertext y as (y1; y2; y3; y4; y5) :=
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(Fr;Hs;R; (Fr)c1 ; (Hs)c2), generating a simulated proof  from the zero-knowledge trap-
door, and generating a one-time signature sots on (vksots;m; a; ; y;  ). When the simulator
receives an open query (vksots; a; ; y;  ; sots), the simulator first verifies the signature, and if
the signature does not pass the verification, it returns ?. In the case the signature is valid, the
simulator computes
F := (y
c1
1 =y4)
1=(H(vksots) H(vksots)); H := (yc22 =y5)
1=(H(vksots) H(vksots));  := y3=FH ;
finds i for which  is a valid signature on the message vksots under vi = reg[i], and outputs
(i; (; F ; H)). If no such i is found, output (0;?).
Finally the adversary outputs a bit b0 and halts. The simulator outputs 1 if b = b0, and
outputs 0 if b , b0.
In the above simulation, if R in the tuple given to the simulator is equal to gr+s, the sim-
ulated oracle response is identical to that of Game 6. On the other hand, if R is randomly
chosen, the simulation is identical Game 7. Hence if jPr[S 6]   Pr[S 7]j is non-negligible, the
simulator’s advantage in distinguishing linear tuples is also non-negligible. 
These two lemmas complete the proof of Theorem 3.6. 
Non-frameability and traceability can be proven more easily since these security notions
do not require simulation of the Open oracle. For non-frameability, once an opening of the
modified scheme that compromises the non-frameability notion is produced, one can obtain
an opening for the original scheme (by simply dropping the extra components of F and
H) which will compromise the non-frameability of the original scheme. The proof of the
following theorems are essentially identical to the original proofs given in [Gro10], and are
therefore not given here.
Theorem 3.9. The modified Groth scheme provides non-frameability assuming the q-SDH
assumption [BB08] holds, the one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under a
weak chosen message attack, and that the hash function is collision resistant.
Theorem 3.10. The modified Groth scheme provides traceability assuming the q-U assump-
tion [Gro10] holds.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have identified an overlooked security concern for dynamic group signatures, namely,
the possibility that a false opening proof can be produced by a corrupt user. To address this
concern, we defined (two variants of) a new security notion denoted opening soundness, and
furthermore discussed the opening soundness of several existing schemes. As a result, we
have shown that the Bellare-Shi-Zhang construction [BSZ05] provides opening soundness
as it is, and that small modifications to the Groth scheme (of the full version) [Gro10] al-
low this scheme to provide opening soundness as well. We have also briefly discussed the
opening soundness of some of the random oracle schemes [FI05, BCN+10], but leave further
investigation of these schemes as future work.
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Chapter 4
On Necessity of Public-key
Encryption with Non-interactive
Opening for Group Signature
Schemes
In this chapter, we proposed a generic construction of public-key encryption with non-
interactive opening (PKENO) from any group signature scheme satisfying the opening
soundness notion.
This contribution is the type (I) of our contribution (Sect. 1.1.3). Namely, by showing
the generic construction, this contribution clarifies a necessity condition for constructing a
group signature scheme satisfying opening soundness. This contribution evidences that for
obtaining a group signature scheme with opening soundness it is necessary to use PKENO
as a building block or to use a complexity theoretic assumption strong enough to construct a
PKENO scheme.
– 57 –
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and Heyst [CvH91], are a popular type of anony-
mous signatures. In a group signature (GS) scheme, a group manager (GM) issues a group
signing key to each member in the group, and by using this key, a member can generate a
group signature on behalf of the group. This signature is similar to an ordinary digital signa-
ture in that it is publicly verifiable using the public key of the group manager, but a verifier
cannot identify the member within the group who constructed the signature. Hence, whereas
it can be verified that a signature originates from a group member, the actual signer will
remain anonymous. To prevent misuse, the GM is able to revoke this anonymity and iden-
tify the group member who constructed a given signature. Besides being interesting from a
theoretical point of view, GS schemes provides functionalities which are applicable in many
practical scenarios, which have led to a rigorous study of both the GS primitive and its appli-
cations in the literature. For example, in a biometric-based authentication scheme [BCPZ08],
a user can be anonymously authenticated by using a user’s biometric trait as a secret key of
a GS scheme. In an identity management scheme for outsourcing business [IMS+06], with
the help of GS scheme, the outsourcee does not have to manage the list of identities of users.
In an anonymous survey system [NS03], the dealer can collect statistical information without
revealing the identity of users by applying a GS scheme.
However, due to its sophisticated functionalities, designing practical GS schemes is gener-
ally not easy, and hence, only a limited number of such constructions are known [ACJT00,
BBS04, DP06, FI06, Gro07]. In principle, a GS scheme can be constructed from any en-
hanced trapdoor permutation [BMW03, BSZ05], but this fact does not immediately imply
that it is possible to construct a practical GS scheme from such a cryptographic primitive.
Similar gaps exist for ordinary digital signatures and pseudorandom generators, for which
there are well-known generic constructions based on any one-way function [Gol01, Gol04,
Rom90, BMG07]. However, these constructions are far from ecient, and stronger assump-
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tions are required to construct practical schemes. Hence, investigating the diculty of de-
signing practical GS schemes goes beyond determining the theoretical minimal assumption
on which group signatures can be built.
The motivation of the present work is to clarify the relative strength of the GS primitive
by investigating the relationship of GS with another primitive of public-key encryption with
non-interactive opening (PKENO). Since PKENO is recognized to be a very powerful crypto-
graphic tool, a close relationship with these will highlight the diculty of constructing group
signature schemes.
4.1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we analyze the diculty of constructing group signatures by showing an impli-
cation result. More specifically, we show that PKENO [DHKT08, Gal09] can be constructed
from an arbitrary GS scheme which is secure in the dynamic group setting and provides
opening soundness [SSE+12a]. While opening soundness is not part of the security model
defined by Bellare et al. [BSZ05], it has recently been introduced in [SSE+12a] as an ar-
guably essential security requirement for group signatures when considering security against
a potentially malicious group manager(s), as done in [BSZ05]*1. Our result implies that this
type of GS is a very strong cryptographic primitive, since PKENO is already a stronger prim-
itive than standard public key encryption (PKE), which itself is recognized as a very powerful
cryptographic tool. Moreover, our transformation is relatively practical, as the resulting ci-
phertext consists of only a small number of group signatures, assuming the message space of
the PKENO scheme is restricted to short messages. This shows that constructing an ecient
*1 Intuitively, opening soundness guarantees that, for a given message/signature pair (m; ), the group manager
cannot convince a verifier that was constructed by one signer while, at the same time, being able to convince
another verifier that  was constructed by a dierent signer. We note that similar security requirements are
considered for other types of signature schemes providing signer anonymity (e.g. partial signatures [BD09]
and convertible undeniable signatures [PKO10]), and that the generic construction of a GS scheme presented
in [BSZ05] provides opening soundness. Note, however, that not all GS scheme which are secure in the model
of [BSZ05] provides this property e.g. [Gro07] does not. See Section 2.3.2 for a formal definition of opening
soundness.
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group signature (in terms of signature size) is as hard as constructing a PKENO scheme with
small ciphertext overhead and a message space consisting of short messages. Furthermore, in
our transformation, not all functionalities of a GS scheme are utilized to construct a PKENO
scheme. This provides further evidence that GS is stronger than PKENO (We stress, however,
that our result does not imply impossibility of designing practical GS schemes.)
From a technical point of view, we do not merely rewrite the functionality of a GS scheme
to that of a PKENO scheme, but develop a dedicated multiple encryption technique for our
conversion which simultaneously enhances eciency and security. Specifically, in our ap-
proach, we obtain as an intermediate result a PKE scheme with single-bit plaintexts, and
need to extend the plaintext space of this scheme to support suciently large message. To
resolve this issue, we make use of our specific multiple encryption technique. We notice
that the existing multiple encryption techniques cannot be applied to our approach since,
for example, the Dodis-Katz multiple encryption technique [DK05] requires that the com-
ponent encryption scheme already has a suciently large plaintext space, and the approach
by Zhang-Hanaoka-Shikata-Imai [ZHSI04] requires random oracles which are known be to
problematic [CGH98]. Furthermore, the Myers-Shelat technique [Ms09] cannot be applied to
extend the plaintext space of our intermediate encryption scheme as the converted encryption
scheme by [Ms09] loses special properties of the intermediate scheme which are important
for constructing PKENO. However, our multiple encryption technique is based on the spe-
cific functionality of GS, and therefore, can only be applied in limited situations (like our
conversions). More specifically, our multiple encryption technique exploits that a collection
of group signatures can easily be bound to a tag by including the tag as part of the mes-
sage being signed by each signature. This property plays a crucial role in achieving a secure
encryption scheme with a larger message space while maintaining a reasonable level of e-
ciency. However, while the property follows straightforwardly from the functionality of GS,
not many cryptographic primitives provide a similar property, which limits the applications
of our technique.
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4.1.3 Related Works
The relationship between GS and PKE has previously been studied in the literature. More
specifically, Abdalla and Warinschi [AW04] gave a generic construction of chosen-plaintext
(CPA) secure PKE (with multi-bit plaintext space) [AW04] from a GS scheme. This result
was extended to generic constructions of chosen-ciphertext (CCA) secure PKE from GS with
an appropriate level of security [CG05, OFHO09]. Our construction are obtained by extend-
ing these results and combining them with our multiple encryption technique to obtain the
functionality of PKENO.
The concept of PKENO was first proposed by Damgård, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Thor-
bek [DHKT08]. This type of scheme allows a receiver of a ciphertext to prove that the
decryption result corresponds to a given message, without compromising his decryption key.
The functionality of a PKENO can, for example, be used to construct a secure authenticated
message transmission system with non-repudiation (introduced in [GLF+10]). If a standard
PKE is used, then there is no way to provide a non-repudiable proof of the origin of a
received message unless the receiver reveals his own decryption key. By replacing PKE with
PKENO, the receiver can provide such a proof.
Concrete PKENO constructions have also been proposed [DHKT08, Gal09, GLF+10,
LDLK10]. A generic construction of PKENO based on identity-based encryption (IBE) has
been proposed [DHKT08] by following the IBE-to-PKE transformation by Canetti, Halevi,
and Katz [CHK04]. Another generic construction proposed by Galindo et al. [GLF+10]
is based on (robust) threshold encryption scheme. However, unlike group signatures, the
building blocks for these constructions (identity-based encryption and threshold encryption,
respectively) are widely recognized as very powerful cryptographic primitives. Further-
more, these constructions will not allow us to draw any conclusion about the diculty of
constructing ecient group signature schemes.
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4.2 Public Key Encryption with Non-interactive Opening
from Group Signatures
In this section, we propose a generic construction of a PKENO scheme based on a GS scheme
which is secure in the BSZ model and provides opening soundness.
4.2.1 Proposed GS-based PKENO
We will now present our GS-based PKENO construction. The basic idea behind our con-
struction is similar to that of Abdalla and Warinschi [AW04] and Ohtake et al. [OFHO09].
More specifically, we let a ciphertext consist of a collection of group signatures. Each group
signature will correspond to single bit of the plaintext and is constructed using one of two
signing keys, which will be part of the public key, depending on whether the plaintext bit
is 0 or 1. The receiver will then use the opening key to determine which signing key was
used to construct the signature and will thereby learn the corresponding bit of the plaintext.
Furthermore, due to the functionality of the group signature scheme, the receiver will also
obtain a publicly verifiable proof of this correspondence, which will be used to implement
the non-interactive opening property of the PKENO. To avoid malleability, the group signa-
tures in a ciphertext will all be signatures on a verification key vksots of a one-time signature
scheme, and the corresponding sksots will be used to construct a one-time signature which
binds the group signatures together. However, this approach requires a somewhat counter-
intuitive measure to ensure that the scheme provides the strong correctness requirement that
a receiver can provide a publicly verifiable proof of the decryption result of any ciphertext.
More specifically, if a ciphertext in the above construction outlined above contains a group
signature which verifies but cannot be traced to one of the two signer keys in the public key,
the ciphertext will be invalid, but the receiver will not obtain a publicly verifiable proof of
this fact. In this case, we let the receiver reveal his private key as a proof of the invalidity of
the ciphertext. Note, however, that if the underlying GS scheme satisfies traceability, such
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group signature will be computationally hard to construct, and this measure will not harm the
security of the scheme.*2 The message space of our PKENO construction is assumed to be
MPKENO = f0; 1gt. The construction is defined as follows:
NOKg(1): Given a security parameter 1 ( 2 N), run (gpk; ik; ok)  GKg(1). For
i = 1; 2, run (upki; uski)  UKg(1), and the interactive algorithms Join(gpk; upki;
uski) and Issue(gpk; ik) to obtain gski and reg[i]. Output an encryption key pk =
(gpk; gsk1; gsk2; upk1; upk2) and a decryption key sk = (ok; reg).
NOEnc(pk;m): For a t-bit plaintext m, let mi 2 f0; 1g be the i-th bit of m. Generate a key
pair (vksots; sksots)  SgKgsots(1). For all i 2 [1; t], run i  GSig(gpk; gskmi+1;
vksots), compute sots  SgSignsksots ((1; : : : ; t)), and output C := (sots; vksots;
(1; : : : ; t)). Note that i is a GS of the signed message vksots under the signing
key gskmi+1.
NODec(pk; sk;C): Parse C = (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)). If SgVerifyvksots (sots; (1; : : : ;
t)) , 1, then output ?. Otherwise, for all i 2 [1; t], if there exists i such that
0  GVf(gpk; vksots; i), then output ?. Otherwise, run ( ji; i)  Open(gpk; ok;
vksots; i; reg). If ji < f1; 2g or Judge(gpk;mi + 1; upkmi+1; vksots; i; i) = 0 for any
i 2 [1; t], then output ?. Otherwise, set mi = ji   1, and output m = m1k    kmt.
NOProve(pk; sk;C): Parse C as (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)). If SgVerifyvksots (sots; (1; : : : ;
t)) , 1 or if GVf(gpk; vksots; i) , 1 for any i 2 [1; t], then output the proof  = ;
indicating an invalid ciphertext. Otherwise, run ( ji; i)  Open(gpk; ok; vksots; i;
reg) for all i 2 [1; t]. If ji < f1; 2g or Judge(gpk;mi + 1; upkmi+1; vksots; i; i) = 0 for
any i, the ciphertext is invalid, but this cannot be publicly verified. In this case, output
sk = (ok; reg) as a proof. Otherwise, output the proof  = (1; : : : ; t).
*2 One might think that it is sucient to output a special symbol, e.g. ?, to indicate that (some of) the signatures
are untraceable. However, this is not the case. In a construction where this approach is taken, a malicious
receiver will be able to claim that a ciphertext, which is actually valid, is invalid by outputting ?. Since a
verifier cannot distinguish between traceable and untraceable signatures, he will not be able to detect that the
claim made by the receiver is incorrect, and if ? is accepted as a valid proof, the verifier would be convinced
that the ciphertext in question is invalid when this might not the case.
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NOVerify(pk;C;m; ): Parse C as (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)) and consider the following
cases:
m = ?;  = ;: If SgVerifyvksots (sots; (1; : : : ; t)) , 1 or if GVf(gpk; vksots; i) , 1
for any i 2 [1; t], then output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
m = ?;  = sk: Compute ( ji; i)  Open(gpk; ok; vksots; i; reg) for all i 2 [1; t]. If
ji < f1; 2g or Judge(gpk; ji; upk ji ; vksots; i; i) = 0 for any i, output 1. Otherwise,
output 0.
m = ?;  = (1; : : : ; t) or m , ?;  , (1; : : : ; t): Output 0.
m , ?;  = (1; : : : ; t): Parse m! m1k    kmt. If Judge(gpk;mi + 1; upkmi+1; vksots;
i; i) = 1 for all i 2 [1; t], output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Note that in the above construction, the dynamic aspects of the group signature scheme is
actually not required since a user will run GKg, UKg, and the (interactive) Join, Issue proto-
col by himself as part of the NOKg algorithm. However, the functionality provided by Open
and Judge, which is normally not defined for a static group signature scheme [BMW03], is
crucial for the construction.
4.2.2 Security Analysis
In the following, we prove that our GS-based PKENO construction satisfies the functionality
and security requirements outlined in above. The correctness of our PKENO construction
easily follows from the correctness of the underlying group signature scheme, so we leave
out the details of this observation.
Theorem 4.1. Our GS-based PKENO scheme satisfies correctness.
Proof. This can be seen by considering the output produced by NODec and NOProve when
given a ciphertext with dierent properties, and how NOVerify will respond to this.
Firstly, consider the case in which the ciphertext C = (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)) has the
property that
SgVerifyvksots(sots; (1; : : : ; t)) , 1
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or
GVf(gpk; vksots; i) , 1
for at least one i 2 [1; t]. In this case, C corresponds to an invalid ciphertext (which can
be publicly verified), NODec will output m = ?, NOProve will output  = ;, and hence
NOVerify(pk;C;m; ) will output 1. In the following cases, we assume SgVerifyvksots(sots;
(1; : : : ; t)) = 1 and GVf(gpk; vksots; i) = 1 for all i 2 [1; t].
Secondly, consider the case in whichC has the property that there exists an index i 2 [1; t]
for which ( ji ; i ) Open(gpk; ok; vksots; i ; reg) and either
ji < f1; 2g
or
Judge(gpk; ji ; upk ji ; vksots; i ; i) = 0
holds. This implies that C is an invalid ciphertext (although this cannot be publicly veri-
fied) and NODec will output ?. Furthermore, NOProve will output (sk; reg) as a proof, and
NOVerify will run Open and Judge to confirm the invalidity of C, and lastly return 1 since
m = ?.
Lastly, consider the case in which ( ji; i) Open(gpk; ok; vksots; i; reg) and both
ji 2 f1; 2g
and
Judge(gpk;mi + 1; upkmi+1; vksots; i ; i) = 1
hold for all i 2 [1; t]. Note that in this case, C is a valid ciphertext, NODec will always output
a message m , ? and NOProve will always output a proof of the form  = (1; : : : ; t).
Furthermore, since Open and Judge are deterministic and are executed with the same input,
if we run NODec, NOProve, and NOVerify, the output of NOVerify will be 1.
Since a ciphertext C must fall in one of the above described cases, we conclude that our
proposed PKENO scheme must be correct. 
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Theorem 4.2. Our GS-Based PKENO scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure if the underlying
GS scheme satisfies anonymity and the one-time signature scheme is OT-sUF-CMA secure.
Proof. The roadmap of our proof is as follows. For a fixed pair of challenge messages, m0
and m1, we define the sequences of games [Sho04] G0;G1; : : : ;Gt0 , where t0 := jfi j m0;i ,
m1;igj is the number of dierent bits between m0 and m1. Let (i1; i2; : : : ; it0 ) be the set of the
positions such that m0;i` , m1;i` (` 2 [1; t0]). The first game, G0, is defined to be identical
to Expind-ccpaPKENO;A(1
) with an exception that the challenge ciphertext is computed using m0 as
a plaintext. In G`, the i`-th bit of m0 is changed to m1;i` , and the challenge ciphertext is
computed using this plaintext. In other words, G` 1 and G` are identical except the i`-th bit
of the challenge message is dierent. The last game, Gt0 , corresponds to Exp
ind-ccpa
PKENO;A(1
) in
which the challenge ciphertext is computed using m1 as the plaintext. We claim that for every
1  `  t0, if there exists an adversaryA that can distinguish between playing gameG` 1 and
game G` with non-negligible probability, then we can construct an algorithm that can break
anonymity of the underlying GS scheme. If this is the case, we can conclude that the output
of any chosen-ciphertext adversary A will only be dierent with negligible probability if A
is given an encryption of m1 instead of an encryption of m0 as a challenge ciphertext. This
implies that the GS scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure.
LetA be an chosen-ciphertext adversary playing either game G` 1 or game G`, and let A
denote the dierence between the probability thatA outputs 1 in gameG` 1 and in gameG`.
We assume that A is non-negligible. Using A, we construct an algorithm B that breaks the
anonymity of the underlying GS scheme.
B interacts in the anonymity experiment for the GS scheme, and initially receives the
public group key gpk and the issuer key ik. First B queries the identities 1 and 2 to the
SndToU oracle, interacts with the oracle running Issue(gpk; ik), and also queries USK(1) and
USK(2) to obtain (upk1; usk1; gsk1) and (upk2; usk2; gsk2). In addition, B generates (vksots;
sksots) SgKgsots(1). B then runsA with input pk = (gpk; gsk1; gsk2; upk1; upk2).
When a decryption query C = (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)) is submitted by A, B answers as
follows: B checks whether all (one-time and group) signatures are valid or not. If there is an
invalid signature, then B returns ?. Otherwise, we consider the following two cases:
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vksots = vksots: We call this case the forge event. B outputs a random bit, and aborts.
vksots , vksots: For all i 2 [1; t],B sends (vksots; i) to the opening oracle, and obtains ( ji; i).
If
ji < f1; 2g
or
Judge(gpk; ji; upk ji ; vksots; i; i) = 0;
then B returns ?. Otherwise, B sets mi = ji   1, and returns m := m1k    kmt.
When a proof query C = (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)) is submitted by A, B responds as in a
decryption query, except that when the indices and proofs ( ji; i) are obtained, B checks that
ji 2 f1; 2g and Judge(gpk; ji; upk ji ; vksots; i; i) = 1 for all i 2 [1; t]. If this is not the case, B
aborts, and we denote this event non-trace. Otherwise, B returns  = (1; : : : ; t).
In the challenge phase, A submits two challenge messages (m0;m1). B responds as fol-
lows:
Recall that, in game G`, the bit at index i` in the plaintext used to construct the chal-
lenge ciphertext is changed from m0;i` to m1;i` . For all k 2 [1; i`   1], B computes k  
GSig(gpk; gskm1;k+1; vk

sots). For k = i`, B submits the identities m0;i` and m1;i` , and the
message vksots as his challenge values, and obtains k  GSig(gpk; gskmb;i`+1; vk

sots) (note
that m0;i` , m1;i` and that the bit b is unknown to B). For all k 2 [i` + 1; t], B computes
k  GSig(gpk; gskm0;k+1; vksots). Lastly, B computes sots  SgSignsksots ((1; : : : ; t )), and
sends C := (sots; vk

sots; (

1; : : : ; 

t )) as the challenge ciphertext toA.
After the challenge phase, A can ask additional decryption and proof queries which B
responds to as above (note that since B aborts when vksots = vksots, B will never submit the
illegal query (vksots; i` ) to the opening oracle).
At some point,A will output a bit b0 which B forwards as his own guess in the anonymity
experiment of the underlying GS scheme. Note that if B’s challenge bit b is 0, then B will be
simulating game G` 1 toA, whereas if b = 1, B will be simulating game G` toA. Since the
simulation is perfect assuming B does not abort, B breaks the anonymity of the GS scheme
– 67 –
with probability at least
AdvanonGS;B  jA   Pr[forge]   Pr[non-trace]j
Recall that A is assumed to be non-negligible. To complete the proof, we show that Pr[forge]
and Pr[non-trace] are negligible assuming the used one-time signature scheme is OT-sUF-
CMA secure and the GS scheme satisfies traceability. This implies that B will break the
anonymity of the GS scheme with non-negligible probability.
We first show that Pr[forge] is negligible by constructing an algorithm B0 which interacts
with A and breaks the OT-sUF-CMA security of the one-time signature scheme if forge
occurs. B0 is constructed as follows.
Initially, B0 is given a verification key vk from the OT-sUF-CMA experiment,
which B0 will use as vksots in the interaction with A. Firstly, B0 generates (pk; sk)
 NOKg(1) and runs A with input pk. Note that since A knows sk, all decryption and
proof queries can trivially be answered. If forge occurs before the challenge phase, A will
submit a decryption or proof query C = (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)) for which vksots = vksots
and sots is a valid signature on (1; : : : ; t) under vksots. Hence, B0 outputs sots and
m = (1; : : : ; t), and breaks the OT-sUF-CMA security of the one-time signature scheme.
Otherwise, A will submit two challenge messages, m0 and m1. B0 picks b  f0; 1g,
computes i  GSig(gpk; gskmb;i+1; vksots) for i 2 [1; t], and submits (1; : : : ; t ) to his
one-time signing oracle to obtain sots. Lastly, B0 forwards C = (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t ))
to A. If, after the challenge phase, forge occurs, B0 breaks the OT-sUF-CMA security as
above. Note that the forgery output by B0 will be a valid forgery since C , C implies that
(sots; (1; : : : ; t)) , (sots; (1; : : : ; 

t )).
Hence, B0 will break the OT-sUF-CMA security of the one-time signature scheme when-
ever forge occurs.
Lastly, we show that Pr[non-trace] is negligible by constructing an algorithm B00 which
interacts with A and breaks the traceability of the GS scheme whenever non-trace occurs.
B00 is constructed as follows.
Initially, B00 is given (gpk; ok) as input and have access to the oracles O = fSndToU(; );
AddU();RReg();USK();CrptU(; )g. B makes queries AddU(1), AddU(2), RReg(1),
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RReg(2), USK(1), and USK(2) to its oracles to obtain (upk1; usk1; gsk1), (upk2; usk2; gsk2)
and reg. Then B sets pk  (gpk; gsk1; gsk2; upk1; upk2), sk  (ok; reg), and runs A with
input pk. Note that B00 can trivially answer all decryption and proof queries since B00
knows sk. If non-trace occurs, A submits a decryption or proof query C = (sots; vksots;
(1; : : : ; t)) such that if we compute ( ji; i) Open(gpk; ok; vksots; i; reg), then exists an i
such that either ji < f1; 2g or Judge(gpk;mi + 1; upkmi+1; vksots; i; i) = 0. This is exactly the
winning condition in the traceability experiment, and B00 returns m = vksots and i to break
the traceability of the GS scheme.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.3. Our GS-Based PKENO scheme satisfies proof soundness if the underlying
GS scheme satisfies opening soundness and correctness, and the one-time signature scheme
satisfies correctness.
Proof. LetA be an adversary who breaks proof soundness of our GS-based PKENO scheme.
Using A, we construct an algorithm B that breaks opening soundness of the underlying GS
scheme. B is constructed as follows.
Initially, B receives gpk, ok, and ik from the opening soundness experiment of the under-
lying GS scheme. B then makes (upk1; usk1; gsk1), (upk2; usk2; gsk2), and reg using ik, and
makes four queries CrptU(1; upk1), CrptU(2; upk2), WReg(1; reg[1]), and WReg(2; reg[2]).
Lastly, B sets pk = (gpk; gsk1; gsk2; upk1; upk2) and sk = (ok; reg), and runs A with input
(pk; sk).
At some point, A sends a challenge message m to B which parses m as m := m1k    kmt.
B then generates (vksots; sksots)  SgKgsots(1), and computes i  GSig(gpk;
gskmi+1; vksots) for all i 2 [1; t]. Lastly, B computes sots  
SgSignsksots ((1; : : : ; t)), and sends the ciphertext C := (sots; vksots; (1; : : : ; t)) to
A.
After receiving C, A will output a message m0 and a proof 0. The definition of proof
soundness requires that the output of a successful adversary satisfiesNOVerify(pk;C;m0; 0) =
1 and m , m0. We first consider the case in which (m0; 0) = (?; ;). Note that due to the
correctness of the one-time signature scheme and the group signature scheme, it must be the
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case that SgVerifysksots (sots; (1; : : : ; t)) = 1 and GVf(gpk; vksots; i) = 1 for all i 2 [1; t].
Hence, due to the definition of NOVerify, A will have advantage 0 in this case. Likewise,
in the case (m; 0) = (?; sk)*3, where sk = (ok; reg), we note that the correctness of the
group signature scheme implies that computing ( ji; i) Open(gpk; ok; vksots; i; reg) yields
ji 2 f1; 2g and Judge(gpk; ji; upk ji ; vksots; i; i) = 1 for all i 2 [1; t], and hence, A will have
advantage 0 due to the definition of NOVerify.
This leaves the case m0 , ? and 0 , f;; skg. In this case, B parses m0 and 0 as m0 :=
m01k    km0t and 0 := (01; : : : ; 0t). Recall that the definition of proof soundness requires
that the output of a successful adversary satisfies m , m0. Hence, there must exist at least
one index i 2 [1; t] such that m0i , mi. For such an i, B computes ( j; i)  Open(gpk;
ok; vksots; i). Due to the correctness of the GS scheme, it must hold that Judge(gpk;mi +
1; upkmi+1; vksots; i; i) = 1. Furthermore, since NOVerify(pk;C;m
0; 0) = 1, it must also hold
that Judge(gpk;m0i + 1; upkm0i+1; vksots; i; 
0
i) = 1. Hence, by returning the message vksots, the
signature i, the identities mi + 1 and m0i + 1, and the proofs i and 
0
i , B breaks the opening
soundness of the underlying GS scheme.

4.2.3 Concrete Implementations
A generic construction of a GS scheme secure in the BSZ model was introduced in [BSZ05]
based on an existential unforgeable digital signature, a CCA-secure PKE, and a simulation-
sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. In addition, there are several GS
schemes secure in the BSZ model such as e.g., the Delerable´e-Pointcheval scheme [DP06]
and the Groth schemes [Gro06, Gro07]. The Delerable´e-Pointcheval scheme is ecient
but only secure in the random oracle model. Although the first scheme by Groth [Gro06]
is secure in the standard model, each group signature consists of a large number of group
elements. The second scheme by Groth [Gro07] provides a reasonable constant-size group
*3 Notice that in this case, outputting the secret key sk as a proof will play a crucial role in proving the soundness
of the proposed scheme. See the first paragraph of Section 4.2.1 for details.
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signature, and is secure in the standard model. As for the latter Groth scheme [Gro07],
although the original scheme does not provide opening soundness as it is, it will provide
opening soundness with a slight modification [GLF+10, SSE+12a]*4.
4.3 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that PKENO can be constructed from group signatures which
are secure in the BSZ model and provide opening soundness. These results imply that this
type of group signatures are a stronger primitive than PKENO which itself is already a very
strong primitive compared to ordinary CCA-secure public key encryption. Furthermore, as-
suming the used group signature scheme is ecient, the PKENO scheme derived from our
constructions are also relatively ecient. Hence, we can interpret our result as evidence of
the thesis that designing group signatures is significantly harder than designing many other
ordinary cryptographic primitives.
*4 Actually the Groth GS scheme (and its variant by Sakai et al. [SSE+12a]) adopt a dierent syntax from the
BSZ model, thus the security definitions under which the security of the schemes are proven also need to be
modified from the BSZ model (See [SSE+12b] for further discussion). Fortunately these security definitions
are suciently strong to instantiate our generic constructions with the Groth scheme.
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Chapter 5
Threshold Encryption with
Decryption Consistency from
Public-key Encryption with
Non-interactive Opening
In this chapter, we propose a generic construction of threshold public-key encryption with
decryption consistency from any PKENO scheme.
This contribution is understood as a contribution of type (I) in Sect. 1.1.3. Combining the
result by Galindo et al. [GLF+10], the contribution shows equivalence of between existence of
a PKENO scheme and a threshold encryption scheme. It shows that for designing a threshold
encryption scheme it is promising to design a PKENO scheme and then extend it to support
threshold decryption.
– 73 –
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Dynamic threshold encryption.
Threshold public-key encryption (TPKE) [CG99, DF90, DSDFY94, SG02] is an extension
of ordinary public-key encryption which distributes the secret key among several (say, n) de-
cryption servers such that arbitrary k servers are needed to cooperate to successfully decrypt
a ciphertext. In this paper, we consider TPKE schemes to be non-interactive, which means
that each decryption server is able to produce its “decryption share” without interacting with
other parties, and any (honestly generated) k decryption shares from k dierent servers can
be combined successfully to produce the correct plaintext.
In addition to (a threshold variant of) the chosen-ciphertext security, TPKE schemes are
required to satisfy decryption consistency [BBH06, SG02]. The decryption consistency re-
quires that even if a sender and the decryption servers collude, they cannot create two dier-
ent sets of k decryption shares which respectively produce dierent plaintexts when honestly
combined. This property forces a sender to commit to the message being encrypted. More
specifically, decryption consistency prevents a malicious sender from creating “equivocal”
ciphertexts essentially corresponding to the encryption of two dierent messages, and then,
at a later stage, deciding what message the ciphertext should decrypt to by forcing a specific
set of servers to participate in the decryption process.
Many TPKE schemes have a limitation that restricts the set of authorized decryption
servers (i.e. the servers allowed to participate in the decryption process) and the threshold
to be fixed at the setup of the scheme. In addition, decryption servers cannot join the system
after the system is set up. This restricts the flexibility of TPKE schemes, and potentially
limits the applications of TPKE.
To address these restrictions, Delerable´e and Pointcheval proposed dynamic TPKE [DP08].
A dynamic TPKE scheme allows a decryption server to join the system after the setup, and
also allows a sender to choose the threshold k and the authorized set of servers, among which
any k servers can successfully decrypt the ciphertext when they cooperate. Delerable´e and
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Pointcheval [DP08] formalized syntax and a security notion of dynamic TPKE, and proposed
a concrete dynamic TPKE scheme from an assumption called the multi-sequence of exponent
Die-Hellman (MSE-DDH) assumption.
The Delerable´e-Pointcheval scheme is currently the only known dynamic TPKE scheme,
and thus, until now, there have been no dynamic TPKE schemes that avoid q-type assump-
tions*1. Furthermore, their scheme depends on a random oracle to achieve decryption con-
sistency, and hence there is no known dynamic TPKE schemes in the standard model that
provides decryption consistency regardless of the underlying assumption.
5.1.1.1 Our contribution.
To overcome these drawbacks, we propose new dynamic TPKE schemes supporting decryp-
tion consistency without depending on any q-type assumptions or random oracles. More
precisely we propose two constructions of dynamic TPKE, both of which use public-key en-
cryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO) as a core component of the constructions.
PKENO [DHKT08] is an extension of the ordinary public-key encryption that allows the
receiver to prove the validity of the decryption result without revealing the decryption key.
The first scheme uses a PKENO scheme in a purely black-box manner, it is a generic,
or more precisely black-box, construction of a dynamic TPKE scheme from PKENO. The
construction combines the multiple encryption technique [DK05] and a technique of verifi-
able secret sharing [BKP11, BOGW88] to ensure the decryption consistency. However, this
generic construction archives relatively weaker notion of decryption consistency, compared
with several previous (non-dynamic) TPKE schemes (More concretely, the definition of de-
cryption consistency that the first scheme satisfies is slightly weaker than the definition that,
for example, the Boneh-Boyen-Halevi scheme [BBH06] satisfies).
The second proposed scheme overcomes this weakness of the first proposed scheme, by
deviating from being a generic construction. This scheme combines a specific PKENO
*1 A q-type assumption is an assumption for which the size of the instance is parameterized by a polynomial
q in the security parameter. Usually the polynomial q bounds the number of an adversary’s queries the
scheme can resists. Also note that q-type assumptions allow a more ecient generic attack on the underlying
problem [Che06, SHI+12] than static (non q-type) assumptions.
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construction and the Groth-Sahai proof [GS08], to achieve the stronger decryption consist-
ency than the first scheme, which is in precise as strong as that of the Boneh-Boyen-Halevi
scheme [BBH06]. Furthermore, this specific construction archives asymptotically shorter
ciphertext overhead than the first generic construction, as the first scheme has the cipher-
text overhead proportional to n2 in which n is the number decryption servers involved in the
ciphertext, while the second scheme has the overhead of proportional to n.
Our results highlight usefulness of PKENO to construct threshold PKE schemes, as both
of the above two result make use of that as a central building block. We highlight that the
usability of PKENO for constructing TPKE has been conjectured by Galindo et al. [GLF+10],
but this conjecture is not investigated in detail.
We revisit their conjecture, and show that there exists some subtlety in decryption consist-
ency. In particular, as Galindo et al. suggested, our construction uses multiple encryption
of PKENO. In addition, we show that for achieving decryption consistency we need another
technique to detect a maliciously generated ciphertext. In the first construction we use a tech-
nique of verifiable secret sharing for this purpose. However, it cannot achieve the highest
notion of decryption consistency, as mention above. If we admit deviating from a black-box
construction, we can obtain as strong decryption consistency as achieved by several previous
works, as shown in the second construction.
To further study the Galindo et al. conjecture, we lastly investigate the possibility of a
black-box construction of TPKE from PKENO keeping the higher notion of decryption con-
sistency. In fact, introducing another technique to ensure the validity of a ciphertext, we pro-
vide a armative answer by a black-box construction of TPKE scheme that provides strong
decryption consistency. Drawbacks of this scheme is that it is no longer dynamic TPKE,
and that the number of decryption servers the scheme can support is only logarithmic in the
security parameter, rather than an arbitrary polynomial.
5.1.1.2 Our technique.
Our approach is based on the Dodis-Katz multiple encryption technique and further enhanc-
ing the ability to detect malicious behavior of both a sender and decryption servers. This
is because, the Dodis-Katz multiple encryption scheme already can serve as dynamic TPKE
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except decryption consistency, as each decryption servers generate their own key pair by their
own to join the system, and to specify the authorized set dynamically a sender simply picks
the public keys of the servers that the sender wants to be authorized. Thus, to construct
a dynamic TPKE scheme with decryption consistency, we need to improve the Dodis-Katz
scheme to provide decryption consistency.
One of the possible (and simple) approach is to replace the underlying secret sharing
scheme with a more enhanced scheme with some kind of cheating detection. However, this
approach is not straightforward because most of the secret sharing scheme with cheating de-
tection assumes that the shares are distributed honestly, and in such a case it is able to detect
malicious share holders. In contrast, our setting of decryption consistency, even the shares
are generated maliciously, as the shares are generated by a potentially malicious sender.
Instead, we need another mechanism to ensure the consistency between the multiple shares.
Further diculty is that these shares are encrypted as the Dodis-Katz scheme does. In this
case, any single decryption servers cannot verify the consistency of the shares, as the server
can only see a single share which is directed to that server. In particular, if we combine
Shamir’s k-out-of-n scheme with the Dodis-Katz multiple encryption, encrypted n shares
should consist of degree-(k   1) curve, otherwise dierent k shares result in dierent decryp-
tion results, and thus the decryption consistency will be violated. For decryption consistency,
we need to extend the Dodis-Katz scheme to allow decryption servers to detect such a mali-
ciously generated ciphertext.
To this end, we take three dierent approaches for each proposed scheme.
The first scheme combines the Dodis-Katz scheme with a technique from verifiable secret
sharing [BOGW88, BKP11]. This is a classical technique to provide consistency between
shares of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, and extensively studied mainly in the context of
multiparty computations. We bring this technique to the context of non-interactive TPKE to
construct a TPKE scheme with decryption consistency.
The second scheme is fairly simple. We use an non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to
ensure consistency between the encrypted shares. This simplicity will be obtained at the
cost of the non-black-box construction or quite restricted ecient instantiations. That is, the
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only known ecient instantiation of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is restricted to the
bilinear groups (especially the Groth-Sahai proof [GS08]), or at least this construction is no
longer a black-box construction, as we need to employ the non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof for general NP-languages.
The third scheme takes slightly dierent approach. This scheme uses the technique of
multiple-assignment secret sharing [ISN93], which is originally developed for constructing
secret sharing schemes supporting general access structure. Interestingly, as shown in this
paper, this technique is also useful to ensure decryption consistency of a TPKE scheme. The
key technique is instantiating a multiple-assignment scheme with n-out-of-n secret sharing.
A useful property of n-out-of-n sharing is that any combination of n shares can be a set of
honestly generated shares, whereas in k-out-of-n sharing (k < n) there are invalid, and thus
potentially dangerous for decryption consistency, combinations of n shares. If we want to use
k-out-of-n sharing for constructing a TPKE scheme, we need to exclude such a potentially
dangerous combination of shares with some additional mechanism. In contrast, if we only
use an n-out-of-n sharing scheme, no such dangerous combination exists, thus we have no
need to manage such mechanism for detecting dangerous ciphertexts anymore.
5.1.1.3 Related work.
Our first proposed scheme includes a commitment in the ciphertext to achieve certain kind
of decryption consistency. Similar techniques of including a commitment in the ciphertext
are often proposed in the literature, for various purpose. Abdalla, Bellare, and Neven pro-
posed robustness notion of the ordinary public-key encryption [ABN10], which requires that
a single ciphertext should not be decrypted successfully decrypted by two or more decryption
keys, and used a similar technique to achieve this robustness. This technique is reminiscent
of the improvement of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transformation by Boneh and Katz [BK05],
which uses an encapsulation scheme (a commitment scheme to a random string) instead of a
normal commitment scheme.
Shoup and Gennaro formalized decryption consistency and proposed two schemes that
achieve this notion [SG02]. These schemes are respectively based on the computational and
decision Die-Hellman assumption, together with using random oracles. Boneh, Boyen, and
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Halevi proposed a TPKE scheme with decryption consistency which is no longer relying on
random oracles [BBH06]. Their scheme is proved under the decision bilinear Die-Hellman
assumption.
Dodis and Katz proposed the multiple encryption technique that preserves chosen-
ciphertext security of the underlying encryption scheme, and applies this technique to
construct TPKE scheme [DK05]. They formalized several notions of message privacy named
MCPA, wMCCA, MCCA, and sMCCA. These four security notions are in fact concen-
trated on the secrecy of the plaintext, rather than resilience of decryption process against
maliciously behaved sender and receivers (decryption servers), and thus are independent
notions from decryption consistency. In the same paper the authors also discuss decryption
robustness. This notion is more related to decryption consistency, however, it ensures that
under the assumption that a ciphertext is a honestly generated encryption of M, how many
honestly derived decryption shares are sucient to recover the M successfully, even when
that honest shares are mixed with maliciously generated shares. In contrast, decryption
consistency requires that even when a ciphertext and its decryption shares are generated
maliciously, the result of combining shares should be uniquely determined.
Emura, Hanaoka, and Sakai [EHS10] claimed that group signature can be transformed to
PKENO and TPKE. However, their first approach is not quite matured, and is revised by
the same authors. They finally showed that the underlying group signature scheme needs to
have an additional property called opening soundness [SSE+12a], and gave a rigorous proof
of the fact that any group signature scheme with opening soundness can be transformed to a
PKENO scheme [EHSS13].
5.2 New Definitions
In this section we introduce new definitions used in the rest of this chapter. The definitions
includes a dynamic extension of the threshold encryption, a weaker variant of decryption
consistency, and a labeled variant of the PKENO primitive.
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5.2.1 Threshold Public-Key Encryption
First we define an extension of the threshold encryption primitive that allows dynamic joining
of decryption servers. We then define an weaker variant of decryption consistency which
allows a decryption server to claim, in a publicly verifiable way, the ciphertext is partially
invalid so that it is impossible to provide a decryption share which can be securely combined.
Intuitively this weaker decryption consistency allows each decryption servers to be unable
to verify the entire ciphertext. In fact we give two dierent variant of decryption consistency,
namely the weak and strong decryption consistency. While the “strong” notion exactly fol-
lows the definition in [BBH06], the “weak” notion is introduced to capture the decryption
consistency achieved by one of our proposed scheme. More detailed discussion on this weak
notion is given in the paragraphs after Definition 5.1.
To define the relaxed version of decryption consistency, at first we allow the share verifi-
cation algorithm to have a ternary output (rather than the binary > and ?).
ThVerify. The share verification algorithm ThVerify takes as input the public key pk, the
verification key vk, a ciphertext C, and a decryption share . It outputs either >valid,
>invalid, or ?.
The second correctness condition is also modified correspondingly: for all  2 N, any
integers n and k (1  k  n), any (pk; vk; (ski)i2[n]) ThKg(1; n; k), it holds that
 for any C and any  2 [n], ThVerify(pk; vk;C;ThDec(pk; ; sk;C)) outputs either >valid
or >invalid.
The definition of chosen-ciphertext security is unchanged.
Finally, the definition of decryption consistency will be changed with replacing the winning
condition of the adversary as follows. After outputting a tuple (C; ((i; ˆi))i2[k]; ((0i ; ˆ
0
i))i2[k]),
the adversary is declared to win the game if one of the following two conditions holds:
 The following three conditions holds (i) 1, : : :, k are mutually distinct, and
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ThVerify(pk; vk;C; (i; ˆi)) = >valid; (ii) the same holds for ((0i ; ˆ0i))i2[k]; and
(iii) ThCombine(pk; vk;C; ((i; ˆi))i2[k]) , ThCombine(pk; vk;C; ((0i ; ˆ
0
i))i2[k]).
 There exists , ˆ, ˆ0 that satisfy (; ˆ), (; ˆ0) 2 f(1; ˆ1); : : : ; (k; ˆk); (01; ˆ01); : : : ; (0k; ˆ0k)g,
ThVerify(pk; vk;C; (; ˆ)) = >valid, and ThVerify(pk; vk;C; (; ˆ0)) = >invalid.
We denote this modified experiment by Exp(k; n)-wConsistent().
Definition 5.1. A threshold encryption scheme (ThKg;ThEnc;ThDec;ThVerify;
ThCombine) (with the extended syntax) has weak decryption consistency if for any
integer k and n (0  k  n) and any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA the advantage
Adv(k; n)-wConsistentA () = Pr[Exp
(k; n)-wConsistent() = 1] is negligible in .
Note that in the above definition, the adversary is provided with all the secret keys of the
decryption servers, rather than those of only k servers. This stronger type of definition was
introduced by Galindo et al. [GLF+10], in order to prove a generic construction of PKENO
from TPKE. Our result can be seen as the converse of [GLF+10].
The ThVerify algorithm has three possible outputs >valid, >invalid, and ? rather than just
binary values > and ?. In particular, if the ciphertext is not publicly verifiable, it might be
the case that some servers receive a valid share, while the other servers are unable to obtain
any valid shares. Furthermore, due to the lack of public verifiability of the ciphertext, a
server that receives a valid share cannot convince himself that the other servers also receive a
valid share, and a server that does not receive a valid share cannot convince himself that the
other servers also do not receive a valid share. This situation make it harder to agree on the
validity/invalidity of the entire ciphertext among the servers.
Our definition of the weak decryption consistency tries to relax this diculty by allowing
each servers to claim the validity/invalidity of their received shares individually. That is, a
server that receives a valid share is required to produce a publicly verifiable proof for the
validity of the share, while a server that receives an invalid share is required to produce a
publicly verifiable proof for the invalidity of the share. The ThVerify algorithm verifies these
proofs and outputs >valid if the server’s claim of validity is (considered to be) true, >invalid if
the server’s claim of invalidity is true ? if the server’s claim is simply false. The definition
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of the weak decryption consistency requires that if servers’ claim of validity are verified as
correct, any combination of such shares should be agree on the decryption result. However,
if a server claims that the received share is invalid (and the claim is verified by ThVerify), we
no longer require this server to produce any shares that can be securely combined.
We further introduce a stronger definition of decrytption consistency called strong decrytp-
tion consistency. It requires the ThVerify algorithm to output either >valid or ? but never
output >invalid. The strong decrytption consistency is actually equivalent to the decrytption
consistency defined by Boneh, Boyen, and Halevi [BBH06] except for the “known secret
key” extension. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 5.2. A TPKE scheme is said to have strong decryption consistency if in
addition to the weak decryption consistency it satisfies the following condition: for any
(pk; vk; (ski)1in)  ThKg(1; n; k), any ciphertext C 2 f0; 1g, and any decryption shares ,
ThVerify(pk; vk;C; (i)1ik) outputs either >valid or ?.
5.2.2 Dynamic Threshold Public-key Encryption
We then give a formal definition of the dynamic TPKE. The definition basically follows the
definition given by Delerable´e and Pointcheval [DP08] again with the known-secret-keys
extension. However the description of the security game is modified to the public-key setting
rather than the identity-based setting.
A dynamic TPKE scheme consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithms:
DSetup. The setup algorithm DSetup takes as input the security parameter 1 and outputs
the public parameter pk and the master secret keymk. The public parameter pk implic-
itly specifies the message spaceMpk, which determines the set of plaintext that can be
encrypted under that public key.
DJoin. The join algorithm takes as input the public parameter pk and the master secret key
mk, and outputs a pair (upk; usk) of the public and secret keys for a new user. We
assume that the user public key upk is made publicly available.
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DEnc. The encryption algorithm DEnc take as input the public parameter pk, n public keys
upk1, : : :, upkn, the threshold k, and the plaintext m to be encrypted and outputs a
ciphertext C.
DDec. The partial decryption algorithm DDec takes as input the public parameter pk, the
public and secret keys of some user, and a ciphertext C and outputs the decryption
share (upk; ).
DVerify. The verification algorithm DVerify takes as input the public parameter pk, the pub-
lic key upk of some user, a ciphertext C, and its decryption share  by (the owner of)
upk and outputs either >valid, >invalid, or ?.
DCombine. The combining algorithm DCombine takes as input the security parameter pk,
a ciphertext C and k decryption shares 1, : : :, k and outputs a plaintext m or ?.
We require dynamic TPKE schemes to satisfy the following correctness conditions: for any
integer n and k (n  k), any honestly generated (pk;mk)  DSetup(1), and any n honestly
generated users’ key pair (upk1; usk1)  DJoin(pk;mk), : : :, (upkn; uskn)  DJoin(pk;mk),
it is required that
 for any plaintext m, honestly generated ciphertext C  DEnc(; upk1; : : : ; upkn; k;m),
and any size-k subset f1; : : : ; kg  [n], if one honestly computes decryp-
tion shares as i  DDec(pk; upki ; uski ;C) (1  i  k), then we have that
DCombine(pk;C; 1; : : : ; k) = m, and
 for an arbitrary ciphertext C and any 1  i  n, if one honestly computes a decryption
share   DDec(pk; upki; uski;C), then we have that DVerify(pk; upk;C; ) is either
>valid or >invalid.
The security requirements for dynamic TPKE are defined by extending those of (non-
dynamic) TPKE. We firstly describe the secrecy requirement by the following game between
a challenger and an adversary:
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Expdynamic-CCA(A1;A2) ():
b f0; 1g
(pk;mk) DSetup(1)
(upki; uski) DJoin(pk;mk) (i 2 [N])
( ˜upki; ˜uski) DJoin(pk;mk) (i 2 [N˜])
(m0;m1; S ; state) ADDec(pk;upk;usk;)(pk; (upki)i2[N]; ( ˜upki; ˜uski)i2[N˜])
where S = fupk1; : : : ; upkng  fupk1; : : : ; upkn; ˜upk1; : : : ; ˜upkng
and S include (at most) k   1 corrupted keys from f ˜upk1; : : : ; ˜upkN˜g
C  DEnc(pk; upk1; : : : ; upkn; k;mb))
b0  ADDec(pk;upk;usk;)2 (C; state)
return (b = b0)
In the experiment, the adversary (A1;A2) is required to output m0 and m1 with jm0j = jm1j,
Furthermore,A2 not to submit any query (i;C) with arbitrary i.
Definition 5.3. A dynamic TPKE scheme (DSetup;DJoin;DEnc;DDec;DVerify;
DCombine) is chosen-ciphertext secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
(A1;A2) and any N, N˜ 2 N the advantage Advdynamic-CCA(A1;A2) () = j2  Pr[Exp
dynamic-CCA
(A1;A2) () =
1]   1j is negligible in .
We then define the decrytption consistency requirement by the following game.
Expdynamic-ConsistentA (): (pk;mk) DSetup(1)
( ˜upki; ˜uski) DJoin(pk;mk) (i 2 [N˜])
(C; (( j; ˆ j)) j2[k]; ((0j; ˆ
0
j)) j2[k]) A(pk; ( ˜upk; ˜usk)i2[N˜])
return 1 if one of the following two conditions holds.
Here the winning condition is defined by the following two condition:
1. Both S and S 0 consists of k decryption shares from k distinct servers, in which we as-
sume the threshold associated with a ciphertext can be publicly determined and denote
this by k, S and S 0 are not equal to each other as sets, all shares  2 S [ S 0 satisfy
DVerify(pk; upk;C; ) = >valid where upk is the user public key of the corresponding
decryption servers of , and DCombine(pk;C; S ) , DCombine(pk;C; S 0).
2. There exists , 0 2 S [ S 0 which are both attributed to the same decryption server,
DVerify(pk; upk;C; ) = >valid, and DVerify(pk; upk;C; 0) = >invalid, in which upk is
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the user public key of the decryption server of  and 0.
The adversary wins if one of the above two conditions hold.
Definition 5.4. A dynamic TPKE scheme (DSetup;DJoin;DEnc;DDec;DVerify;
DCombine) is weak decryption consistency if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A and any N˜ 2 N the advantage Advdynamic-ConsistencyA () = j2  Pr[Expdynamic-ConsistencyA () =
1]   1j is negligible in .
As in the non-dynamic version of decryption consistency, this definition is given in the
“known secret keys” manner. Also as in the previous, we can define the strong decryp-
tion consistency of a dynamic TPKE scheme. The exact definition of the strong decryption
consistency is given quite similarly to the non-dynamic version, hence we omit the formal
definition.
5.2.3 Public-Key Encryption with Non-Interactive Opening
As mentioned in the introduction, our generic construction is based on public-key encryption
with non-interactive opening. Actually, we require the underlying scheme to support labels
(or to be tag-based) [MRY04, Kil06], whose formal definition is as follows.
We define syntax and security of public-key encryption with non-interactive opening. A
public-key encryption scheme with non-interactive opening consists of the following five
algorithms.
NOKg. The key-generation algorithm NOKg takes as input a security parameter 1 and out-
puts a pair (ek; dk) of the encryption key and the decryption key. The public parameter
pk implicitly specifies the message space Mpk, which determines the set of plaintext
that can be encrypted under that public key.
NOEnc. The encryption algorithm NOEnc takes as input the encryption key ek, a label L,
and a plaintext m. It outputs a ciphertext c.
NODec. The decryption algorithm NODec takes as input the decryption key dk, a label L,
and a ciphertext c. It outputs a plaintext m or a special symbol ?.
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NOProve. The proof algorithm NOProve takes as input the decryption key dk, a label L,
and a ciphertext c. It outputs a proof .
NOVerify. The verification algorithm NOVerify takes as input the encryption key ek, a label
L, a ciphertext c, a plaintext m, and a proof , and outputs a bit 1 or 0, indicating the
proof is respectively valid or invalid.
As the correctness condition, the labeled PKENO scheme is required to satisfy the follow-
ing conditions.
 For any (ek; dk)  NOKg(1), any plaintext m 2 Mpk and any label L 2 f0; 1g, it
holds that NODec(dk; L;NOEnc(pk; L;m)) = m.
 For any (ek; dk)  NOKg(1), any ciphertext c 2 f0; 1g, and any label L 2 f0; 1g, it
holds that NOVerify(ek; L; c;NODec(dk; L; c);NOProve(dk; L; c)) = 1.
Notice that in the latter conditions the ciphertext c is not restricted to the legitimate output of
the encryption algorithm NOEnc(ek; L;m) with some L and m, and hence NODec(dk; L; c)
potentially would be ?.
We require the labeled PKENO scheme to be selective-label weak chosen-ciphertext secure
and strongly committing. Although the former requirement for PKENO schemes has not been
formally stated in the literature, it is a straightforward adoption of the similar requirement for
ordinary (tag-based) public-key encryption schemes formalized by Kiltz [Kil06]. The latter
requirement is originally formalized by Galindo et al. [GLF+10]. More precisely our defini-
tion is a slightly weaker variant than that of Galindo et al.[GLF+10], as our definition requires
the target key pair to be generated honestly. It is also worth noting that the requirement of
proof soundness, which is defined by Damgård et al., is implied by our definition.
The requirement of selective-label weak chosen-ciphertext security is defined by the fol-
lowing game between challenger and the adversaryA.
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ExpPKENO-sLabel-wCCA(A1;A2;A3) ():
b f0; 1g
(L; state1) A1(1)
(ek; dk) NOKg(1)
(m0;m1; state2) A1NODec(dk;;);NOProve(dk;;)(state1; ek)
c  NOEnc(ek; L;mb)
b0  A2PDec(dk;;);NOProve(dk;;)(state2; c)
return b = b0
In the experiment, the adversary (A1;A2;A3) is required to output m0 and m1 with jm0j =
jm1j, and not to submit (L; c) to its both oracles regardless of c throughout the experiment.
Definition 5.5. A PKENO scheme (NOKg;NOEnc;NODec;NOProve;NOVerify) is
selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary (A1;A2;A3) the advantage AdvPKENO-sLabel-wCCA(A1;A2;A3) () = j2  Pr[ExpPKENO-sLabel-wCCA(A1;A2;A3) () =
1]   1j is negligible in .
The committing requirement is defined by the following game.
ExpPKENO-Label-CommitA ():
(ek; dk) NOKg(1)
(c; L;m; ;m0; 0) A(ek; dk)
return (NOVerify(ek; c; L;m; ) = >) ^ (NOVerify(ek; c; L;m0; 0) = >)
^ (m , m0)
In the experiment, the plaintexts m and m0 are required to be inMek [ f?g.
Definition 5.6. A PKENO scheme (NOKg;NOEnc;NODec;NOProve;NOVerify)
is committing if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the advantage
AdvPKENO-Label-CommitA () = Pr[Adv
PKENO-Label-Commit
A () = 1] is negligible in .
5.3 Generic Construction of Dynamic Threshold PKE
In this section we present the first proposed construction, which can provide the dynamic
TPKE functionality.
First we revisit the Galindo et al. conjecture [GLF+10], on which the first proposed scheme
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is based. The conjecture is that TPKE with decryption consistency can be constructed from
the Dodis-Katz transformation with labeled PKENO. However, below we explain that it is
not enough to achieve the decrytption consistency. Let m be a plaintext to be encrypted, and
f (x) be a k   1 degree polynomial with the constant term m. Then, a sender computes n
PKENO ciphertexts of f (i) for all i 2 [n] whose label is a verification key of an one-time
signature. Finally, the sender makes a signature whose signed messages are all ciphertexts.
By using the Prove algorithm of PKENO, the TVerify algorithm can be implemented. So,
this construction seems to have decryption consistency, since m can be obtained from any k
of ciphertexts. One problem of this construction is, however, that a sender may not encrypt
f (i). That is, it is not guaranteed that all corresponding plaintexts are on the same polynomial
f . A trivial attack is as follows. Let k = 2 and n = 3 for the simplicity. Then, a sender chooses
two degree-1 polynomial f and g where f (2) = g(2), computes PKENO ciphertexts for f (1),
f (2), and g(3), respectively. As in the case that all ciphertexts, say C1;C2;C3, are correctly
generated, all PKENO ciphertexts are valid in the sense of the TVerify algorithm. However,
the TCombine algorithm outputs f (0) from (C1;C2), and outputs g(0) from (C2;C3), which
contradicts decryption consistency. Namely, even if all decryption shares are valid, there is
no guarantee that any combinations of k decryption shares yield the same plaintext.
The problem explained above is that a sender may not encrypt plaintexts which are on
the same polynomial. In our construction, we adopt a technique from verifiable secret shar-
ing [BKP11, BOGW88] to resolve this problem.
DSetup(1). Generate the commitment parameter ck as ck  ComKg(1), set pk = ck and
mk = ;, and output (pk;mk).
DJoin(pk;mk). Generate the public and secret keys (ek; dk) of the PKENO scheme by run-
ning (ek; dk) NOKg(1). Set (upk; usk) = (ek; dk) and output (upk; usk).
DEnc(pk; upk1; : : : ; upkn; k;m). Let ck be pk and eki be upki for all i 2 [n], and proceed as
follows:
 Generate a key pair (vksots; sksots) SgKg(1) for the one-time signature scheme.
 Choose a random bivariate polynomial f (x; y) = Pk 1i=0 Pk 1j=0 ai; jxiy j of degree k 1
with a0;0 = m and f (i; j) = f ( j; i) for all i and j.
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 Compute commitments and their decommitments of f (i; j) for 1  i  j  n as
(ci; j; ri; j) Commit(ck; f (i; j)).
 Let c j;i = ci; j and r j;i = ri; j for 1  i < j  n.
 Compute PKENO ciphertext asCi = NOEncpki(vksots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ;
ri;ni) for i = 1; : : : ; n.
 sots  SgSignsksots(hk; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1ini).
 Output C = (vksots; k; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots).
DDec(pk; upk; usk;C). Parse C as (vksots; k; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots) and find
i such that upki = upk. If no such i is found, output (upk;?). Otherwise, proceed as
follows.
 Output (upk;?) if SgVerifyvksots(hk; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1ini) = 0.
 Decrypt Ci as mˆ NODecusk(vksots;Ci).
 Compute a proof  as   NOProveusk(vksots;Ci).
 Output i = (upk; (mˆ; )).
DVerify(pk; vk;C; ). Parse C as (vksots; k; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots) and parse
 as (upk; ˆ). Find i satisfying upk = upki. If no such i exists, output ? immediately. If
such i exists, run SgVerify(vksots; hk; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1ini; sots) to verify
the one-time signature sots and proceeds as follows.
 If the one-time signature is invalid and ˆ = ?, output >valid.
 If the one-time signature is valid, ˆ is parsed as (mˆ; ), and NOVerify(upki;Ci; mˆ;
) = 1, further verify the following three conditions:
– mˆ is parsed as h f1; : : : ; fn; r1; : : : ; rni,
– ComVerify(ck; ci; j; f j; r j) = 1 (or ComVerify(ck; c j;i; f j; r j;i) = 1 for j < i) for
all j 2 [n], and
– ( f1; : : : ; fn) defines a degree-(k   1) polynomial.
If all of the three conditions holds, output >valid. Otherwise output >invalid.
 If neither two conditions hold, output ?.
DCombine(pk; vk;C; 1; : : : ; k). Parse C as (vksots; k; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in;
sots) and i as ( ˆupki; ˆi) for all 1  i  k.
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 If there is at least one i that is ?, output ?.
 Otherwise if all ˆi are parsed as (( fi;1; : : : ; fi;1; ri;1; : : : ; ri;n); i), proceed as fol-
lows:
– find ti satisfying upkti = ˆupki for all i,
– interpolate (t1; fti;t1 ), : : :, (tk; fti;tk ) to obtain a polynomial gti(x) for all i,
– interpolate (t1; gt1(0)), : : :, (tk; gtk (0)) to obtain a polynomial g(y), and
– output g(0).
Security. Security of the above scheme is described as follows.
Theorem 5.7. The construction is chosen-ciphertext secure if the PKENO scheme is
selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext secure, the commitment scheme is (computation-
ally) hiding, and the one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable.
Proof. Let A be an adversary of having the advantage " in the chosen-ciphertext security
game. We bound this advantage to be negligible by gradually changing the game as follows.
In the following description, we denote by S i the event in which the adversary correctly guess
the bit in Game i.
Game 0. This is exactly same as in the original chosen-ciphertext security game.
Game 1. In this game, the decryption oracle is modified to reject any decryption query
which reuses the one-time signature verification key from the challenge ciphertext
regardless of validity of the one-time signature in the queries.
Game 2. Then we modify how the challenge ciphertext is computed, by replacing the
uncorrupted ciphertexts with garbage. Let C = (vksots; (upk

i )1in; (ci; j)1i jn;
(Ci )1in; 

sots) be the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the components C

i are
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computed as follows:
Ci  
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni)
if upki 2 f ˜upk1; : : : ; ˜upkN˜g;
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h0; : : : ; 0; 0jri;1 j; : : : ; 0jri;n ji)
if upki 2 fupk1; : : : ; upkNg:
With this modification the advantage of the adversary only changes negligibly. See
Lemma 5.9 for details.
Game 3. Finally we replace the commitments in the challenge ciphertext with garbage.
More concretely we replace the commitments whose decommitment are not included
in the corrupted ciphertexts. This modification does not introduce more than negligible
dierence on the advantage of the adversary. See Lemma 5.10 for detail.
Lemma 5.8. If the one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable, jPr[S 0]   Pr[S 2]j is
negligible.
Proof (of Lemma 5.8). It can be shown by a standard argument using the dierence lemma.
The two games diers only when a ciphertext C = (vksots; k; (upki)1in; (ci; j)1i j; (Ci)1in;
sots) with the following property is queried: (1) it reuses the verification key vksots from
the challenge ciphertext, and (2) the one-time signature sots is valid. Whenever we receive
such a query from the adversary, we can obtain a strong forgery of the underlying one-time
signature scheme. This fact proves that the dierence jPr[S 0]   Pr[S 2]j is bounded by the
probability that a polynomial-time algorithm outputs such a forgery, which is negligible by
the assumption of the lemma. 
Lemma 5.9. If the labeled PKENO scheme is selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext se-
cure, jPr[S 1]   Pr[S 2]j is negligible.
Proof (of Lemma 5.9). The proof further proceeds with a sequence of (sub)games G1;0, G1;1,
: : :, G1;N , in which G1;0 is identical to Game 1 and G1;N is identical to Game 2. In the game
G1;l, the ciphertexts with public key upk1, : : :, upkl 1, or upkl are replaced with garbage, while
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these with upkl+1, : : :, upkN 1, upkN are kept untouched. More formally, when the adversary
submits the set S = fupk1; : : : ; upkng (together with the threshold k and two messages m0 and
m1), then in the game G1;l the ciphertext Ci in the challenge ciphertext is computed as:
Ci  
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
NOEnc(upki ; vksots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni)
if upki 2 f ˜upk1; : : : ; ˜upkN˜g;
NOEnc(upki ; vksots; h0; : : : ; 0; 0jri;1 j; : : : ; 0jri;n ji)
if upki 2 fupk1; : : : ; upklg;
NOEnc(upki ; vksots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni)
if upki 2 fupkl+1, : : :, upkNg:
Noticing that G1;0 is equivalent to Game 1 and G1;n k+1 is to Game 2, we can conclude
Lemma 5.9 by showing that for all l 2 f1; : : : ;Ng, jPr[S 1;l 1]   Pr[S 1;l]j is negligible.
Now we will show that jPr[S 1;l 1]   Pr[S 1;l]j is negligible for all l 2 f1; : : : ;Ng. To prove
this we construct a simulator Bl which runs in the chosen-ciphertext security game of the
PKENO scheme. The description of B is as follows:
Setup. The simulator B first chooses a key-pair (vksots; sksots) of the one-time signature
scheme. Then it outputs vksots as the label for the challenge. The simulator receives an
encryption key ek of the PKENO scheme. To set up the TPKE scheme, the simulatorB
sets upkl = ek. For all the other upki (i < [N] n flg), it generates (eki; dki) NOKg(1)
for all i , l and sets pki = eki. Furthermore, for all ˜upki (i 2 [N˜]) the simulator
again generates (e˜ki; d˜ki)  NOKg(1) and sets ( ˜upki; ˜uski) = (e˜ki; d˜ki). The simula-
tor also runs ComKg(1) to get a commitment key ck. Finally it sets pk = ck and sends
(pk; (upki)i2[N]; ( ˜upki; ˜uski)i2[N˜]) to the adversaryA.
Query I. When the adversaryA issues a decryption query (upk0;C), the simulator responds
as follows. First it parses C as (vksots; k; (upk0i)1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots).
 If vksots = vksots or SgVerify(vksots; hk; (ci; j)1i j; (Ci)1ini; sots) = 0, the simu-
lator responds with (upk0;?).
 Let i0 2 [n] be the integer that satisfies upk0 = upk0i0 . The simulator obtains the
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decryption of Ci0 as follows. If upk0 = upkl, to which the simulator embeds the
target PKENO scheme, the simulator issues a decryption query (vksots;Ci0 ) to its
own decryption-and-prove oracle and receives a pair (m; ) of a message and a
proof. The simulator responds with (upk0; (m; )).
 If upk0 = upki (i , l), the simulator runs NODec(dki; vksots;Ci) to obtain m
and runs NOProve(dki; vksots;Ci) to obtain . The simulator responds with
(upk0; (m; )).
Challenge. When the adversaryA requests the challenge ciphertext by submitting two mes-
sages m0 and m1, an authorized set S = fupk1; : : : ; upkng, and a threshold k, the sim-
ulator B chooses a random bit b, choose a random symmetric bivariate polynomial
f (x; y) =
Pk 1
i=0
Pk 1
j=0 ai; jx
iy j of degree k   1 with a0;0 = mb, computes commitments
and decommitments (ci; j; ri; j)  Commit(ck; f (i; j)) for 1  i  j  n, and sets
c j;i = ci; j and r j;i = ri; j for 1  i < j  n. If upkl = upki with some i, then
the simulator submits two plaintexts M0 = h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni and
M1 = h0; : : : ; 0; 0jri ;1 j; : : : ; 0jri ;n ji to the challenger of the PKENO game. Receiving
the challenge ciphertext c, B computes n ciphertexts of the PKENO scheme as fol-
lows:
Ci  
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni)
if upki 2 f ˜upk1; : : : ; ˜upkN˜g;
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h0; : : : ; 0; 0jri;1 j; : : : ; 0jri;n ji)
if upki 2 fupk1; : : : ; upkl 1g;
c if upki = upkl;
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni)
if upki 2 fupkl+1; : : : ; upkNg:
Finally B generates a one-time signature sots  SgSign(sksots; hk; (upki )1in;
(ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1ini). If upkl < S, the simulator B ignores the PKENO challenge
ciphertext c and computes the challenge ciphertext for the TPKE scheme as in the
game l (or the game l   1. The choice now does not matter since upkl < S). In any
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case, the challenge ciphertext C = (vksots; k; (upk

i )1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots)
is sent to the adversaryA.
Query II. After receiving the challenge ciphertext, A again issues decryption queries,
which are responded as in the first query phase by the simulator B.
Guess. Finally the adversaryA outputs a guess bit b0 and halts. The simulator then outputs
1 if b = b0, otherwise outputs 0.
In the above simulation, if the simulator Bl receives a ciphertext of M0, the view of the
adversaryA is equivalent toG1;l 1, and otherwise it is equivalent toG1;l. Hence we have that
Pr[S 1;l 1]   Pr[S 1;l] = Pr[Bl ! 1jb = 0]   Pr[Bl ! 1jb = 1]:
The right-hand side is negligible because of the assumption that the PKENO scheme is
selective-label weak chosen-ciphertext secure. 
Lemma 5.10. Suppose that the commitment scheme is (computationally) hiding. Then
jPr[S 2]   Pr[S 3]j is negligible.
Proof (of Lemma 5.10). To prove the lemma we construct a simulator B which runs in the
left-or-right game of the commitment scheme. The description of B is as follows.
Setup. The simulator B starts with receiving the commitment key ck form the challenger.
The simulator generates N keys of the PKENO scheme as (eki; dki)  NOKg(1) for
all i 2 [N] and N˜ keys of the same PKENO scheme as (e˜ki; d˜ki)  NOKg(1). The
simulator also generates a key (vksots; sk

sots) by running SgKg(1
). The simulator sets
pk = ck, (upki; uski) = (eki; dki) for all i 2 [N], and ( ˜upki; ˜uski) = (e˜ki; d˜ki) for all
i 2 [N˜], and run the adversaryA with (pk; (upki)i2[N]; ( ˜upki; ˜uski)i2[N˜]) as input.
Query I. To a share-decryption query (upk0;C) B responds as described by Game 2 (or 3).
It can be done since B knows the user secret keys usk1, : : :, uskN of all the uncorrupted
user public keys upk1, : : :, upkN .
Challenge. When the adversary A outputs two messages m0 and m1 together with an au-
thorized set S = fupk1; : : : ; upkng and a threshold k, the simulator B proceeds as
follows. It first chooses a random bit b, a random symmetric bivariate polynomial
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f (x; y) =
Pk 1
i=0
Pk 1
j=0 ai; jx
iy j with a0;0 = mb. Then computes commitments ci; j (1 
i  j  n) as follows. For all (i; j) with either upki or upkj corrupted, the simulator
runs Commit(ck; f (i; j)) to obtain the commitment ci; j together with its decommit-
ment ri; j. For all (i; j) with both upki and upk

j uncorrupted, the simulator submits
(M0;M1) = ( f (i; j); 0) to the left-or-right oracle to obtain a commitment ci; j of either
f (i; j) or 0. The simulator further computes PKENO ciphertextsC1, : : :,Cn as follows:
Ci  
8>>>>><>>>>>:
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h f (i; 1); : : : ; f (i; n); ri;1; : : : ; ri;ni) if upki is corrupted;
NOEnc(upki ; vk

sots; h0; : : : ; 0; 0    0; : : : ; 0    0i) if upki is uncorrupted:
Finally the simulator Bl runs SgSign(sksots; hk; (upki )1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1ini) to
obtains sots, sets C = (vk

sots; k; (upk

i )1in; (ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots), and sends
the adversary C.
Query II. In this phase the adversary again issues decryption queries, which are responded
as in the Query I phase.
Guess. Finally the adversary A outputs a guess b0 and halts. The simulator Bl outputs 1 if
b = b0 and outputs 0 if b , b0.
In this simulation, if the simulator receives commitments of m0’s, the adversary’s view is
identical to G2, and if the simulator receives those of m1’s, the view is identical to G3.
Hence we have that jPr[S 2]   Pr[S 3]j = jPr[B ! 1jthe commitments are of m0’s]   Pr[B !
1jthe commitments are of 0’s]j, whose right-hand side is negligible. 
Lemma 5.11. Pr[S 3] = 1=2.
Proof (of Lemma 5.11). To see the lemma, we argue that for any view of the adversary, the
number of polynomials consistent to the view with the constraint f (0; 0) = m0 is equal to
that of polynomial consistent to the view with the constraint f (0; 0) = m1. Actually there is
a single polynomial for each constraints f (0; 0) = m0 and f (0; 0) = m1, which we will show
below.
In Game 3, the information on the polynomial f included in the adversary’s view is the set
f fi; j = f (i; j) j i 2 S or j 2 S g of evaluations of f , in which S  [n] is the set of the corrupted
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servers. The constraints of fi; j = f (i; j) and f (0; 0) = m0 uniquely determines a symmetric
degree-(k   1) polynomial as seen below. Let us denote the set S by fi1; : : : ; ik 1g. From the n
equations fi1;1 = f (i1; 1), : : :, fi1;n = f (i1; n) there exists a degree-(k 1) univariate polynomial
fi1 such that f (x) = f (i1; x) for all x. Similar things hold for i2, : : :, ik 1, that is, there exist
degree-(k   1) polynomials fi2 , : : :, fik 1 such that fi2 (x) = f (i2; x), : : :, fik 1 (x) = f (ik 1; x) for
all x. Furthermore, from n equations f1;i1 = f (1; i1), : : :, fn;i1 = f (n; i1), we can determine the
evaluation f (0; i1). Similar thing can be applied to i2, : : :, ik 1, that is, we can determine the
evaluation of f (0; i2), : : :, f (0; ik 1). Together with the assumption that f (0; 0) = m0, we can
further determine a degree-(k   1) polynomial f0 such that f0(x) = f (0; x) for all x. These k
polynomials fi1 , : : :, fik 1 , and f0 determine the entire bivariate polynomial f (x; y) uniquely.
The same thing holds for the case that f (0; 0) = m1. 
These lemmas conclude the proof of the main theorem. 
Theorem 5.12. The construction has the weak decryption consistency if the PKENO scheme
is strongly committing and that the commitment scheme is (computationally) binding.
Proof. Let A be an adversary of the decryption consistency game, (pk; ( ˜upki; ˜uski)i2[N˜]) be
the input to A, and (C; S ; S 0) be the output of A. Let C be parsed as (vksots; k; (upki )1in;
(ci; j)1i jn; (Ci)1in; sots). Let succ1 and succ2 be the events in whichA successfully out-
puts two sets S and S 0 that meet the conditions 1. and 2. defined in the game for decrytption
consistency, respectively. Let us denote S and S 0 as S = f(upk1; ˆ1); : : : ; (upkk; ˆk)g and
S 0 = f(upk01; ˆ01); : : : ; (upk0k; ˆ0k)g. To prove the theorem, we show that both Pr[succ1] and
Pr[succ2] is negligible.
We first bound Pr[succ2]. In this case, the output of the adversary contains two decryption
share (upk; ˆ) and (upk; ˆ0) of the same server upk. From these decryption shares we can
obtain two proofs (of the PKENO scheme) which violate the committing property of the
PKENO scheme. This enables us to construct a reduction algorithm that internally runs the
adversary A and breaks the committing property of the PKENO. Let (upk; ˆ) be verified as
>valid and (upk; ˆ0) be as >invalid. Regarding to (upk; ˆ) we have the two possibilities that
ˆ = ? and that ˆ is parsed as (mˆ; ). However, since (upk; ˆ0) is verified as >invalid, which
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implies that the one-time signature included in C is valid, we can exclude the first possibility
and thus we have that ˆ is parsed as (mˆ; ) and NOVerify( ˜upki; vksots;Ci; mˆ; ) = 1 for some i.
Regarding to (upk; ˆ0), since it is verified as >invalid, we also have that ˆ0 is parsed as (mˆ0; 0)
and NOVerify( ˜upki; vksots;Ci; mˆ
0; 0) = 1 for the same i as before. Furthermore, since (upk; ˆ)
is verified as >valid, mˆ satisfies all of the three conditions described by the DVerify algorithm.
In contrast to this, mˆ0 does not satisfy at least one of the same conditions, because (upk; ˆ0)
is verified as >invalid. Hence mˆ must dier from mˆ0, thus the tuple (vksots;Ci; mˆ; ; mˆ0; 0)
violates the committing property of the underlying PKENO scheme. More formally, we need
to construct a simulator that receives a target key pair of the PKENO scheme and outputs a
tuple that breaks the committing property. Such a simulator will choose random i 2 [N˜] and
sets ( ˜upki ; ˜uski) to be the target keys received. When the adversary A outputs (C; S ; S 0),
the simulator will compute a tuple (vksots;Ci; mˆ; ; mˆ0; 0) as described above and will output
it. The simulator successfully breaks the committing property with probability Pr[succ2]=N˜,
which is negligible due to the committing property of the PKENO scheme.
Then we will bound Pr[succ1]. Let
I = fi 2 [n] j (upki ; ˆ) 2 S for some ˆg
and
I0 = fi 2 [n] j (upki ; ˆ) 2 S 0 for some ˆg:
We denote I = fi1; : : : ; ikg and I0 = fi01; : : : ; i0kg. Using this notations we can denote S as
f(upki1 ; ˆ1); : : : ; (upkik ; ˆk)g, and S 0 as f(upki01 ; ˆ01); : : : ; (upk

i0k
; ˆ0k)g. Since these decryption
shares are verified as >valid, we have two possibilities that ˆ1 =    = ˆk = ˆ01 = ˆ0k = ?
and that none of ˆ1, : : :, ˆk, ˆ01, : : :, ˆ
0
k is ?. Since in the former case the decryption consist-
ency will never break, we assume that the latter case occurs in the following. In the latter case
we can further assume that ˆ` is parsed as (h fi` ;1; : : : ; fi` ;n; ri` ;1; : : : ; ri` ;ni; `) for all ` 2 [k] and
ˆ0`0 is parsed as (h f 0i0
`0 ;1
; : : : ; f 0i0
`0 ;n
; r0i0
`0 ;1
; : : : ; r0i0
`0 ;n
i; 0`0) for all ` 2 [k].
We first define an event bad1 by the following condition: there exist integers ` 2 [k] and
`0 2 [k] such that the `-th decryption share in S and `0-th decryption share in S 0 are both
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generated by the same server and these shares do not agree in the k  1 curve. More formally,
there exist two integer ` and `0 such that i` = i0`0 and ( fi` ;1; : : : ; fi` ;n) , ( f
0
i0
`0 ;1
; : : : ; f 0i0
`0
).
We further define an event bad2 as follows. Intuitively the event bad2 captures the case
that the decryption shares submitted by the adversary do not constitute a symmetric bivariate
polynomial. To state this more formally we will introduce some notations. Let us denote the
union I [ I0 to be I [ I0 = f j1; : : : ; jtg. Notice that t is either equal to 2k or smaller than 2k
(The latter case occurs when some servers are involved in both S and S 0). If we assume the
event bad1 does not occur, we can define the following t  t matrix:0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
f j1; j1 f

j1; j2
   f j1; jt
f j2; j1 f

j2; j2
   f j2; jt
:::
:::
: : :
:::
f jt ; j1 f

jt ; j2
   f jt ; jt
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
; (5.1)
where f u;v is defined as
f u;v =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
fu;v (u 2 I n I0)
f 0u;v (u 2 I0 n I)
fu;v = f 0u;v (u 2 I \ I0):
We say that the event bad2 occurs if bad1 does not occur and the above matrix is not sym-
metric.
Noticing that Pr[succ1] = Pr[succ1 ^ (bad1 _ bad2)] + Pr[succ1 ^ :(bad1 _ bad2)] it
is sucient to show that the two terms are negligible for proving the theorem. The first
term Pr[succ1 ^ (bad1 _bad2)] is bounded by a standard reduction argument constructing an
adversary that breaks the committing property of the PKENO scheme or the binding property
of the commitment scheme. The other term Pr[succ1 ^ :(bad1 _ bad2)] is actually equal to
zero, which will be discussed below.
Denote by g j the result of the interpolation from n points f j;1, : : :, f

j;n, which is actually the
share submitted by the server j. To see that Pr[succ1 ^:(bad1 _ bad2)], it is sucient to see
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that the column vector
~g =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
g j1
g j2
:::
g jt
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(5.2)
is degree-(k 1). If this column vector is degree-(k 1), any choice of k points (out of t) results
in the same point through the interpolation from k points. It ensures that the adversary has no
chance to satisfy the conditions that DCombine(pk; vk;C; S ) , DCombine(pk; vk;C; S 0).
To see that the vector ~g is degree-(k   1) we proceed as follows. Observing the fact that
the n points f j;1, : : :, f

j;n is degree-(k   1), we first claim that even though g j’s are defined as
the interpolation from the n points f j;1, : : :, f

j;n, interpolation from k points coincides in the
result of interpolation. Particularly g j can be written as the Lagrange interpolation from the
k points f j; j1 , : : :, f

j; jt
as
g j =  j1 f

j; j1 +  j2 f

j; j2 +     jt f j; jt :
Furthermore, ~g can be represented as the following linear combination:0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
g j1
g j2
:::
g jt
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=  j1
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
f j1; j1
f j2; j1
:::
f jt ; j1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
+  j2
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
f j1; j2
f j2; j2
:::
f jt ; j2
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
+    +  jt
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
f j1; jt
f j2; jt
:::
f jt ; jt
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (5.3)
This equation shows that if all of the t column vectors in the right-hand side of the linear
combination is degree-(k   1), so is the vector in the left-hand side. Since the matrix in
Eq. (5.1) is symmetric and every column vectors of that matrix are degree-(k   1) as verified
by DVerify, every row vectors are also degree-(k   1). The t vectors appear in Eq. (5.3) is
actually the row vectors of the matrix in Eq. (5.1), hence the vector ~g is degree-(k   1). 
Instantiating the Generic Construction. To instantiate this generic construction, we need
to have a “labeled” scheme of PKENO. Fortunately, to extend some known PKENO scheme
to support labels is relatively straightforward. In particular, the PKENO scheme proposed by
Galindo et al. [GLF+10] can be easily extended to the labeled scheme. For completeness, we
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provide the description of the labeled scheme and its security proof, together with its variant
from the decision bilinear Die-Hellman assumption, in Appendix 5.6.
If we instantiate the generic construction with the PKENO scheme form the decision linear
assumption, we can obtain the first dynamic TPKE scheme from a static assumption which
archives the weak decryption consistency without relying random oracles. In addition, re-
garding the result by Emura et al. showing that a PKENO scheme can be constructed from an
arbitrary group signature scheme (with a suciently but reasonably strong security notion)
as a generic and black-box construction [EHSS13], interestingly we can obtain an (even dy-
namic) TPKEwith the weak decryption consistency from an arbitrary group signature scheme
as a generic construction. It would be of independent interest that these apparently unrelated
two primitives of group signature and threshold encryption can be related only by means of
generic constructions.
However, we need to admit our generic construction of dynamic TPKE is not as ecient as
the Delerable´e-Pointcheval scheme, as our construction has the ciphertext size proportional to
the square of the number of the authorized servers, while the Delerable´e-Pointcheval scheme
has a constant size ciphertext. Furthermore, our scheme only achieves the weak decryption
consistency rather than the strong notion.
In the next section we present a specific construction of dynamic TPKE that provides a
more shorter, linear to the number of the authorized servers, ciphertext and the strong de-
cryption consistency. The security of this specific construction comes from only the decision
linear assumption.
5.4 Dynamic Threshold PKE from the Decision Linear
Assumption
In this section we present a dynamic TPKE scheme with the strong decryption consistency.
Security of this scheme solely comes from the decision linear assumption, while the Deler-
able´e-Pointcheval scheme relies on a q-type assumption which is called MSE-DDH assump-
tion. We also remark that the strong decryption consistency of our scheme does not require
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random oracles.
The description of the proposed scheme is as follows.
DSetup(1). Run G(1) to set up the bilinear group parameter (p;G;GT ; e; g). Choose
a common reference string ( ~f1; ~f2; ~f3) 2 (G3)3 for the binding setting, where ~f1 =
( f1; 1; g), ~f2 = (1; f2; g), and ~f3 = ~f11 ~f22 for random f1, f2 2 G n f 1 g and random 1,
2 2 Zp. Set pk = (p;G;GT ; e; g; ~f1; ~f2; ~f3) and mk = ;, and output (pk;mk).
DJoin(pk;mk). Generate public and secret keys of the PKENO scheme described in
Sect. 5.6.2 by choosing random x, y  Zp and random U, V  G and setting u = gx
and v = gy. Set upk = (u; v;U;V) and usk = (x; y) and output (upk; usk).
DEnc(pk; upk1; : : : ; upkn; k;m). Parse upki as (ui; vi;Ui;Vi) for all i 2 [n]. Generate verifica-
tion and signing keys (vk; sk) for a one-time signature scheme by running SgKg(1).
Choose random integers r1, : : :, rn, s1, : : :, sn, a1, : : :, ak 1  Zp and computes ci;1  
uiri , ci;2  vi si , ci;3  (gvkUi)ri , ci;4  (gvkVi)si , and ci;5  gri+simga1i+a2i2++ak 1ik 1
for all i 2 [n]. Then compute a Groth-Sahai proof zk which demonstrates that the
equations
ci;1 = uiri ;
ci;2 = vi si ;
ci;5 = grigsi (gi
k 1
)ak 1    (gi2 )a2 (gi)a1m
for all i 2 [n] with witness m 2 G and r1, : : :, rn, s1, : : :, sn, a1, : : :, ak 1 2 Zp.
Finally compute a one-time signature  by running SgSign(sk; h(upki)i2[n]; k;
(ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zki) and output C = (vk; (upki)i2[n]; k; (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zk; ).
DDec(pk; upk; usk;C). Parse C as (vk; (upki)i2[n]; k; (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zk; ). Find i 2 [n]
such that upk = upki and output (upk;?) if no such i exists. Otherwise proceed as
follows. Firstly verify that the one-time signature  is valid, the Groth-Sahai proof
zk is valid, and for all i 2 [n] the equations e(ui; ci;3) = e(ci;1; gvkUi) and e(vi; ci;4) =
e(ci;2; gvkVi) hold. If any of the above does not holds, output (upk;?) immediately. If
all of them holds, compute (u) = c1=xi;1 , 
(v) = c1=yi;2 , and mˆ = ci;5=
(u)(v), and outputs
 = (upk; (mˆ; (u); (v))).
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DVerify(pk; upk;C; ). ParseC as (vk; (upki)i2[n]; k; (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zk; ). Then verify the
following conditions: no i 2 [n] does not satisfy upk = upki, the one-time signature 
is invalid, the Groth-Sahai proof zk is invalid, or for some i 2 [n] one of e(ui; ci;3) =
e(ci;1; gvkUi) and e(vi; ci;4) = e(ci;2; gvkVi) does not hold. If at least one of the above
does not hold and  is parsed as (upk;?), output >valid. Otherwise, if all of the above
do hold,  is parsed as (upk; (mˆ; (u); (v))), and the three equations e(u; (u)) = e(ci;1; g),
e(v; (v)) = e(ci;2; g), and ci;5 = mˆ(u)(v) hold, output >valid. In any other cases, output
?.
DCombine(pk;C; 1; : : : ; k). Parse C as (vk; (upki)i2[n]; k; (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zk; ). If
there is at least one i that is parsed as (upk;?), output ?. Otherwise, parse i
as ( ˆupki; (mˆi; ˆ
(u)
i ; ˆ
(v)
i )), find ti satisfying upkti = ˆupki for all i 2 [k], compute
m = mˆ11    mˆkk in which i = Q j2[k]nf i g  t j=(ti   t j), and output m.
Security. This scheme is proven to be secure under the decision linear assumption.
Theorem 5.13. The construction is chosen-ciphertext secure if the decision linear assump-
tion holds on G.
Chosen-ciphertext security of this scheme is in fact relatively easily derived from the zero-
knowledge property of the Groth-Sahai proof system and the labeled PKENO scheme pre-
sented in Sect. 5.6.2, as the proposed scheme is built on these two building blocks. However,
for completeness we present a bit detailed proof for the chosen-ciphertext security.
Proof (of Theorem 5.13). Let A be an adversary having the advantage " in the game of the
chosen-ciphertext security. To bound the advantage " we consider the following sequence of
games:
Game 0. This is the original game defined in the definition of chosen-ciphertext security.
Game 1. In this game the common reference string set in the public parameter pk is changed
to be generated by the simulation algorithm.
Game 2. In this game the Groth-Sahai proof included in the challenge ciphertext is replaced
with the simulated proof.
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Game 3. In this game the decryption oracle is changed to reject any query that reuse the
verification key vk of the one-time signature scheme from the challenge ciphertext.
Game 4. In this game, all ciphertexts of the uncorrupted public keys in the challenge ci-
phertext are replaced with ciphertexts that encrypt random group elements.
In the following we denote by S i the event in which the adversary correctly guess the bit
flipped by the challenger in Game i.
Lemma 5.14. If the decision linear assumption on G holds, jPr[S 0]   Pr[S 1]j and jPr[S 1]  
Pr[S 2]j are negligible.
Proof. The change introduced by Game 1 will not aect the behavior of the adversary A,
since the soundness string and the witness-indistinguishable string of the Groth-Sahai proof
is computationally indistinguishable, which itself proved from the decision linear assumption
on G. The change by Game 2 is also indistinguishable, since on a witness-indistinguishable
string a real proof and a simulated proof (with the trapdoor behind the string) has the same
distribution, thus the change by Game 2 is perfectly indistinguishable. 
Lemma 5.15. If the one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable, jPr[S 2]   Pr[S 3]j is
negligible.
Proof. The proof will be done by applying the dierence lemma. The game diers when the
adversary queries a ciphertext that includes the same verification key to the challenge cipher-
text, and is not responded with ? by the original decryption oracle. In that case the query
contains a valid signature on the queried ciphertext. Furthermore, whenever the adversary
issues such a query, from this query we can extract a strong forgery of the one-time signature
scheme, which enable us to construct a simulator that attacks the strong unforgeability of the
one-time signature scheme. 
Lemma 5.16. If the decision linear assumption on G holds, jPr[S 3]   Pr[S 4]j is negligible.
Proof. The proof basically follows the proof of the Dodis-Katz transformation. We first
introduce the subgames G3;0, : : :, G3;N of the following:
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Game G3;`. In this game, if the challenge ciphertext includes a PKENO ciphertexts of the
keys upk1, : : :, upk` (the public keys upk1, : : :, upkN are the keys given to the adversary
at the first phase of the game), these PKENO ciphertexts are replaced with ciphertexts
of random group elements.
We also note that the game G3;0 is identical to Game 3, and the game G3;N is identical to
Game 4, and thus it is sucient for proving the lemma to prove that jPr[S 3;` 1]   Pr[S 3;`]j is
negligible.
To prove this inequality we construct an algorithm B that attacks the chosen-ciphertext
security of the DLIN-based PKENO scheme presented in Sect. 5.6.2. We briefly describe
this algorithm.
Setup. The algorithm B firstly generates verification/signing keys vk and sk of the one-
time signature scheme, and sends the verification key vk as the target label to the
PKENO challenger. Then B receives a public key (u; v;U;V) of the PKENO scheme,
and uses this key as upk`. All the other public keys upki (i , `) and ˜upki and the
witness-indistinguishable common reference string ( ~f1; ~f2; ~f3), together with the trap-
door for simulating the Groth-Sahai proof, are generated by B itself.
Query I. Decryption queries (upk0;C) are responded as follows. Let C = (vk; (upk0i)i2[n]; k;
(ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zk; ). If vk = vk, B returns (upk0;?) toA. This is a valid simula-
tion due to the change introduced in Game 3. Otherwise, if upk0 , upk`, B responds
to the query by using the decryption key corresponding to upk, which is known to
B. If upk0 = upk`, B proceeds as follows for responding to the query. Firstly B
verifies the one-time signature , the zero-knowledge proof zk. In addition B also
verifies validity of all n ciphertext (c1;1; : : : ; c1;5), : : :, (cn;1; : : : ; cn;5) by checking the
equations e(ci;1; gvkUi) = e(ui; ci;3) and e(ci;2; gvkVi) = e(vi; ci;4) hold for all i 2 [n].
If any of the above verification fails, B immediately returns (upk`;?) to A. Other-
wise, B sends the ciphertext (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5) where i satisfies upk0i = upk` together with
the tag vk to the PKENO challenger and obtains the decryption result mˆ and a proof
((u); (v)). Notice that in this query B certainly obtains the decryption result and the
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proof rather than ?, because (i) vk , vk, thus the query is not forbidden, and (ii) the
ciphertext (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5) is valid in the sense that it satisfies e(ci;1; gvkUi) = e(ui; ci;3)
and e(ci;2; gvkVi) = e(vi; ci;4), and thus it will not rejected due to the invalidity of the
ciphertext. After receiving mˆ, (u), and (v), B sends (upk`; (mˆ; (u); (v)) toA.
Challenge. When A requests the challenge ciphertext by issuing (S; k;m0;m1) where
S = f upk1; : : : ; upkn g, B proceeds as follows. If for some i, upki = upk`, then
B chooses a random bit b and random integers a1, : : :, ak 1 2 Zp, and sends
M0 = mbgi
a1+(i)2a2++(i)k 1ak 1 and M1 = R` to the PKENO challenger to receive a
PKENO ciphertext (c1; : : : ; c

5). Then B computes PKENO ciphertext (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)
for all i 2 [n] as
(ci;1; : : : ; c

i;5) 
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(uiri ; vi si ; (gvkUi)ri ; (gvkVi)si ; gri+simbgia1++i
k 1ak 1 )
if upki 2 f ˜upk1; : : : ; ˜upkN˜ g
(uiri ; vi si ; (gvkUi)ri ; (gvkVi)si ; gri+siRi)
if upki 2 f upk1; : : : ; upk` 1 g
(c1; : : : ; c

5) if upk

i = upk`
(uiri ; vi si ; (gvkUi)ri ; (gvkVi)si ; gri+simbgia1++i
k 1ak 1 )
if upki 2 f upk`+1; : : : ; upkN g;
in which ri, si (i 2 [n] n f i g) is random elements in Zp and Ri (i 2 [`   1]) is random
elements in G. Furthermore, B computes a simulated proof zk using the trapdoor
for the Groth-Sahai proof and a one-time signature  using the signing key sk, then
sends (vk; (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5)i2[n]; zk; ) as the challenge ciphertext to the adversaryA.
Query II. After receiving the challenge, A again issues decryption queries. These queries
are responded to as in the Query I phase.
Guess. WhenA outputs a guess b0 and halts, B outputs 1 if b = b0 and 0 if b , b0.
Noticing that when B receives the PKENO challenge ciphertext with the plaintext M0,
the view of the adversary A is identical to that of G3;` 1, and when B receives the
challenge of M1, the view is identical to that of G3;`. Hence Pr[S 3;` 1]   Pr[S 3;`] =
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Pr[B ! 1jthe challenge is of M0]   Pr[B ! 1jthe challenge is of M1], whose right-hand
side is negligible, due to the assumption that the PKENO scheme is selective-label weak
chosen-ciphertext secure. 
The above lemmas complete the proof of Theorem 5.13. 
Theorem 5.17. The construction satisfies the strong decryption consistency.
Proof. Let a ciphertextC = (vk; (upki )i2[n]; k; (ci;1; : : : ; ci;5); zk; ) and two sets of decryption
shares S = f (upk1; ˆ1); : : : ; (upkk; ˆk) g, and S 0 = f (upk01; ˆ01); : : : ; (upk0k; ˆ0k) g be the output of
the decryption-consistency adversary. In the following we will argue that assuming every 2k
decryption shares are verified as >valid, the two sets S and S 0 are combined to the same result,
regardless of the form the shares.
Firstly, due to the construction of the DVerify algorithm, we can assume that we only have
one of the following two cases:
 ˆ1 =    = ˆk = ˆ01 =    = ˆ0k = ?, or
 ˆ1, : : :, ˆk, ˆ01, : : :, ˆ0k are all parsed as (mˆ1; (u)1 ; (v)1 ), : : :, (mˆk; (u)k ; (v)k ), (mˆ01; (u)1 ; (v)1 ),
: : :, (mˆk; 
(u)
k ; 
(v)
k ), respectively.
For the first case, both S and S 0 are combined to ?, hence in this case the adversary never
violate the decryption consistency of the scheme. For the second case, due to the perfect
soundness of the Groth-Sahai proof system, there exists r1, : : :, rn, s1, : : :, sn, a1, : : :, ak 1 2
Zp, and m 2 G that satisfies
ci;1 = uiri ;
ci;2 = vi si ;
ci;5 = grigsi(gi
k 1
)ak 1    (gi2 )a2 (gi)a1m;
where ui and vi is the part of the user public key upki = (ui; vi;Ui;Vi). Furthermore, due to
the committing property of the PKENO scheme, we have that for all j 2 [k]
mˆ j = (gi
k 1
)ak 1    (gi2)a2(gi)a1m
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with i satisfying upk j = upk

i , and similarly for all j 2 [k]
mˆ0j = (g
ik 1)ak 1    (gi2 )a2 (gi)a1m
with i satisfying upk0j = upk

i . These equations ensure that the two sets S and S
0 contain
shares which are honestly derived from the common polynomial ak 1Xk 1+   +a1X+logg m,
which further ensures that S and S 0 will be combined to the same decryption result. 
5.5 Generic Construction of TPKE with the Strong
Decryption Consistency
In this section, we present the third proposed scheme, which achieves the strong decrytption
consistency or the decrytption consistency defined by Boneh, Boyen, and Halevi [BBH06].
Let us consider the k-out-of-n setting. The basic idea behind this construction is that if
k servers (but not n servers) cooperating in decryption are able to recover all the shares,
it is possible to ensure the stronger decrytption consistency. This is because in this way
we can avoid the following situation: even though some k servers receive apparently valid
shares, that is, they lie on a common degree-(k 1) polynomial, another coalition of k servers
receives obviously invalid shares, namely, shares that lie on a higher-degree polynomial. This
situation was unavoidable in the construction in Sect. 5.3 and had it suer the weaker notion
of decrytption consistency. However, if a construction allows a coalition of k servers to
recover all the shares, they are able to convince themselves that any coalition other than them
also recovers the same set of shares and that they will agree on the (in)validity of the shares
in particular.
Obviously, if we use Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (or even its variation) it is not very
straightforward to achieve the two properties that (i) cooperating k servers are able to recover
all the shares, and (ii) any coalition of k 1 servers gains no information on the original secret.
Fortunately, such a structure of distributing shares is studied in a dierent context, which is
also useful in our current purpose. Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki showed the possibility of realizing
an arbitrary (monotone) access structure by showing that such a scheme is constructed form
– 107 –
an t-out-of-t secret sharing scheme [ISN93]. Their scheme first generates t-out-of-t shares
of the secret and assigns dierent subsets of t shares to dierent parties, in such a way that
no unauthorized coalition of the parties cannot complete the t shares whereas any authorized
coalition can do that.*2
We adopt this technique for distributing decryption keys among the decryption servers,
instead of distributing shares. Namely, at the setup, our scheme generates t instances of the
PKENO scheme and assigns dierent subsets of t decryption keys to dierent decryption
servers in the exactly same manner as the Ito-Saito-Nishizeki scheme assigns t shares to the
parties. The ciphertext just consists of t ciphertexts of PKENO which respectively encrypts t-
out-of-t shares of the actual plaintext. In this way, any coalition of k servers is able to recover
the entire shares and is able to confirm that another coalition of k servers will recover the
same set of shares.
The description of the scheme is as follows. Let n and k be integers with n  k  1. Let
[n] = f1; : : : ; ng. We denote byU the family of all size-(k 1) subsets of [n] and byUi its sub-
family that contains only the sets that does not contain i, that is,U = fU  [n] j jU j = k 1 g,
andUi = fU  [n] j jU j = k   1, i < U g.*3
ThKg(1; n; k). Generate

n
k 1

pairs of PKENO keys by running (pkU ; dkU)  NOKg(1)
for U 2 U and set pk = (pkU)U2U , vk = ;, and ski = (dkU)U2Ui .
ThEnc(pk;m). Run SgKg(1) to obtain a pair (vksots; sksots) of the one-time signature
scheme. Let pk be parsed as (pkU)U2U . Generate

n
k 1

-out-of-

n
k 1

shares of m
such that m =
L
U2U mU and encrypt each shares as CU  NOEnc(pkU ; vksots;mU)
for all U 2 U. Then run SgSign(sksots; hCUiU2U) to obtain sots. Finally output
C = (vksots; (CU)U2U ; sots) as the ciphertext.
*2 More formally this assignment will be done as follows. Let A be the family of all maximum unauthorized
sets. The dealer divides the original message into jAj shares by jAj-out-of-jAj and associates each share
respectively with dierent unauthorized set A 2 A. Each party i receives all the shares associated to the
unauthorized set that does not contain i.
*3 For example, if (k; n) = (2; 3), these sets is represented as U = f1; 2; 3g, U1 = f2; 3g, U2 = f1; 3g, and
U3 = f1; 2g.
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ThDec(pk; i; ski;C). Let dki and C be parsed as (skU)U2Ui and (vksots; (CU)U2U ; sots), re-
spectively. If SgVerify(vksots; hCUiU2U ; sots) = 0, output (i;?). Otherwise compute
mU  NODec(dkU ; vksots;CU) and U  NOProve(dkU ; vksots;CU) for all U 2 Ui,
and then output (i; (mU ; U)U2Ui).
ThVerify(pk; vk;C; ). Parse C as (vksots; (CU)U2U ; sots) and  as (i; ˆ). Output >valid if one
of the following conditions holds.
1. It holds that ˆ = ? and SgVerify(vksots; (CU)U2U ; sots) = 0, or
2. ˆ is parsed as (mU ; U)U2Ui and NOProve(pkU ; vksots;CU ; U) = 1 for all U 2 Ui.
Otherwise output ?.
ThCombine(pk; vk;C; 1; : : : ; k). Parse  j as (i j; ˆ j) for all j 2 [n]. Output ? if ˆ j = ?
for some j. Otherwise parse ˆ j as ˆ j = (m j;U ;  j;U)U2U j for all j 2 [k]. Output ? if
m j;U = ? for some j andU. Output? ifm j;U , m j0;U for some j, j0, andU. Otherwise,
output m =
L
U2U mU in which mU = m j;U with arbitrary j 2 [k] (the choice of j’s
does not aect the output).
Extension to Arbitrary Access Structures. The scheme is easily extended to support any
(monotone) access structure. The extension is done by simply replacing the assignment of
decryption keys to each decryption server with that described by the Ito-Saito-Nishizeki con-
struction. The security proof is done in a quite similar way to the threshold version. Thus
we omit the proof for the general access structure case but only present the proof for the
threshold case.
Security. Security of the proposed scheme is described as the following theorems. We
emphasize that contrary to the scheme in the previous section, the construction in this section
provides the strong decrytption consistency.
Theorem 5.18. The construction is chosen-ciphertext secure if the PKENO scheme is
selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext secure and the one-time signature scheme is
strongly unforgeable.
Proof. The proof proceeds with the following sequence of games.
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Game 0. Game 0 is identical to the game for the definition of the chosen-ciphertext security
of TPKE.
Game 1. In Game 1, the decryption oracle is changed to reject any decryption queries that
reuse the verification key from the challenge ciphertext.
Game 2. Let U be the set of corrupted servers. In this game, the ciphertext CU in the
challenge ciphertext is replaced with an encryption of the all-zero string.
Let S i be the event that in Game i the adversary successfully guess the bit flipped by the
challenger. In the following lemmas we prove that the changes described above changes the
probability of the successful guess by the adversary.
Lemma 5.19. Provided that the one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable, we have
that Pr[S 0]   Pr[S 1] is negligible.
Proof (of Lemma 5.19). The proof will be done in a similar way to that of Lemma 5.8. In
this case we also employ the dierence lemma with the event F defined to the case in which
the adversary issues a legitimate (i.e., dierent from the challenge) decryption query which
reuses the verification key of the one-time signature scheme from the challenge and includes
a valid one-time signature. By the dierence lemma we obtain that jPr[S 0] Pr[S 1]j < Pr[F].
Finally due to the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme we conclude Pr[F]
is negligible. 
Lemma 5.20. Provided that the labeled PKENO scheme is selective-label weakly chosen-
ciphertext secure, we have that Pr[S 1]   Pr[S 2] is negligible.
Proof (of Lemma 5.20). Let A be an arbitrary adversary of the proposed scheme. To prove
this lemma we construct a simulator B that interacts with A and tries to break the chosen-
ciphertext security of the PKENO scheme. The construction of B is as follows.
Initialize. The simulatorB receives the setU of servers to be corrupted from the adversary
A.
Setup. The simulator B generates keys (vksots; sksots) of the one-time signature scheme by
running SgKg(1), sends vksots for its own challenger as the target label, and receives a
– 110 –
public key ek from the challenger. Then the simulator B generates

n
k 1

  1 key pairs
by running (ekU ; dkU)  NOKg(1) for all U 2 U n fUg. Finally, the simulator sets
ekU  ek, pki  (ekU)U2Ui for all i 2 [n], vk = ;, ski = (dkU)U2Ui for all i 2 U and
sends pk = (ekU)U2U , vk, and (ski)i2U to the adversaryA.
Query I. When the adversary A issues a query (i;C) where C = (vksots; (CU)U2U ; sots),
the simulator responds as follows. If vksots = vksots, the simulator responds with (i;?).
Otherwise, for all U 2 Ui the simulator B computes mU and U by either running
NODec(dkU ; vksots;CU) and NOProve(dkU ; vksots;CU) for U , U or querying CU
with label vksots to the decryption-and-proof oracle for U = U. The simulator re-
sponds with (i; (mU ; U)U2Ui).
Challenge. When the adversary A submits two messages m0 and m1, the simulator pro-
ceeds as follows. The simulator first chooses a random bit b 2 f0; 1g and

n
k 1

  1,
also chooses random messages mU for all U 2 U n fUg, and encrypts these mU by
running NOEnc(ekU ; vksots;mU) to obtain CU . The simulator submits M0 = mb L
U2UnfUgmU and M1 = 0
jmb j to receive the challenge ciphertext. When the simulator
then receives the challenge ciphertext C, which is an encryption of either the correct
share of mb or garbage under the label vksots, the simulator setsCU to beC, computes
a one-time signature sots of hCUiU2U by running SgSign(sksots; hCUiU2U), and sends
(vksots; (CU)U2U ; sots) back to the adversaryA.
Query II. Again the adversary A issues decryption queries, which are responded as in the
previous phase by the simulator B.
Guess. Finally the adversaryA outputs a bit b0 and halts. The simulator outputs 1 if b = b0
and 0 otherwise.
In this simulation, if B receives the challenge ciphertext C of M0 the adversary’s view is
identical to that of Game 1, while of M1 that is identical to Game 2. This fact shows that
Pr[S 1]   Pr[S 2] = Pr[B ! 1jb = 0]   Pr[B ! 1jb = 1]. It is negligible because of the
assumption that the PKENO scheme is selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext secure. 
Finally we show that in the last game the adversary has no advantage on guessing the
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challenger’s bit.
Lemma 5.21. Pr[S 2] = 1=2.
Proof (of Lemma 5.21). In Game 2, regardless of the bit generated by the challenger of the
TPKE scheme, all the PKENO ciphertexts are ciphertexts of either a randomly-chosen string
or the all-zero string. Thus the behavior of the challenger is independent from the bit b, and
it is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary. 
These three lemmas completes the proof of the actual theorem. 
Theorem 5.22. The construction has the strong decryption consistency if the PKENO scheme
is strongly committing.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that attacks the decrytption consistency property of the above
generic construction. We construct a simulator B that breaks the committing property of the
PKENO scheme by interacting withA. The description of is as follows:
Setup. The simulator B receives a encryption/decryption key pair (ek; dk) of the PKENO
scheme from its own challenger. Then B sets up the TPKE scheme as follows: B
chooses random U from the family U and sets ekU  ek and dkU  dk. For all
U 2 U n fUg, B runs NOKg(1) to obtain (ekU ; dkU). Then B sets pk  (ekU)U2U ,
vk  ;, and ski  (dkU)U2Ui for all i 2 [n], and sends pk, vk, sk1, : : :, skn to the
adversaryA.
Forge. When the adversary outputs a triple (C; S ; S 0), the simulator B proceeds as fol-
lows. The simulator B first verifies that (C; S ; S 0) satisfies the winning condition
of the decrytption consistency game. If the condition does not satisfied, the simu-
lator aborts. Notice that if B does not abort, we have that ThCombine(pk; vk;C; S ) ,
ThCombine(pk; vk;C; S 0), since the ThVerify algorithm of our construction concerned
never outputs >invalid. Then the simulator B finds tuple (L; c;m; ;m0; 0) that breaks
the committing property of the PKENO scheme as follows: (i) when both S and S 0
claim non-? result, we have that LU2U mU , LU2U m0U . It implies that for some
U we have that mU , m0U with valid proofs U and 
0
U to a single ciphertext CU .
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Let U0 be the set satisfying this condition. In this case B outputs (L; c;m; ;m0; 0) =
(vksots;CU0 ;mU0 ; U0 ;m0U0 ; 
0
U0 ). (i) The other case is that only one of S and S
0 claims
? and the other claims a non-? plaintext. Let S claims m as the decryption result and
S 0 claims ?. In this case, for all U 2 U it holds that mU , ? and for some U 2 U
it holds that m0U = ?. Let U0 be the set such that m0U = ?. The simulator B outputs
(L; c;m; ;m0; 0) = (vksots;CU0 ;mU0 ; U0 ;?; 0U0).
The simulator B successfully breaks the committing property of the PKENO scheme when
the adversary A breaks the decrytption consistency property and U = U0. Since the distri-
bution of U is independent from the view ofA, the success probability of B is the advantage
ofA divided by

n
k 1

, which is even negligible by the assumption of the committing property
of the PKENO scheme. 
5.6 Instantiating PKENO Supporting Labels
In this section we present two specific instantiations of labeled PKENO for completeness.
The schemes can be easily obtained by tweaking the TPKE schemes by Arita and Tsuru-
dome [AT09]. We also note that Galindo et al. have already showed a generic construction
of PKENO from TPKE with appropriate security [GLF+10] and that our instantiations are al-
most obtained by instantiating their generic construction with the Arita-Tsurudome schemes.
Despite this we present concrete descriptions of our instantiations because our schemes ex-
plicitly treat the “label” functionality, which is not carried out by Galindo et al.
5.6.1 Instantiation from the Decision Bilinear Die-Hellman Assump-
tion
The first instantiation is based on the decision bilinear Die-Hellman assumption. The con-
crete construction is as follows:
NOKg(1). Run G(1) to obtain the bilinear-groups parameter (p;G;GT ; e; g). Choose ran-
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dom x  Zp and random elements v, z  G, sets u = gx, ek = (p;G;GT ; e; g; u; v; z)
and dk = x. Output (ek; dk).
NOEnc(ek; L;m). Choose a random integer r  Zp. Computes c1  gr, c2  (uLv)r, and
c3  e(u; z)rm. Output (c1; c2; c3).
NODec(dk; L; c). Parse c as (c1; c2; c3). Verify that the equation e(g; c2) = e(c1; uLv) holds,
otherwise output ?. If the equation holds, output c3=e(c1x; z).
NOProve(dk; L; c). Parse c as (c1; c2; c3). Verify that the equation e(g; c2) = e(c1; uLv) holds,
otherwise output ?. If the equation holds, output c1x.
NOVerify(pk; L;m; c; ). Parse c as (c1; c2; c3). If m = ?,  = ?, and e(g; c2) , e(c1; uLv),
output 1. If m , ? and  , ?, then output 1 when e(g; ) = e(c1; u), e(g; c2) =
e(c1; uLv), and c3=m = e(; z). Otherwise, output 0.
The scheme is proven to be secure under the decision bilinear Die-Hellman assumption.
Theorem 5.23. The above construction is selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext secure
provided the decision bilinear Die-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof. Let A be the adversary which attacks the DBDH-based instantiation with advantage
. We construct a simulator B that solves the decision bilinear Die-Hellman problem with
the same advantage. The description of B is as follows.
Initialize. Given a problem instance (g; g; g; g;T ), in which T is either e(g; g) or a
random element from GT , B runsA with input the security parameter 1 and receives
a label L.
Setup. The simulator B then sets up the public key ek = (g; u; v; z) for the scheme, where
u  g, v  u Lgt with random t 2 Zp, and z  g. The simulator B sends ek to the
adversaryA.
Query I. When A issues a decryption-and-proof query (L; c) where c = (c1; c2; c3), B re-
sponds as follows. If the query does not satisfy the equation e(g; c2) = e(c1; uLv), B
responds with (?;?). Otherwise B computes   (c2=c1t)1=(L L) and m c3=e(; z),
and returns (m; ) toA. The simulation is perfect, that is,A’s view in interaction with
B is identical to the view in interaction with the challenger in the security definition.
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Actually, given that the equation (g; c2) = (c1; uLv) holds, we have that c1 = gr and
c2 = (uLv)r for some r 2 Zp. Furthermore, since A is restricted to issue queries that
satisfy L , L, from a simple calculation we also have that  = ur. From this it follows
that the simulation is perfect.
Challenge. WhenA issues a pair (m0;m1), B generates the challenge ciphertext (c1; c2; c3)
by letting c1  g, c2  (g)t, and c3  T  mb with random b  f0; 1g. Then B
returns c = (c1; c2; c3) to A. The simulation is again perfect except the distribution
of c3, which is perfect under the condition that T = e(g; g)
. This follows from
corresponding  to the randomness r in the (challenge) ciphertext and noticing that
the ciphertext is generated under the label L. We also note that if T is a random
element no information on b is given to the adversary in a information-theoretical
sense.
Query II. In this phase A again issues decryption-and-proof queries, to which B responds
as in the previous phase.
Guess. Finally the adversaryA outputs a guess b0. The simulator B outputs 1 if b = b0 and
outputs 0 otherwise.
The above description shows that if T = e(g; g), B outputs 1 with probability 1=2 + ,
whereas if T is a random element outputs 1 with probability 1=2. This shows that the ad-
vantage of B in solving the DBDH problem is (1=2 + )   1=2 = , which completes the
proof. 
Theorem 5.24. The DBDH-based construction is strongly committing.
Proof. Given two message-proof pairs (m; ) and (m0; 0) for a ciphertext c = (c1; c2; c3) and
a common label L, we argue that if two proofs  and 0 are both valid, two messages are
equal (with probability 1). Firstly, the case that only one of m and m0 is ? and the other is
not, will never occur. This is simply because that the proof for ? implies that the equation
e(g; c2) = e(c1; uLv) dose not hold and the proof for non-? implies that the equation does hold.
Hence we assume that neitherm norm0 are?. Since the equations e(g; ) = e(c1; u) = e(g; 0),
which are verified to hold in the NOVerify algorithm of the construction, we have that  = 0
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due to the non-degenerate (and bijective when one argument is fixed) property of the bilinear
map e. It finally implies that m = c3=e(; z) = c3=e(0; z) = m0, in which the first and third
equations come from the equations verified in the NOVerify algorithm, and the second from
the fact  = 0. 
5.6.2 Instantiation from the Decision Linear Assumption
The other instantiation is based on the decision linear assumption. The construction is as
follows:
NOKg(1). Run G(1) to obtain the bilinear-groups parameter (p;G;GT ; e; g). Choose ran-
dom x, y  Zp and random elements U, V  G, sets u = gx, v = gy, ek =
(p;G;GT ; e; u; v;U;V) and dk = (x; y). Output (ek; dk).
NOEnc(ek; L;m). Choose a random integer r, s  Zp. Computes c1  ur, c2  vs,
c3  (gLU)r, c4  (gLV)s, and c5  gr+sm. Output (c1; c2; c3; c4; c5).
NODec(dk; L; c). Parse c as (c1; c2; c3; c4; c5). Verify the equation e(c3; u) = e(gLU; c1)
and e(c4; v) = e(gLV; c2) hold, otherwise output ?. If the equation holds, output
c5=c11=xc21=y.
NOProve(dk; L; c). Parse c as (c1; c2; c3; c4; c5). Verify that the equation e(c3; u) =
e(gLU; c1) and e(c4; v) = e(gLV; c2) hold, otherwise output ?. If the equation holds,
output  = ((u); (v)) = (c11=x; c21=y).
NOVerify(pk; L;m; c; ). Parse c as (c1; c2; c3; c4; c5). If m = ?,  = ?, and either e(c3; u) ,
e(gLU; c1) or e(c4; v) , e(gLV; c2) hold, output 1. Ifm , ? and  is parsed as ((u); (v)),
then output 1 when e(c1; g) = e(u; (u)), e(c2; g) = e(v; (v)), e(c3; u) = e(gLU; c1),
e(c4; v) = e(gLV; c2), and c5=m = (u)(v). Otherwise output 0.
Security proofs can be done in a similar way to the DBDH-based construction. Since the
security proof for this scheme will be done almost similarly to the DBDH-based scheme, we
omit the formal proof for the DLIN-based instantiation.
Theorem 5.25. The DLIN-based construction is selective-label weakly chosen-ciphertext
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secure provided the decision linear assumption holds.
Theorem 5.26. The DLIN-based construction is strongly committing.
5.7 Conclusion
We presented three constructions of TPKE with decryption consistency. The first and second
scheme is in fact dynamic TPKE. The first scheme is actually a generic construction from
PKENO with the weak decryption consistency. The second scheme deviates from a generic
construction, while providing a shorter ciphertext length than the first scheme and the strong
decryption consistency. These two schemes are the first dynamic TPKE with the (weak or
strong) decryption consistency which do not rely on neither q-type assumptions or random
oracles. The third scheme puts forward the possibility of a generic construction of TPKE with
the strong decryption consistency, and show that it is possibly at cost of being a non-dynamic
scheme and allowing only a smaller (logarithmic) number of decryption servers.
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Part III
Applying Group Signature to a
New Extension of Public-key
Encryption

Chapter 6
Restrictive Public-key Encryption
In this chapter, we present a new extension of public-key encryption, which we name restric-
tive public-key encryption scheme. This extension has several useful application, to name a
few, multiparty computation secure against malicious adversary.
This contribution is categorized as the type (II) in the Sect. 1.1.3. The notion of restrictive
PKE is obtained by translating the revocation extension*1 (and its related security notion) of
group signature to those of public-key encryption, via the generic construction of (ordinary)
public-key encryption from group signature.
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Background and Motivation
Public key encryption schemes are required to hide even partial information of plaintexts.
This strong requirement is formalized as the notion of semantic security [GM84], and it is
currently considered as even one of the lowest requirement for encryption scheme.
As a consequence of the strong secrecy requirement of semantic security, no one can detect
the ciphertext which encrypts some particular plaintexts. This paper considers how to add
*1 The revocation extension of group signature allows the group manager to revoke the membership of group
member securely. Once the membership of a group member is revoked, the member no longer able to generate
a signature that verified as valid by the verification algorithm.
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such a functionality to public key encryption without losing reasonable secrecy of encrypted
plaintexts. To formally treat this functionality, we define the notion of restrictive public
key encryption (RPKE). RPKE allows a trusted third party to specify a set of prohibited
messages, and anyone can detect a ciphertext which encrypts one of the prohibited messages.
Moreover, this verification process is required not to leak information about the encrypted
plaintext except whether it is a prohibited messages or not.
Such a functionality can be realized using well-known NIZK technique, like a general
NIZK through the Hamilton path problem. In this paper, we explore further ecient construc-
tion, and proposes a scheme that achieves shorter ciphertext whose length does not increase
as the number of allowed messages increase.
One of the application of RPKE is a countermeasure against abuse of a public key infras-
tructure by terrorists. This is achieved by disallowing encryption of crime-related messages,
and forbid terrorists from using a public key infrastructure to planning terrorism or sending
instruction for terrorist activities. Another application may be a format-checking in electronic
voting, by disallowing encryption of irregular format ballots. In this application, only encryp-
tions of correctly-formatted voting is allowed, and gateways can dispose any encrypted ballot
of irregular format without violating privacy of voters. Parental control and SPAM-mail
filtering are further potential application of RPKE. Restrictive PKE would be also useful in
multiparty computation in which parties sends ciphertexts whose plaintexts should have some
specific formats. In such a case a malicious participants sends encryption of irregular-format
plaintexts which will cause several security issues. A RPKE scheme allows honest parties to
detect such irregular ciphertexts.
6.1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we give a formal definition of RPKE. We also give ecient constructions of
RPKE. The definition even captures very strong security of chosen-ciphertext security. The
construction utilizes the techniques of Teranishi et al. [TFS09], Boudot [Bou00], and Nakan-
ishi et al. [NFHF10], which techniques are all developed in the context of group signature
with revocation, in order to obtain an ecient construction. The construction also has a
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capability of updating the message space specified by the authority. We again emphasize
that the construction given in this paper is quite more ecient than the trivial construc-
tion employing the general NIZK technique through the Hamilton path problem and even
more ecient than a simple OR-proof based construction. More concretely, the encryp-
tion cost, the verification cost, and the ciphertext length is constant (independent from the
number of allowed messages and the number of prohibited messages), whereas in the OR-
proof construction they all linearly increase as allowed messages increase. This eciency is
achieved by the use of techniques of Teranishi et al. [TFS09], Boudot [Bou00], and Nakan-
ishi et al. [NFHF10]. The proposed construction uses the BB signature [BB08] and the BBS+
signature [ASM06, BBS04, FI06] and further uses non-interactive proofs proving possession
of the signature. This non-interactive proofs are constructed from novel algebraic properties
of the BB signature and the BBS+ signature. Furthermore, we also briefly discuss the OR-
proof construction as an alternative construction suitable for the case of small number of the
permitted messages.
6.1.3 Related Work
Verifiable encryption [CD00, CS03a, TV09] is one of the most widely known ways to restrict
contents under the secret channel and enables anyone to verify whether encrypted messages
satisfy certain restrictions or not without leaking other information about plaintexts. How-
ever, verifiable encryption does not have the capability of disallowing to encrypt some spec-
ified messages. Fuchsbauer and Pointcheval [FP09] proposed a techniques to verify whether
an encrypted plaintext satisfies some pairing-product equation, but it also lacks a capability
of restricting the message space. Searchable encryption [BDCOP04] seems to be a promis-
ing technique to construct RPKE, that is, once the authority publicizes trapdoor information
corresponding to some prohibited keyword, anyone can detect ciphertexts that encrypt one of
the prohibited keyword. However, in order to update the message space publicized by the au-
thority, this approach requires to revoke the trapdoor previously publicized. Since all known
searchable encryption schemes does not have such a capability, searchable encryption cannot
be directly adopted to the RPKE context. Another approach is publicizing all trapdoors for
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allowed messages, in order to recover encrypted message by using this trapdoor information
and detecting prohibited messages. However, this approach is also inappropriate, because the
information of encrypted message is completely leaked due to the trapdoor information publi-
cized by the authority. Gonza´lez Nieto et al. [GNMP+12] proposed a primitive called publicly
verifiable ciphertexts [GNMP+12], in which the consistency check of chosen-ciphertext se-
cure encryption can be outsourced from the receiver, and a ciphertext can be converted into
another form which still guarantees chosen-plaintext security.
There are several recent development on the techniques for ecient NIZK proof applica-
ble to broad classes of languages (such as the Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08]). These techniques
can achieve quite high security level (as its security can be proved without relying on ran-
dom oracles from standard assumption), without loosing fairly practical eciency. However,
these techniques do not achieve really practical performance comparing to the techniques
developed in the random oracle model such as the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
6.2 Restrictive Public Key Encryption
6.2.1 Motivating Discussion
First, to control the contents under secure communications, we consider a scenario as follows.
Let us consider four entities: a message restriction authority (MRA), a verifier, a sender, and
a receiver. The MRA indicates a restricted message space MS (a set of allowed messages),
and publicizes the corresponding public verification key to verifiers and senders. A verifier
(which is assumed to be a gateway) inspects whether a ciphertext sent by the sender is an
encryption of a value belonging to the message space MS. We require that any information
about a plaintext is not revealed from a ciphertext, except the above information. In addition,
a verifier inspects all ciphertext, and disposes it if it does not pass the verification process.
In this scenario, the MRA can control the encrypted contents without compromising user
privacy.
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6.2.2 Formal Definitions
Definition 6.1. A restrictive public key encryption (RPKE) consists of six algorithms
(MRASetup;RKeyGen;MSSetup;REnc;VerifyMS;RDec) such that:
MRASetup: The key generation algorithm for the MRA takes as input a security parameter
 2 N, and returns a public key pkMRA and a private key skMRA.
RKeyGen: The receiver key generation algorithm takes as input pkMRA, and returns a public
key pkdec and a private key skdec.
MSSetup: The public verification key generation algorithm takes as inputs pkMRA, skMRA,
and MS , and returns the public verification key pkMS.
REnc: The encryption algorithm takes as inputs pkMRA, pkdec, MS , pkMS, and a message
M, and returns a ciphertext C. If M < MS , then the algorithm returns ?.
VerifyMS: The public verification algorithm takes as inputs pkMRA, pkd, MS , pkMS, and C,
and returns a bit 1 or 0.
RDec: The decryption algorithm takes as inputs pkMRA, pkd, skd, MS , pkMS, and C, and
returns M or ?.
As a correctness, a RPKE scheme has to satisfy that for any  2 N, any restric-
tive message space MS, any message M 2 MS, (pkMRA; skMRA)  MRASetup(1),
(pkd; skd)  RKeyGen(pkMRA), pkMS  MSSetup(pkMRA, skMRA;MS ), and C  
REnc(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;M), it holds that RDec(pkMRA; pkd; skd;MS ; pkMS;C) = M
and VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;C) = 1.
Here, we describe an implementation of a scenario to control the contents under se-
cure communications (presented in Sect. 6.2.1) using RPKE notations. The MRA runs
MRASetup(1), publicizes its public key pkMRA, and keeps its secret key skMRA. The MRA
indicates an allowed message space MS , runs MSSetup(pkMRA; skMRA;MS ), and publicizes
pkMS. A receiver runs RKeyGen(pkMRA) and publicizes its public key pkdec, and keeps
its corresponding secret key skdec. For a plaintext M, a sender computes a ciphertext C
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by running REnc(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;M), and sends C to a verifier (which is assumed
to be gateway). By using only public values pkMRA, pkdec, and pkMS, a verifier checks
whether M 2 MS or not without decrypting C. In addition, this procedure should be done
without any interaction with other entities. If VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS  ;C) = 1
(i.e., M 2 MS ), then the verifier forwards C to the corresponding receiver. Otherwise, if
VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS  ;C) = 0 (i.e., M < MS or C is an ill-formed value), the
verifier disposes C. The receiver runs RDec(pkMRA; pkd; skd;MS ; pkMS;C), and obtains M.
The receiver does not have to consider MS for decrypting C. In the above scenario, The
MRA and the verifier cannot obtain any information about a plaintext M from a ciphertext,
except whether M 2 MS or not. If MS is changed updated to MS 0, then the MRA runs
MSSetup(pkMRA; skMRA;MS 0), and publicizes pkMS 0 again. And then pkMS0 is broadcasted
to all users.
Here we define verification soundness, which requires that all dishonestly-generated ci-
phertext never passes the verification process of VerifyMS. Furthermore, this notion requires
even a ciphertext which is honestly-generated with MS not to pass the verification process
with a dierent message space MS0. The latter prevents a sender from reusing a previous
public verification key pkMS. To guarantee that even a receiver cannot produce such a in-
valid (dishonestly-generated but passing the verification) ciphertext, we allow A to obtain
(pkd; skd).
Definition 6.2. A RPKE is said to satisfy verification soundness if the advantage
Pr[(pkMRA; skMRA) MRASetup(1);
(pkdec; skdec) RKeyGen(pkMRA);
(MS ; pkMS  ;C) AMSSetup(pkMRA;skMRA;)(pkMRA; pkdec; skdec);
: VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS  ;C) = 1
^ RDec(pkMRA; pkd; skd;MS ; pkMS  ;C) < MS 
^ pkMS  is received from MSSetup oracle by query MS]
is negligible for any PPT adversaryA.
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Next, we define indistinguishability with restrictive message space under chosen ciphertext
attack (IND-MSR-CCA). To guarantee that even the MRA cannot decrypt a ciphertext, we
assume thatA can obtain (pkMRA; skMRA).
Definition 6.3. A RPKE is said to satisfy IND-MSR-CCA if the advantage
Pr[(pkMRA; skMRA) MRASetup(1);
(pkdec; skdec) RKeyGen(pkMRA);
(M0;M

1;MS
) ARDec(pkMRA;pkdec;skdec;;;)(pkMRA; skMRA; pkd);
b f0; 1g; pkMS  MSSetup(pkMRA; skMRA;MS);
C  REnc(pkMRA; pkd;MS; pkMS ;Mb);
b0  ARDec(pkMRA;pkdec;skdec;;;)(s;C) : b = b0]   1=2
is negligible for any PPT adversary A which satisfies the following conditions: (1) The
adversaryA does not query the decryption oracle RDec(pkMRA; pkd; skd; ; ; ) with the query
(MS; pkMS ;C) after receiving the challenge ciphertext C and (2) M0, M

1, and MS
 output
by the adversaryA always satisfy that M0, M1 2 MS .
6.3 Useful Techniques
In this section, we explain the techniques used in the main scheme presented in Sect. 6.4,
which are Teranishi et al., Boudot, and Nakanishi et al. [Bou00, NFHF10, TFS09]. For ease
of understanding at first we explain the proposed scheme in a somewhat abstract manner, and
then we describe the scheme in detail.
Let [1;N] = f1; : : : ;Ng be a set of all possible messages (may or may not be prohibited)
and r be the number of all prohibited messages. We say that the sequence (m1; : : : ;mr) is the
consecutive prohibited messages of MS when fm1; : : : ;mrg is the all prohibited messages of
MS and it holds that m1 <    < mr. Later (m1; : : : ;mr) denotes the consecutive prohibited
messages of MS, whereMS is the allowed message space implicit in the context.
From the highest perspective, the proposed construction is to encrypt a plaintext M by
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computing c = PEnc(pkd;M; u) and adding a non-interactive proof  that proves that M 2
MS, and constitute a whole ciphertext (c; ) as c = PEnc(pkd;M; u) and
 = NIZKf (M; u) : c = PEnc(pkd;M; u) ^ M 2 MS g:
For example,  is a OR-proof (through Fiat-Shamir heuristics) as NIZKfM : (M = M1) _
   _ (M = MN r)g, however, the eciency might linearly depend on the number of allowed
messages N r. Or, when using inequality proof with OR-proof to construct a proof , the ef-
ficiency increases linearly depends on the number of prohibited messages r. These construc-
tion does not provide satisfiable eciency. To improve the eciency of the construction, we
employ a technique developed by Nakanishi et al. [NFHF10]. Before explaining the Nakan-
ishi et al. technique, we explain two other technique developed by Teranishi et al. [TFS09]
and Boudot [Bou00], which are used as building blocks in the Nakanishi et al. technique.
6.3.1 Teranishi et al. Technique [TFS09]
Using the technique of Teranishi, Furukawa, and Sako [TFS09], we can reduce the compu-
tational complexity just mentioned above. Briefly speaking, Teranishi et al. technique is an
NIZK proof of knowledge that proves a secret knowledge ! is in the interval [1;N]. This
technique involves a signature scheme (SgKg;SgSign;SgVerify), and its NIZK proof has
the form of NIZKf(S ; !) : SgVerify(!; S ) = 1g (where the witness is (S ; !)). This proof
system can be eciently constructed by using an appropriate signature scheme (the BB sig-
nature [BB08] is used indeed) and its algebraic property.
When applying this technique to the RPKE construction, we get the following improve-
ment: In the setup, the MRA generates a verification/signing key pair and secretly possesses
the signing key. The MRA then publicizes signatures for all allowed messages. To encrypt a
message M, a sender uses the signature S publicized by the MRA and compute a ciphertext
c = PEnc(pkd;M; u) and a proof of knowledge
 = NIZKf (M; u; S ) : c = PEnc(pkd;M; u) ^ SgVerify(M; S ) = 1 g; (6.1)
which is attached to the ciphertext c. In this way, if a sender wants to encrypt an allowed
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message M 2 MS, he can generate an acceptable  using SgSign(M) publicized by the
MRA. In contrast, if a sender wants to encrypt a prohibited message M0 < MS, he can-
not generate an acceptable proof  of the form above. This is because the MRA does not
publicize SgSign(M0), nor the sender cannot generate SgSign(M0) by himself (due to the
unforgeability of the signature), and thus the sender cannot generate the proof of knowledge
NIZKf(M0; S ) : SgVerify(M0; S ) = 1g due to the lack of the knowledge needed.
Furthermore, the computational cost of verification of the proof does not depend on
the number of allowed messages, because the proof of knowledge NIZKf(M; u; S ) : c =
PEnc(pkd;M; u)^SgVerify(M; S ) = 1g used here does not depend on the number of allowed
messages.
6.3.2 Boudot Technique [Bou00]
The construction discussed above requires the MRA to publicize jMSj signatures. Mo-
tivated to reduce this large size of the public parameter, we then introduce Boudot’s
technique [Bou00]. Although the technique itself is not directly applied to our context of
the set-membership proof, it was shown to be applicable to this context by Nakanishi et
al. [NFHF10].
The technique is proving a relationship between hidden integers. The relationship proved
by this technique is the form ! = !12 + !2 in which !, !1, and !2 are integers hidden
as witness. This technique can potentially reduce the size of the public parameter of our
construction.
The point is that when an arbitrary integer ! 2 [1;N] is expressed as ! = !1 + !2, !1 and
!2 run the smaller ranges of [1;N1] = b
p
Nc and [1;N2] = b2
p
Nc respectively. Utilizing this
fact, if we want to prove that an encrypted plaintext is in the range [1;N] of this specific form,
we can directly apply the Boudot technique. Instead of publicizing N signatures of messages
1, : : :, N (as in the Teranishi et al. technique), the authority publicizes signatures on messages
1, : : :, N1 = b
p
Nc and signature on 1, : : :, N2 = b2
p
Nc (by a dierent signing key). A sender
who wants to prove his ciphertext encrypts a message ! is in the range [1;N] can construct
an non-interactive proof as follows: First he decomposes the message ! as ! = !12 + !2 in
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which !1 2 [1;N1] and !2 2 [1;N2]. Then prove the knowledge of the signatures on !1 and
!2 and simultaneously proves the relationship ! = !12+!2 between the two signed message
and the encrypted message.
This technique can only prove membership of a single interval [a; b], but it is not able to
prove membership of union of several intervals [a1; b1][[a2; b2][  [[an; bn]. The latter type
of proof system can be used for our purpose of constructing RPKE. Teranishi et al. provided
a technique for the set-membership proof of this type, which is explained in the next section.
6.3.3 Nakanishi et al. Technique [NFHF10]
The proposed scheme is obtained by combining Nakanishi et al.’s technique with the Boudot
techniques. Nakanishi et al.’s technique utilizes the fact that if all the prohibited messages are
denoted as m1, : : :, mr, and m1 <    < mr holds, then any allowed message M 2 MS has a
unique “position” j such that m j < M < m j+1 holds, and any prohibited message M < MS has
no such position. Another fact that the technique relies on is that when N < p=2 holds, y > x
is logically equivalent to y   x mod p 2 [1;N] for any x, y 2 [1;N]. Using these properties,
one can prove the fact M 2 MS by proving the existence of j such that m j < M < m j+1
instead, and prove m j < M < m j+1 itself by proving M   m j 2 [1;N] ^ m j+1   M 2 [1;N].
To prove M  m j 2 [1;N], one can further apply the Boudot technique as proving knowledge
of signatures SgSign(1) and SgSign(2) such that M   m j = 12 + 2 to reduce the size
of the public parameter that the MRA has to prepare. More precisely, in order to ensure
that m j and m j+1 used to prove M   m j 2 [1;N] are the prohibited messages, a sender also
proves knowledge of signatures SgSign(m j;m j+1). This technique is originally developed by
Nakanishi et al. [NFHF10] in the context of revocable group signature. We further apply the
technique of Nakanishi et al., in order to construct an ecient RPKE scheme.
Putting all together, the ciphertext of the proposed construction has the form of (c; ), and
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each of components are computed as
c = PEnc(pkd;M; u);
 = NIZK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(M; u; S 00; S 1; S 01; S 2; S
0
2;
1; 2; 1; 2;m j;m j+1)
: SgVerify((m j;m j+1); S 00) = 1
^ SgVerify(1; S 1) = 1
^ SgVerify(1; S 01) = 1
^ SgVerify0(2; S 2) = 1
^ SgVerify0(2; S 02) = 1
^ M   m j = 12 + 2 mod p
^ m j+1   M = 12 + 2 mod p
^ c = PEnc(pkd;M; u)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
: (6.2)
We again emphasize that , a non-interactive proof of knowledge, can be instantiated ef-
ficiently, which is obtained from algebraic properties of the involved public key encryp-
tion scheme and signature scheme (More concretely, algebraic property of the BB signa-
ture [BB08] and the BBS+ signature [ASM06, BBS04, FI06] is used, and for the detailed
description of these two signature scheme see Sect. 6.4.3).
6.3.4 Updating pkMS
The above idea does not provide the functionality of updating the message space, but a sim-
ple modification (which will be explained below) enables us to obtain such a functionality.
To update the message space specified by the MRA from MS to MS0 where the prohibited
messages of MS and MS0 are fm1; : : : ;mrg and fm01; : : : ;m0r0 g respectively, one may think that
just re-publicizing signatures SgSign00(m0i ;m
0
i+1) for all i 2 f0; : : : ; r0g is suce to do that
(where m00 = 0 and m
0
r0+1 = N + 1 as in the construction). However, in this way, a malicious
sender will re-use some old signature SgSign00(mi;mi+1) and try to fool the verification pro-
cess, which inspects whether a ciphertext encrypts a value belonging to a new message space
MS0. A simple way to avoid the above attack is to publicize signatures SgSign(t;mi;mi+1)
where t is a serial number, instead of SgSign(mi;mi+1). In this case a malicious sender is no
longer able to re-use old signatures to fool the verification process.
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6.4 Constructions
In this section we describes the main proposed scheme. The proposed scheme borrow the
ideas described in the previous section, which have been developed in the context of revoca-
ble group signature. Noticing the similarity between requirement of revocation and that of
RPKE, in which the former demands that a group signature hides all partial information of
the member’s identity and makes the fact that the signer is not one of the revoked members
publicly verifiable, whereas the latter demands a ciphertext to hide all partial information
of the plaintext whereas it also claims the encrypted plaintext is not one of the prohibited
messages in a publicly-verifiable form, we decide to borrow the idea from revocable group
signature schemes to construct ecient RPKE schemes.
6.4.1 High Level Description of the Proposed Scheme
Using the ideas we mentioned above, we show a construction of RPKE. In order to give a
high-level overview of the proposed scheme, we first show the proposed scheme in the form
of generic construction. Then we present the specific construction of RPKE in a later section.
The generic construction is based on an IND-CCA secure PKE, an EUF-CMA secure signa-
ture, and a -protocol for Eq. (6.2). In the following, let [1;N] = f1; : : : ;Ng be a set of whole
possible messages (they may or may not be prohibited), r be the number of prohibited mes-
sages. Let (PKg;PEnc;PDec) be an IND-CCA secure public key encryption scheme, (SgKg;
SgSign;SgVerify), (SgKg0;SgSign0;SgVerify0), and (SgKg00;SgSign00;SgVerify00) be EUF-
CMA secure signature schemes. The construction is as follows:
MRASetup(1): Run (Ks;Kv)  SgKg(1), (K0s;K0v)  SgKg0(1), and (K00s ;K00v )  
SgKg00(1). For k 2 [1; b pNc], compute 1;k  SgSign0(K0s; k). For k 2 [0; b2
p
Nc],
compute 2;k  SgSign00(K00s ; k). Output pkMRA = (Kv;K0v;K00v , f1;kgb
p
Nc
k=1 ,
f2;kgb2
p
Nc
k=0 ) and skMRA = (Ks;K
0
s;K
00
s ).
RKeyGen(pkMRA): Run (pk; sk) PKg(1), and output pkd = pk and skd = sk.
MSSetup(pkMRA; skMRA;MS ): Let MS = [1;N] n fm1; : : : ;mrg where m1 <    < mr, m0 =
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0, and mr+1 = N + 1. Choose a current serial number t 2 Zp. For ` 2 [0; r], compute
`  SgSign(Ks; t;m`;m`+1). Output pkMS = (t; f`gr`=0).
REnc(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;M): For M 2 MS , find the position j such that m j < M <
m j+1. If there is no such m j (which means M < MS ), output ?. Otherwise, find  j
from pkMS, compute 1; 1 2 [1; b
p
Nc], and 2; 2 2 [0; b2
p
Nc], where M   m j =
1
2 + 2 and m j+1   M = 12 + 2 and find 1;1 , 2;2 , 1;1 , and 2;2 from pkMRA.
Compute c = PEnc(pkd;M; u), and  of the following relations:
NIZK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(M; u;  j; 1;1 ; 2;2 ; 1;1 ; 2;2 ;
1; 2; 1; 2;m j;m j+1)
:  j = SgSign(t;m j;m j+1)
^ SgVerify0(1; 1;1) = 1
^ SgVerify00(2; 2;2) = 1
^ SgVerify0(1; 1;1) = 1
^ SgVerify00(2; 2;2) = 1
^ M   m j = 12 + 2 mod p
^ m j+1   M = 12 + 2 mod p
^ c = PEnc(pkd;M; u)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Finally, output C = (c; ).
VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;C): Output 1 if  is a valid proof, and 0, otherwise.
RDec(pkMRA; pkd; skd;MS ; pkMS;C): Verify the ciphertext as above and output
PDec(skd;C) if the verification succeeds, otherwise output ?.
The above construction, especially the zero-knowledge proof of Eq. (6.1), can be quite
eciently instantiated when one adopts appropriate digital signatures and Teranishi et al.,
Boudot, and Nakanishi et al. techniques. More concretely, the BBS+ signature [ASM06,
BBS04, FI06] is applied for SgSign, and two instance of the BB signature [BB08] are ap-
plied for SgSign0 and SgSign00. When applying the BBS+ signature and the BB signature,
adopting the techniques of [BBS04, NFHF10], the zero-knowledge proof of Eq. (6.1) is ef-
ficiently constructed, and the entire RPKE construction becomes drastically more ecient
than the construction employing the general NIZK technique. We choose these two schemes
because of the following reasons: the BB signature is chosen due to suitability for construct-
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ing higher-level protocols and additionally its eciency. The BB scheme, which is not only
one of the most ecient signature schemes in the discrete-log type schemes, but also al-
lows us to construct ecient zero-knowledge protocols [BBS04] of proving the knowledge
of the signature. We also employ the BBS+ scheme, in addition to the BB scheme, in or-
der to sign sequences of integers without destroying algebraic property of the integers to be
signed (like hashing integers into a single one), which property is utilized in constructing the
zero-knowledge proof involving the BBS+ signatures. We choose the BBS+ scheme for this
domain-extension purpose because this scheme is a natural extension of the BB scheme, and
thus we do not need any additional assumption to that of the BB scheme. Other type of sig-
natures is also known to allows this domain extension and to be able to provide appropriate
zero-knowledge protocols (to name a few, the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature also allows
this kind of domain extension [CL03, CL04]). However, these signature schemes require
extra assumptions and may reduce simplicity of the resulted RPKE scheme.
A drawback of this construction is that the plaintext space has to be small. More concretely,
[1;N], the set of all possible (prohibited or allowed) messages, has to be just a polynomially
(not exponentially) large. Due to the construction of NIZK proof, a message M 2 [1;N]
have to be encoded into the underlying group as gM , and hence a receiver must compute
a discrete logarithm of gM in order to recover the message M. This constraint causes an
inecient decryption. However, it can be bypassed by restricting N to be suciently small
to compute a discrete logarithm eciently. When one can use Pollard’s lambda method, M
can be recovered from gM in O(
p
N) computation time.
6.4.2 Security Analysis
The above construction satisfies the security requirement of verification soundness and IND-
MSR-CCA security.
Theorem 6.4. The construction given above satisfies verification soundness if the under-
lying signature scheme (SgKg;SgSign;SgVerify) is EUF-CMA secure, signatures (SgKg0,
SgSign0, SgVerify0) and (SgKg00, SgSign00, SgVerify00) are EUF-wCMA secure, and the
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NIZK proof is constructed from -protocol by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics.
Proof. The NIZK proof has an extractor of the proved secret knowledge: given two accepting
protocol views, where commitments are the same but challenges are dierent. By  =
SgSign(; ; ) extracted from the output of A, we consider two cases (1)  < pkMS  , and
(2)  2 pkMS  . Let M := RDec pkMRA; pkd; skd;C. From the definition of verification
soundness, M 2 fm1;m2; : : : ;mrg.
Case 1: We construct an algorithm B that forges one of the underlying signature scheme
(SgKg, SgSign, SgVerify). Let C be the challenger of unforgeability game of this signature.
C sends a public value for verification Kv to B. B computes other public values, and sends
pkMRA to A. By using the signing oracle of the unforgeability game, B can answer message
space queries sent from A. A outputs C. Since VerifyMS pkMRA; pkd; pkMS  ;C = 1,
using the extractor of the NIZK, B obtains  and the corresponding signed messages. Since
 < pkMS  ,  is not an answer of the signing oracle. Therefore,B outputs a forged signature
 and wins.
Case 2: We construct an algorithm B0 that forges one of the underlying signature scheme
(SgKg0, SgSign0, SgVerify0). Let C0 be the challenger of unforgeability game of this signa-
ture under the weakly chosen message attack [BB08]. First, B0 sends messages 1; : : : ; b pNc
to C0. Although, we describe the attack of signatures1;, the attack of signatures2; is simi-
larly described, and therefore we omit this part (in this case B0 sends messages 0; : : : ; b2pNc
to C0). C0 sends a public value for verification K0v to B0. B0 obtains f1;kgb
p
Nc
k=1 from A,
computes other public values, and sends pkMRA to A. Since B0 has a signing key Ks of
the underlying signature scheme (SgKg;SgSign;SgVerify), B0 can answer message space
queries. A outputs C. Since VerifyMS pkMRA; pkd; pkMS  ;C = 1, using the extractor of
the NIZK, B0 obtains  and the corresponding signed messages. Since  2 pkMS  , let
 := SgSign(t;m j ;m j+1). Using the extractor of the NIZK, B0 obtains 1, 2, 1;1 , 2;2 ,
1, 2, 1;1 , and 2;2 , with the conditions M
 m j mod p = 12+2 andm j+1 M mod p =
1
2+2. Next, we show thatm j+1  M orm j  M holds as follows: Since M < MS  from
the definition of verification soundness, there exists m j0 such that j0 2 [1; r] and M = m j0 .
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For all m` < m j0 , m` < M and m`+1  M hold. In addition, for all m`  m j0 , m`  M
and m`+1 > M hold. Therefore, for the consecutive m j and m j+1, m j+1  M or m j  M
holds*2. This means m j+1   M  0 or 0  M   m j in Z. If 0  M   m j , then set
 := M   m j mod p, (1) := 1, (2) := 2, 1; := 1;1 , and 2; := 2;2 . Otherwise, If
m j+1   M  0, then set  := m j+1   M mod p, (1) := 1, (2) := 2, 1; := 1;1 , and
2; := 1;2 . Under the assumption b
p
Nc2 + b2pNc < p=2,  2 [p=2; p   1] holds, and
therefore (1) < [1; b pNc] or (2) < [0; b2pNc] hold. If (2) < [0; b2pNc], then B0 aborts.
Note that the case (2) < [0; b2pNc] can be captured in the attack of the signature scheme
(SgKg00;SgSign00;SgVerify00). Now we assume that (1) < [1; b pNc]. B0 outputs a forged
signature and message pair ((1); 1;(1)), and wins, since (1) is not an input of the signing
oracle. 
Theorem 6.5. The construction given above is IND-MSR-CCA secure if the underlying PKE
scheme is IND-CCA secure and the NIZK proof is constructed from -protocol by using Fiat-
Shamir heuristics.
Proof. Due to the zero-knowledge-ness of NIZK proof, any information is not revealed from
. Therefore, we can reduce the IND-MSR-CCA game to the IND-CCA game of the un-
derlying PKE scheme. Let A be an adversary who breaks the IND-MSR-CCA security of
our RPKE scheme, and C the challenger of the IND-CCA game of the corresponding PKE
scheme. Then, we can construct an algorithm B that breaks the IND-CCA security of the
underlying PKE scheme. First, C gives a public key of the PKE scheme pk to B. B sets pk
to pkd, and sends pkd toA. WhenA issues a decryption query C = (c; ), B checks whether
C is a valid ciphertext or not. If C is valid, then B simply forwards the corresponding part of
this query c to C as a decryption query of the IND-CCA game. WhenA sends the challenge
messages M0 and M

1, B forwards M0 and M1 to C as the challenge messages. C returns
the challenge ciphertext c. B computes the challenge ciphertext of RPKE by applying the
simulated NIZK proofs, say . B sends the challenge ciphertext of RPKE (c; ) toA. IfA
issues a valid (which means the VerifyMS algorithm returns 1) decryption query C = (c; ),
*2 Note that both cases M < m1 and mr < M are included in these two cases.
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then we can construct an algorithm B0 who extracts signed messages m j, 1, and 2 from C,
computes Mb = 12 + 2 +m j, outputs b, and wins. For other decryption queries, B can apply
the decryption oracle of the underlying PKE scheme. Finally,A outputs the guessing bit, and
B also outputs the same bit as the guessing bit of the IND-CCA game. 
6.4.3 Concrete Construction
6.4.3.1 Construction
In this section, we give a concrete instantiation of RPKE. From the viewpoint of eciency,
we apply BB [BB08] and BBS+ [ASM06, BBS04, FI06] signatures to implement Teran-
ishi/Nakanishi proof system. In addition, we apply an ElGamal type double encryption
DoubleEnc to implement the building PKE scheme.
In the following scheme, (g; g1; g2; g3; g4;Y1) is a verification key of BBS+ signatures
f(B j; y j; z j)gr 1j=1, (g˜;Y2) is a verification key of BB signatures fF1;kgb
p
Nc
k=1 , (g˙; Y3) is a verifi-
cation key of BB signatures fF2;kgb2
p
Nc
k=0 , and pkd = ( fˆ ; gˆ1; gˆ2; hˆ) is a public key of the double
encryption scheme DoubleEnc. For a plaintext M0 2 G0 and a random number u 2 Zp,
DoubleEncpkd (M
0; u) = (gˆu1; gˆ
u
2;M
0  hˆu). Other parameters are for computing NIZK proofs.
These NIZK proofs work for exponent in Zp so we need to encrypt M by fˆ M for some gen-
erator fˆ . Therefore, to apply this proving system to PKE, we require that a plaintext of the
building PKE scheme PEnc() is fˆ M , and the knowledge of M need to be proved from a
ciphertext PEnc( fˆ M) by using NIZK system. When receiver obtains fˆ M by using own skd,
receiver needs to solve the DL problem to obtain M from fˆ M . Therefore, as in Boneh et
al. [BGN05] and Okamoto et al. [OT08], we assume N is small with the condition that the
DL problem ( fˆ ; fˆ M) can be solved eciently (e.g., by using baby-step-giant-step algorithm
or Pollard’s lambda method with expected time O(
p
N)). For our purpose the lambda method
is particularly more suitable than the (for example) rho method. This is because the running
time of the former method is proportional to the square root of the size of a previously known
range in which the discrete logarithm lies, whereas that of the latter is proportional to the
square root of the order of the group. That is, if one previously knows that the discrete loga-
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rithm x to be computed is in a certain interval [a; b], which holds in the current context, the
lambda method requires roughly 2
p
b   a multiplications.
The concrete construction we propose is as follows:
MRASetup(1): Let (G;GT ) be a bilinear group with a -bit prime order p and e : GG!
GT be a bilinear map. In addition, let G0 be a DDH-hard group with the same order
p. Let H : f0; 1g ! Zp be a hash function for NIZK proofs. Choose generators
g; g˜; g˙; g1; g˜1; g2; g3; g4; g5 2 G, fˆ 2 G0, a signing key of BBS+ signatures X1 2 Zp,
and signing keys of BB signatures X2, X3 2 Zp, and compute the a verification key of
BBS+ signatures Y1 = gX1 , and verification keys of BB signatures Y2 = gX2 and Y3 =
gX3 . For k 2 [1; b pNc], compute SgSign0BB(k) := F1;k = g˜
1
X2+k . For k 2 [0; b2pNc],
compute SgSign00BB(k) := F2;k = g˙
1
X3+k . Output pkMRA =
 
p; e;G;GT ;G0;H, Y1, Y2, Y3,
fF1;kgk=1, fF2;kgb2
p
Nc
k=0 , fˆ

, and skMRA = (X1, X2, X3).
RKeyGen(pkMRA): Choose gˆ1; gˆ2 2 G0 and z 2 Zp, and compute hˆ = gˆz1. Output a public
key of an ElGamal type double encryption scheme pkd = (gˆ1; gˆ2; hˆ) and the corre-
sponding secret key skd = z.
MSSetup(pkMRA; skMRA;MS ): Let (m1;m2; : : : ;mr) be consecutive prohibited mes-
sages, m0 = 0, and mr+1 = N + 1. Choose a current serial number t 2 Zp.
For ` 2 [0; r], compute BBS+ signatures of three signed messages (t;m`;m`+1)
SgSignBBS+(t;m`;m`+1) := (B`; y`; z`), where B` = (g
t
1g
m`
2 g
m`+1
3 g
y`
4 g)
1
X1+z` , and y`,
z` 2 Zp. Output pkMS = (t; f(m`, m`+1, B`, y`, z`)gr`=0).
REnc(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;M): For M 2 MS , find the position j such that m j < M <
m j+1. If there is no such m j (which means M < MS ), output ?. compute 1; 1 2
[1; b pNc], and 2; 2 2 [0; b2
p
Nc], where M  m j = 12 + 2 and m j+1  M = 12 + 2
and find SgSign0BB(1) = F1;1 , SgSign
00
BB(2) = F2;2 , SgSign
0
BB(1) = F1;1 , and
SgSign00BB(2) = F2;2 from pkMRA. Compute c = DoubleEncpkd ( fˆ
M; u), and  of the
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following relations:
 = NIZK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(M; S 00; S 1; S 01; S 2; S
0
2; 1; 2; 1; 2)
: S 00 = SgSignBBS+(t;m j;m j+1)
^ SgVerify0BB(1; S 1) = 1
^ SgVerify00BB(2; S 2) = 1
^ SgVerify0BB(1; S 01) = 1
^ SgVerify00BB(2; S 02) = 1
^ M   m j = 12 + 2 mod p
^ m j+1   M = 12 + 2 mod p
^ c = DoubleEncpkd ( fˆ M; u)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Concretely, choose , 1;1, 1;2, 2;1, 2;2, u, 1, 01, 2, 
0
2 2 Zp, compute C1 = B jg5 ,
C2 = F1;1g
1;1
5 , C3 = F2;2g
1;2
5 , C4 = F1;1g
2;1
5 , C5 = F2;2g
2;2
5 , C6 = g˜
1 g˜
1
1 , C7 =
g˜1
2
g˜
01
1 , C8 = g˜
1 g˜
2
1 , C9 = g˜
1
2
g˜
02
1 , 
00
1 := 
0
1   11, 002 := 02   21, C10 = gˆu1, C11 = gˆu2,
C12 = fˆ M hˆu,  = z j, 1;1 := 1;11, 1;2 := 1;22, 2;1 := 2;11, and 2;2 := 2;22. In
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addition, compute
 = NIZK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(M; ; ; y j; z j;m j;m j+1;
1; 2; 1; 2; 1;1; 1;2; 2;1; 2;2;
1;1; 1;2; 2;1; 2;2; 1; 
0
1; 
00
1 ; 2; 
0
2; 
00
2 ; u)
: e(C1;Y1)=e(g; g) =
e(g5;Y1)e(g5; g)e(gt1; g)
e(g2; g)m je(g3; g)m j+1
e(g4; g)y j=e(C1; g)z j
^ e(C2;Y2)=e(g˜; g) =
e(g5;Y2)1;1e(g5; g)1;1=e(C2; g)1
^ e(C3;Y3)=e(g˙; g) =
e(g5;Y3)1;2e(g5; g)1;2=e(C3; g)2
^ e(C4;Y2)=e(g˜; g) =
e(g5;Y2)2;1e(g5; g)2;1=e(C4; g)1
^ e(C5;Y3)=e(g˙; g) =
e(g5;Y3)2;2e(g5; g)2;2=e(C5; g)2
^C6 = g˜1 g˜11 ^C7 = C16 g˜
001
1
^C7 = g˜ 2+M m j g˜
0
1
1
^C8 = g˜1 g˜21 ^C9 = C18 g˜
002
1
^C9 = g˜ 2+m j+1 M g˜
0
2
1
^C10 = gˆu1 ^C11 = gˆu2 ^C12 = fˆ M hˆu
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(Detailed NIZK proofs are described in the following). Output a ciphertext C =
(C1; : : : ;C12; ).
VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkd;MS ; pkMS;C): Output 1 if  is a valid proof, and 0, otherwise.
RDec(pkMRA; pkd; skd;MS ; pkMS;C): Verify the ciphertextC under pkMS. If the verification
succeeds, compute fˆ M = C12=Cz10, solve the DL problem ( fˆ ; fˆ
M), and output M. If
the verification fails, output ?.
If MS is changed (let MS 0 be a new message space), then MRA chooses t0 (t0 , t for all
previous t), and opens BBS+ signatures SgSignBBS+(t
0;m0`;m
0
`+1) for all ` 2 [0; r0] as pkMS 0 ,
where (m01;m
0
2; : : : ;m
0
r0 ) is the new consecutive prohibited messages, m
0
0 = 0, and m
0
r = N.
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6.4.3.2 Detailed NIZK Proofs
Here, we show the detailed proof  of our RPKE scheme. Concretely,  is computed as
follows. Note that all pairing values are pre-computable.
1. Choose rM , r , r, ry j , rz j , rm j , rm j+1 , r1 , r2 , r1 , r2 , r1;1 , r1;2 , r2;1 , r2;2 , r1;1 , r1;2 , r2;1 ,
r2;2 , r1 , r01 , r001 , r2 , r02 , r002 , ru 2 Zp.
2. Compute
R1 = e(g5;Y1)re(g5; g)
r rz j e(g1; g)t
e(g2; g)
rmj e(g3; g)
rm j+1 e(g4; g)
ry j =e(B j; g)
rz j ;
R2 = e(g5;Y2)r1;1 e(g5; g)r1;1 1;1r1 =e(F1;1 ; g)
r1 ;
R3 = e(g5;Y3)r1;2 e(g5; g)
r1;2 1;2r2 =e(F2;2 ; g)
r2 ;
R4 = e(g5;Y2)r2;1 e(g5; g)r2;1 2;1r1 =e(F1;1 ; g)
r1 ;
R5 = e(g5;Y3)r2;2 e(g5; g)r2;2 2;2r2 =e(F2;2 ; g)
r2 ;
R6 = g˜r1 g˜
r1
1 ;
R7 = C
r1
6 g˜
r001
1 ;
R8 = g˜
 r2+rM rmj g˜
r01
1 ;
R9 = g˜r1 g˜
r2
1 ;
R10 = C
r1
8 g˜
r002
1 ;
R11 = g˜
 r2+rm j+1 rM g˜
r02
1 ;
R12 = gˆ
ru
1 ;
R13 = gˆ
ru
2 ;
R14 = fˆ rM hˆru :
3. Compute c = H(R1; : : : ;R14;C1; : : : ;C12; pkMRA; pkMS; pkd)
4. Compute sM = rM + cM, s = r + c, s = r + c, sy j = ry j + cy j, sz j = rz j + cz j,
sm j = rm j + cm j, sm j+1 = rm j+1 + cm j+1, s1 = r1 + c1, s2 = r2 + c2, s1 = r1 + c1,
s2 = r2+c2, s1;1 = r1;1+c1;1, s1;2 = r1;2+c1;2, s2;1 = r2;1+c2;1, s2;2 = r2;2+c2;2,
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s1;1 = r1;1+c1;1, s1;2 = r1;2+c1;2, s2;1 = r2;1+c2;1, s2;2 = r2;2+c2;2, s1 = r1+c1,
s01 = r01 + c
0
1, s001 = r001 + c
00
1 , s2 = r2 + c2, s02 = r02 + c
0
2, s002 = r002 + c
00
2 , and
su = ru + cu.
5. Output C = (C1; : : : ;C12; ), where  = (c, sM , s , s, sy j , sz j , sm j , sm j+1 , s1 , s2 , s1 ,
s2 , s1;1 , s1;2 , s2;1 , s2;2 , s1;1 , s1;2 , s2;1 , s2;2 , s1 , s01 , s001 , s2 , s02 , s002 , su).
Next, we show the verification of the above . Note that all pairing values are pre-
computable, except the followings e(C1; g
sz jYc1), e(C2; g
s1Yc2), e(C3; g
s2Yc3), e(C4; g
s1Yc2),
and e(C5; gs2Yc3).
1. Compute
R01 = e(g5;Y1)
se(g5; g)se(g1; g)t
e(g2; g)
sm j e(g3; g)
smj+1 e(g4; g)
sy j
e(g; g)c=e(C1; g
sz jYc1);
R02 = e(g5;Y2)
s1;1 e(g5; g)s1;1 e(g˜; g)c=e(C2; gs1Yc2);
R03 = e(g5;Y3)
s1;2 e(g5; g)s1;2 e(g˙; g)c=e(C3; gs2Yc3);
R04 = e(g5;Y2)
s2;1 e(g5; g)s2;1 e(g˜; g)c=e(C4; gs1Yc2);
R05 = e(g5;Y3)
s2;2 e(g5; g)s2;2 e(g˙; g)c=e(C5; gs2Yc3);
R06 = g˜
s1 g˜
s1
1 C
 c
6 ;
R07 = C
s1
6 g˜
s001
1 C
 c
7 ;
R08 = g˜
 s2+sM sm j g˜
s01
1 C
 c
7 ;
R09 = g˜
s1 g˜
s2
1 C
 c
8 ;
R010 = C
s1
8 g˜
s002
1 C
 c
9 ;
R011 = g˜
 s2+smj+1 sM g˜
s02
1 C
 c
9 ;
R012 = gˆ
su
1 C
 c
10 ;
R013 = gˆ
su
2 C
 c
11 ;
R014 = fˆ
sM hˆsuC c12 :
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2. Check c ?= H(R01; : : : ;R
0
14;C1; : : : ;C12; pkMRA; pkMS; pkd).
The security of the above construction is described as follows. A proof of the theorem can
be obtained with a similar way to the proof of Theorem 6.4 and 6.5.
Theorem 6.6. The construction has verification soundness in the random oracle model when
the q-strong Die-Hellman assumption holds on the bilinear group (G;GT ). The construction
is IND-MSR-CCA secure in the random oracle model, when the DDH assumption holds on
G0.
6.5 Alternative Constructions for Small Message Space
In this section we describe alternative constructions of RPKE, which is suitable for a small
set of permitted message space. Comparing with the construction in the previous section, the
constructions here have an advantage in terms of performance, when a very few message is
allowed by the MRA.
Such a small message space frequently appears in several application. Recently, Nuida
et al. proposed privacy-preserving database search protocols [NSA+12], whose search
queries consist of bit-string which is encrypted in a bit-by-bit manner (with some additive-
homomorphic encryption scheme). In order to protect the database from information
leakage, it is important to prohibit a (possibly malicious) client from sending a query which
encrypts neither 0 nor 1. These bit-by-bit encryption is also used in a dierent context.
One of the example is the non-interactive proof system proposed by Gorth, Ostrovsky,
and Sahai [GOS12]. The proof system, which is for circuit satisfiability, encrypts all the
assignments for the wires for each wire, and demonstrates that for all (NAND) gates, the
wires that are connected to the gate satisfies NAND relation.
The construction presented below is based on the OR-proof technique [CDS94], which is
able to prove that one of pre-specified statements are holds without revealing which state-
ments actually holds (in fact in a zero-knowledge manner). Utilizing this functionality, the
ciphertext of the scheme includes a non-interactive proof which shows that the encrypted
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message is one of the permitted messages, which are constructed by the OR-proof technique.
For simplicity we only present a construction for the single-bit message space of f0; 1g, but it
would be straightforward to extend it a more general message space.
The underlying intuition behind the OR-proof is that two (interactive) proofs for the two
pre-specified statements are executed in parallel in which only one of these proofs is in fact
performed with a real witness, while the other is simulated by the zero-knowledge simulator.
This feature is achieved by allowing the prover to control (part of) the challenge message.
The OR-proof construction, which runs two protocol instances in parallel, allows the prover
to control the challenge message of one of the two protocol instances, while the construction
gives the full control of the challenge message of the other protocol instance to the verifier.
This allows the prover to convince the verifier without knowing the witness for one protocol
instance, while it also enforce the prover to know the witness for the other protocol instance.
With this feature the entire protocol ensures that the prover (who convince the verifier) knows
at least one of the witnesses of the pre-specified statements.
The following RPKE construction proves the following statement using the OR-proof tech-
nique: given a ciphertext (C1;C2;C3) and a public key gˆ1, gˆ2, hˆ, and fˆ , there exists u (ran-
domness of the ciphertext) such that either
(C1;C2;C3) = (gˆu1; gˆ
u
2; hˆ
u fˆ 0)
(which suggests that the plaintext is 0) or
(C1;C2;C3) = (gˆu1; gˆ
u
2; hˆ
u fˆ 1)
(which suggests the plaintext is 1). In this way it achieves the functionality of RPKE
with message space f0; 1g. The components C1 and C3 constitute the ElGamal encryption,
while the component C2 establishes chosen-ciphertext security (in combination with the
zero-knowledge proof). The mechanism behind the chosen-ciphertext security is quite
similar to the well-known Cramer-Shoup encryption [CS03b].
MRASetup(1). Choose a DDH-hard G0 of prime order p of length  and a random element
fˆ 2 G0. Output pkMS = (G0; fˆ ;H) and skMRA = ;, where H is a hash function (modeled
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as the random oracle).
MSSetup(pkMRA;MS). As mentioned above, we here only consider the case ofMS = f0; 1g.
In this case the algorithm simply output pkMS = (m1; : : : ;mn). For a more general case
in which MS = fm1; : : : ;mng, it outputs pkMS = (m1; : : : ;mn).
RKeyGen(pkMRA). Choose a random integer z 2 Zp and random elements gˆ1 gˆ2 2 G0.
Compute hˆ = gˆz1 and output pkdec = (gˆ1; gˆ2; hˆ) and skdec = z.
REnc(pkMRA; pkdec;MS; pkMS;M). To encrypt M 2 f0; 1g, choose a random integer u 2
Zp and compute (C1;C2;C3) = (gˆu1; gˆ
u
2; hˆ
u fˆ M). Further compute an NIZK proof, by
choosing random rM , c1 M , s1 M from Zp, compute
RM;1 = gˆ
rM
1 ; (6.3a)
RM;2 = gˆ
rM
2 ; (6.3b)
RM;3 = hˆrM ; (6.3c)
R1 M;1 = gˆs1 M1 =C
c1 M
1 ; (6.3d)
R1 M;2 = gˆs1 M2 =C
c1 M
2 (6.3e)
R1 M;3 = hˆs1 M=(C3= fˆ 1 M)c1 M : (6.3f)
Then compute c = H(R0;1;R0;2;R0;3;R1;1;R1;2;R1;3;C1;C2;C3; pk). Finally compute
cM = c   c1 M and sM = rM + cMu, and output C = (C1;C2;C3; c0; c1; s0; s1) as the
ciphertext.
VerifyMS(pkMRA; pkdec;MS; pkMS;C). Compute
R00;1 = gˆ
s0
1 =C
c0
1 ;
R00;2 = gˆ
s0
2 =C
c0
2 ;
R00;3 = hˆ
s0=Cc03 ;
R01;1 = gˆ
s1
1 =C
c1
1 ;
R01;2 = gˆ
s1
2 =C
c1
2 ;
R01;3 = hˆ
s1=(C3= fˆ )c0 ;
then verify whether the equation c0 + c1 = H(R00;1;R
0
0;2;R
0
0;3;R
0
1;1;R
0
1;2;R
0
1;3;C1;C2;C3;
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pk) holds.
RDec(pkMRA; pkdec; skdec;MS; pkMS;C). Verify the ciphertext as above, and output ? if the
verification fails. Otherwise compute C3=Cz1 and output 0 if it is equal to 1, output 1 if
equal to fˆ , otherwise output ?.
In the above construction, Eqs. (6.3) show how the OR-proof is constructed. Eqs. (6.3a)-
(6.3c) is computing the proof with the real witness u, whereas Eqs. (6.3d)-(6.3f) is computing
the simulated proof without the corresponding valid witness. The relation cM = c   c1 M en-
forces the prover to arbitrary choose only one of cM and c1 M (in this case the prover chooses
c1 M by itself for a successful simulation), as the value c is determined by the output of the
random oracle. This fact is crucial for constructing a secure OR-proof. More concretely, the
fact that the prover can control c1 M allows the prover to construct the simulated proof, and
the fact that the prover cannot control cM ensures soundness (the property that no adversar-
ial provers cannot construct a proof that passes the verification for a ciphertext that encrypts
neither 0 nor 1).
Security of this construction is described as below.
Theorem 6.7. The construction has verification soundness in the random oracle model. Pro-
vided the DDH assumption, the construction is IND-MSR-CCA secure in the random oracle
model.
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Part IV
Conclusion

Chapter 7
Conclusion
The thesis consists of the following two contributions:
(I) Providing guidelines for constructing new cryptographic primitives, and
(II) providing a more comprehensive approach for detecting overlooked threats.
In particular, we presented the following four example of the above approach. As contri-
butions from the viewpoint (II), Chap. 3 and Chap 6 proposed two new security notion and
extension of cryptographic primitives. Chap. 3 showed that a new security notion for group
signature is obtained from a security notion (and its corresponding security notion) for public-
key encryption called PKENO, while Chap. 6 showed that a new extension of public-key
encryption is obtained from an extension of group signature called revocable group signa-
ture. In addition, from the viewpoint (I), Chap. 4 showed a necessity condition for obtaining
a group signature scheme with the new security notion by presenting a generic construction
of cryptographic primitives. Finally, Chap. 5 showed that a slightly dierent extension of
public-key encryption called threshold encryption, is in fact tightly related to the PKENO
extension.
In particular, our approach is providing guidelines for designing cryptographic schemes
by showing generic constructions of some primitive with some security notions from other
primitive(s) with other security notions. The existence of such a generic construction not only
shows that it is sucient to construct the latter primitives for obtaining the former scheme,
– 149 –
but also shows that it is unavoidable to rely on an complexity theoretic assumption strong
enough to construct the latter primitives. In other words, the generic construction suggests
that the latter primitives themselves can be a crucial building block for the former primitive.
In addition, when one tries to obtain such a generic construction, it might be possible that
there are no known security notions for some primitive that exactly corresponds to the security
notion of the other primitive. In that case one can define a new security notions to complement
the correspondence. We argued that such a new security notion can capture some overlooked
practical threats, as the corresponding old security notion is defined to capture some natural
and practical threats.
Following these approach, this thesis present the following contributions.
In Chap. 3, we identified the relationship between an extension of public-key encryption
called PKENO and an anonymous authentication primitive called group signature. There
exists an relationship between group signature and public-key encryption [BMW03, BSZ05,
AW04, OFHO09], in which the CCA security for public-key encryption roughly corresponds
to the anonymity notion for group signature. However, there had been no known notions
for group signature that corresponds to the security notions achieved by PKENO, and thus
we defined this as opening soundness. We further discussed on the practical importance
of opening soundness, and present concrete scenarios in which opening soundness serves a
crucial role. We also presented group signature schemes with opening soundness, relying on
techniques used in the PKENO context. These constructions of group signature with opening
soundness do not fall into the category of generic construction in the exact sense. Providing
such a generic construction is one of the interesting research topics.
In Chap. 4, we showed that it is essentially unavoidable to use PKENO for constructing a
group signature scheme with opening soundness. It was showed by following our approach
(I), that is, we showed that any group signature scheme with opening soundness can be gener-
ically transformed to a secure PKENO scheme.
In Chap. 5, we showed that any secure PKENO scheme can be transformed to a robust
threshold encryption scheme. The other direction, a generic construction of PKENO from
robust threshold encryption, was already shown by Galindo et al.[GLF+10], but that direction
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was not clearly and rigorously stated ever. This result establishes an equivalence between
PKENO and threshold encryption in a rigorous sense (although an informal similarity was
already observed by several authors), and presents useful suggestion for constructing practical
PKENO and threshold encryption schemes.
In Chap. 6, we extended the relationship between group signature and public-key encryp-
tion to revocable group signature. Following the viewpoint (II), we obtained a new extension
of public-key encryption, which corresponds to revocable group signature, called restrictive
public-key encryption. Furthermore, we also presented an ecient construction of restrictive
public-key encryption scheme, using techniques of revocable group signature. Unfortunately,
as in Chap. 3, this construction is not a generic construction in a rigorous sense. It is another
interesting open problem for investigating possibility of a generic construction of restrictive
public-key encryption from revocable group signature.
This research contributes, by the aforementioned results, to clarifying the relationship
between various sophisticated cryptographic primitives, namely, PKENO, group signature,
threshold encryption, revocable group signature, and restrictive public-key encryption, and
to providing useful guidelines for constructing ecient schemes of these primitives. We can
expect the same approach is promising for clarifying relationships of more other primitives
and for providing guidelines to construct ecient schemes of these primitives.
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